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vAbstract
Architectural Emptiness:
On a reinterpretation of the architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of 
dwelling.
This thesis reinterprets the architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of 
dwelling. In particular it stresses the importance of the concept of poetry on dwelling 
that was outlined in ‘... Poetically Man Dwells ...’. This essay from Heidegger’s late 
period has been less frequently quoted in the literature of the architectural profession 
than some of Heidegger’s more well known essays. The importance of poetry 
is developed in this thesis through creative practice explorations of Heidegger’s 
philosophy supplemented by deep textual analysis.
By developing Heidegger’s concept of poetic dwelling, it is possible to reinterpret 
his ideas about building in richer ways than have previously been carried out in 
architecture. We will discover that space has a particular kind of emptiness that allows 
for poetic experience. Ways of building that manifest this emptiness can be considered 
building for dwelling. 
The focus on poetic dwelling unravels previous architectural interpretations of 
Heidegger’s concept of dwelling. These interpretations tend to focus on the creation 
of a certain type of product rather than on enabling the poetic dwelling process. 
Consequently, by shifting this understanding of dwelling new links can be suggested 
to the work of architectural writers and practitioners who hitherto have not been 
considered to be Heideggerian.
1Introduction - Architectural Emptiness
On a reinterpretation of the architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling.
2Preface
This thesis reinterprets the architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of 
dwelling. This reinterpretation is developed through a study of Heidegger’s essays 
on dwelling in conjunction with an analysis of spatial experiences through creative 
practices. These creative practices explore philosophical concepts through an 
architectural lens. These are two disciplines that are perhaps more closely related than 
might at fi rst seem. Although it is true that philosophy is often thought of as being 
about ideas and architecture about space, when we think of the philosophy of place and 
particularly the feeling of being at home, the mental and the spatial cohabit. We can 
extend this to the feeling of belonging in any place, thus all architecture can, to some 
extent, be seen as an exercise in philosophy. Additionally, exploring philosophical 
concepts through observations of the physical world can give form to ideas, deepening 
the potential to critique and develop them.
As we shall see in Chapter One, Heidegger’s primary focus in his later period of work 
was with the problem of a feeling of homelessness. In the wake of the post WWII 
housing shortages he perceived an increasing sense of alienation from place due to 
rapid technological and societal changes. His essays on dwelling are a call to remember 
the ways in which we relate to places and fi nd a sense of belonging, of home. For 
Heidegger, dwelling is a dynamic and continuous process of ‘being’ by which we bring 
places ‘near’ to us. However, his philosophy states that we no longer build as though we 
are dwellers. The way in which we construct buildings in modern times is, he writes, 
removed from the way that we mentally construct nearness to places. This disconnection 
means that we no longer concern ourselves with how we dwell in the environment. This 
gulf is, in his view, the root of our feelings of existential homelessness. 
Heidegger’s work on dwelling has often been discussed by architects. However, this 
thesis argues that his work is often misunderstood as a call for the creation of a certain 
type of product. This thesis is a reappraisal of Heidegger’s thought that stresses the 
importance that the concept of poetry has on dwelling. A focus on poetry emphasises 
that dwelling is an engaged, creative and ongoing process and the architectural 
Preface
3implications are that we should construct to encourage this. Poetry in the sense of this 
thesis is comparable to the creative act that we engage with when reading a poem. 
Poetry is lived rather than passively taken on board. Similarly our encounters with the 
environment should be seen as poetically engaged rather than passive.
In Chapter Two we will see that, with this idea of poetry in mind, it can be argued that 
Heidegger advocated a process of individuals building buildings for themselves, piece 
by piece, in response to their own dwelling. We will observe that Heidegger sees this as 
having occurred in the past in his example of a farmhouse in the Black Forest. However, 
we can develop the architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling 
further.
In Chapter Three this thesis argues that the impact of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling 
is that environments with a particular type of emptiness more fully allow potential 
for our poetic dwelling process. This new observation connects various architectural 
practitioners and theorists to Heidegger who might not have previously considered 
themselves Heideggerian.
Preface
4Setting the scene: the Chapel of Notre Dame du Haut, a tent, and a bus shelter
The feeling of belonging in a place is one that transcends objective measurements 
of spaces. My interest in experiences in architecture that were in some way 
supersensible, such as this feeling of belonging in place, began several years before the 
commencement of this research. 
As an architecture student I had found the challenge of designing a place that was 
intended to foster belonging fascinating. I was required to consider my own experiences 
in meaningful places and use these in the design of imagined constructions. Edward 
Relph phrases it well, writing that a study of ‘place’ is useful in and of itself and as a 
means for manufacturing new places. “There are two major reasons for attempting to 
understand the phenomenon of place.” He suggests,
First, it is interesting in its own right as a fundamental expression of man’s 
involvement in the world; and second, improved knowledge of the nature of 
place can contribute to the maintenance and manipulation of existing places 
and the creation of new places. (Relph. 1976. 44)
It seemed self-evident that the places in which I felt a sense of belonging were not 
experienced as such only due to their qualities but also due to my own experiences, 
memories, and associations. I wondered how architecture can aid one’s feeling of 
belonging when this seems so particular to the individual. A few examples from a trip 
I once took, a cycle pilgrimage to Le Corbusier’s chapel of Notre Dame du Haut near 
Ronchamp in France, can be used to illuminate this. 
Setting the scene: the Chapel of Notre Dame du Haut, a tent, and a bus shelter
5Figs 1 & 2: (Williams. 2013). Beautiful moments in the environment. Sometimes a sense of belonging in a place 
comes unbidden and unexpected. It can be more to do with the moment, one’s own particular state of mind, and 
whatever subtleties of spatial perception, than with the space itself as an objective entity.
The French language expresses the idea of belonging to a place with the word ‘pays’ which means more than its basic 
translation to our word ‘country’. As Graham Robb writes in his book of French travel and history The Discovery of 
France, the word refers,
to the tangible, ancestral region that people thought of as their home. A pays was the area in which 
everything was familiar: the sound of the human voice, the orchestra of birds and insects, the 
choreography of winds and the mysterious confi gurations of trees, rocks and magic wells. [...] To 
someone with little experience of the world, the pays could be measured in fi elds and furrows. To a 
person far from home, it might be a whole province. (Robb. 2007. 28)
Place, belonging, knowledge and perception, are linked in this concept of pays. While I was travelling through France 
I was continually fi nding places in which I felt at home and others in which I felt like an outsider. 
Setting the scene: the Chapel of Notre Dame du Haut, a tent, and a bus shelter
6Le Corbusier’s chapel sits atop a large hill in the French countryside. It is regarded as 
one of the greatest accomplishments of Le Corbusier’s career and has been described 
as “one of the twentieth century’s greatest sacred structures” (Foges. 2011. 36). Sarah 
Menin and Flora Samuel note in Nature and Space that in this chapel Le Corbusier 
“sought to engender a feeling of bodily wellbeing, which would in turn be spiritually 
uplifting” (Menin & Samuel. 2003. 106). This is manifest in the unearthly atmosphere 
of the chapel’s interior. Of his experience there Steven Holl writes, “It was completely 
silent inside, except for the crackling of candles, all of which were mysteriously aglow. 
[...] The red light that fi ltered down from the nave, had a different type of light captured 
by 22m half-dome scoops.” (Holl. 1994. 123-124). I was lucky enough to be there in 
a thunderstorm. Sitting inside in peace and contentment I was aware of the changing 
light quality outside as clouds passed overhead. The few people inside looked around 
suddenly at each instance of changing light. I was aware of rain hammering on the 
fl agstones outside and the hot, wet, smell. A fl ash of lightning illuminated the space at 
the foot of a light scoop and thunder rolled around the surrounding landscape. 
This was a beautiful moment in one of the world’s most highly acclaimed buildings. 
It invigorated my passion for what architecture can be capable of and how it can 
affect one’s emotions. However, after this I became unsatisfi ed with other works 
of architecture that were equally highly acclaimed. Mies van der Rohe’s Neue 
Nationalgalerie in Berlin, which I visited shortly after, conjured no such feelings of 
belonging on the particular moment I visited. I saw it simply as a keen architectural 
game. Its elemental display of the constituent parts of architecture - plinth, supports, 
and roof - didn’t touch me in any emotional way and as such for me in that moment 
remained hollow.1 Equally, I visited Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish museum, also in 
Berlin, and was unmoved. Whereas the chapel at Ronchamp had been an experience of 
belonging in a place, this museum, full of its own symbolism and discussed more fully 
in Chapter Three, to me felt exclusionary.
1 It should of course be noted that this was equally a personal reaction to the building and is not, of course, to 
say that others are not profoundly moved by it.
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7Top - Fig 3: (Williams. 2013). 
The inside of the chapel. Etherial 
lighting seduces the viewer and 
reverberant acoustics amplify 
footsteps constructing an 
atmosphere of quietude. 
Bottom - Fig 4: (Williams. 2013). 
Light scoops from the outside. 
Facing different directions the light 
inside shifts from corner to corner 
of the space.
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8While I was travelling towards this chapel near Ronchamp two other spatial experiences 
stand out in my memory as formative of my architectural interests, though it look longer 
for me to recognise their importance.
I was at that time either camping wild or in the many designated campsites in rural 
France. I began to notice an unforeseen relationship and fondness for my tent’s interior. 
Despite being in a different location each night the place of ‘inside the tent’ became 
my home wherever the ‘outside the tent’ happened to be. Each evening this heterotopic 
place would be created, infl ating into the world, claiming a volume of space and 
redefi ning it in a different way that I found familiar and knowable. In the mornings it 
would be deconstructed, packaged in its bag and, like the memories of it that I held, 
would be carried with me till its next incarnation. 
Setting the scene: the Chapel of Notre Dame du Haut, a tent, and a bus shelter
Figs 5 & 6: (Williams. 2013). My bike and my tent, both movable places that, in a country in which I did not belong, 
became my home. 
9At around the same time, an experience very similar to the peace and belonging I felt 
in the chapel occurred in a very different setting. Whilst cycling one day I was almost 
caught by a thunderstorm that rolled over the landscape behind me on a previously 
pleasant day. With the fi rst raindrops brushing my shoulders I managed to reach a small 
village and took refuge in a concrete bus shelter. On the edge of danger but just safe 
from the storm I watched uplifted in awe by the thunderstorm in front of me. The rain 
pounded down and the gutters overfl owed. Safe in the shelter I waited till the storm 
passed and the water drained away. 
These experiences illustrate the diffi culty of discussing supersensible experiences such 
as the phenomenon of belonging in a place if we limit ourselves to only considering 
architectural examples. Neither the bus shelter nor my tent - both of which I found to be 
emotionally stimulating in a manner equally as profound as my experience at the chapel 
- are, according to general architectural discourse, to be considered ‘architecture’ at all. 
Fig 7: (Williams. 2013). A section of a storm experienced from what has become to be seen, in my mind, as my bus 
stop. 
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This raised an interesting question for me about the nature of what to consider as 
architectural and how we should value experiences in spaces.
Nikolaus Pevsner suggested a hierarchical distinction between architecture and 
building. He begins his An Outline of European Architecture by saying “A bicycle 
shed is a building; Lincoln Cathedral is a piece of architecture.” This might at fi rst 
seem to be true, and with good reason, Lincoln Cathedral is beautiful. He goes on, 
“Nearly everything that encloses space on a scale suffi cient for a human being to 
move in is a building; the term architecture applies only to buildings designed with a 
view to aesthetic appeal.” (Pevsner. 1943. 15). In light of my observations about the 
bus shelter (a building) and my tent home (not even a building) this, to me, seemed 
an impoverished view of the environment. If an experience of fi nding refuge - surely 
a primary impulse in the evolution of architecture - such as I felt in the bus shelter 
is not considered ‘architecture’ at all, then surely there is a fl aw in our conception of 
architecture. Or at the very least our concept of architecture is less rich than it could be. 
And if a feeling of a home - another primal architectural impulse - could be found in 
a placeless object such as my tent but at the same time not deemed worthy of the title 
‘architecture’ I decided that my architectural study of belonging in place needed to be 
broadened from a study of the architectural object to a study of spatial experiences. 
For this reason, this thesis studies real world spatial practices rather than just 
architectural theory. This includes the realm of architecture but also of day to day 
experiences in space. That which affects one’s journey through space is considered 
as having interesting merit. In my thinking, then, and in my research, both Pevsner’s 
cathedral and bicycle shed (or indeed, my bus shelter), come to be seen as equally 
valued sources of spatial insight. Similarly my use of fi rst person examples through this 
thesis is unapologetic. In order to describe moments of belonging and the immeasurable 
qualities of fi rst-hand experience, from time to time I rely necessarily on fi rst person 
narrative.
Setting the scene: the Chapel of Notre Dame du Haut, a tent, and a bus shelter
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A brief outline of Heidegger’s infl uence
In beginning this thesis I therefore had an existing interest in experiences of spaces, in a 
heightened awareness of the world, and in a feeling of belonging in places. 
From the sense of belonging in the moment found in the above examples it was a short 
step to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Although having a career spanning fi ve 
decades it was particularly his later work in the early 1950’s on dwelling and place that 
deepened my appreciation and understanding of being in the world. This is the point 
at which this thesis really begins. I began to study my experiences in space through 
a Heideggerian lens using sketches, montages, and models. This was a process of 
understanding my feeling of belonging in places and of deepening my understanding of 
Heidegger’s texts, a process that will be discussed in detail in Chapter One. My work 
celebrates the feeling of belonging in place and the way we construct this in our minds. 
Any discussion of places, particularly one concerned with subjective experience 
rather than objective measurement, must include reference to Heidegger at some 
point. Stephen Mullhall in the BBC radio 4 series In Our Time: Greatest Philosopher 
advocated Heidegger’s position as the greatest philosopher of all time due to his 
infl uence of “putting human beings fi rmly back in the natural world without reducing 
them to it.” In Heidegger’s unifying worldview we do not exist as separate entities 
from the world. This rejects what Mullhall sees as the increasing tendency toward the 
categorisation of things. In addition, his effect on philosophy was to “reject [...] the 
accelerating decomposition of philosophy into its separate branches.” This similarly 
served to unify the already existing categorisation of parts and subsequently, Mullhall 
states, changed the philosophical map of the second half of the 20th century (Mullhall. 
2005).
Consequently Heidegger’s work, particularly his early work in Being and Time has 
infl uenced the fi eld of philosophy to such an extent that Edward S. Casey in his book 
The Fate of Place, puts Heidegger alongside Aristotle as key to the philosophical 
understanding and discussion of place (Casey. 1997. ix). George Steiner notes, in 
Heidegger, that Heidegger can be considered as “not only the most eminent philosopher 
A brief outline of Heidegger’s infl uence
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or critic of metaphysics since Immanuel Kant but one of that small number of decisive 
Western thinkers which would include Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, and 
Hegel.” (Steiner. 1992. 4). Some of his direct infl uences are listed by Steiner as the 
existentialism of Sartre that is explicitly infl uenced by Being and Time, and the work 
of Gadamer and Derrida who were each infl uenced by Heidegger’s textual interpretive 
ideas.
However, although some people hail Heidegger as the most important philosopher of 
the 20th century, others dismiss the value of his work entirely. It’s not just those who 
consider his philosophy to be tainted by his association with National Socialism who 
dismiss his work, although this does occur. Rather, as Steiner notes, although everyone 
agrees on Plato’s importance regardless of their adherence to his ideas, Heidegger’s 
situation is uniquely different. Some say that “His writings are a thicket of impenetrable 
verbiage; the questions he poses are sham questions; the doctrines he puts forwards are, 
so far as anything can be made of them, either false or trivial (Steiner. 1992. 4). Many 
others (Steiner notes that Bertrand Russel’s History of Western Philosophy omits any 
mention of Heidegger) ignore him completely. 
As we shall see throughout this thesis, particularly in Chapter One, although the style of 
Heidegger’s rhetoric is deliberately oblique his philosophy is one of a simple unifying 
message. We have, he says, in the history of Western thought often discussed what 
something is but have always neglected to ask what the nature of ‘is’ is. This leads to a 
position where everything that we think we understand is based on weak foundations. 
His philosophy places the individual at the centre of the world and states that one’s 
subjective appreciation of being is the most important factor in determining what is. 
Our own perception is consequently, not simply something fl avouring an otherwise 
objective reality. Instead our own perception is what is real and the viewing of the world 
as science does is an abstraction, a useful tool. His philosophy is one that unifi es rather 
than categorises, everything exists within one’s perceptual realm.
A brief outline of Heidegger’s infl uence
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Heidegger’s concept of dwelling, which is the major focus of this thesis, is a 
continuation of this paradigm-changing philosophy. It is a concept that has aided how 
we think about our place in the world and how we relate to our built environment. 
This work on dwelling has infl uenced academics and professionals in various 
disciplines. Heidegger helped anthropologist Tim Ingold form a different view of the 
way we understand the relationship that individuals have with their environments in 
Ingold’s essay Building, dwelling, living: how animals and people make themselves at 
home in the world. 
Infl uenced by Heidegger, in Ingold’s view “The most fundamental thing about life is 
that it does not begin here or end there, but is always going on.” (Ingold. 2000. 172). 
However, his concern was that much anthropological work contradicts this with a world 
view based on a mind/world duality. This duality, to which we will return time and 
again in this thesis, places humans on one side of a veil and the world on the other. It 
aids a categorisation-obsessed view of the world, as opposed to the analogue reality of 
life going on. Ingold breaks down the essence of this worldview stating that in essence 
it prescribes that “worlds are made before they are lived in.” (Ingold, 2000. 179). There 
is, in this view, always a world that is outside of us and we must go through a process of 
intellectual interpretation in order to have a relationship with it. There is always a screen 
between an individual and the world. Ingold suggests that in anthropology this leads to a 
confl ict between considering humans as part-organism, part-intellect. Simply put, Ingold 
sees the fl aw with the separation of mind and world in that it suggests that “the only 
way to understand our own creative involvement in the world is by taking ourselves out 
of it.” (Ingold. 2000. 173). 
One of the methods he uses to liberate himself from this problem is through reliance 
on Heidegger’s philosophy. For Ingold, it is Heidegger’s placing of the individual in 
the world as active agent, rather than as a separate receptor of a world ‘out there’, that 
permits a different perspective on our place in the environment.
A brief outline of Heidegger’s infl uence
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Heidegger’s placing of the individual in the world as an experiencing being helps Ingold 
to argue that what an individual creates - whether buildings, things, or memories - 
comes to some extent out of the relationship that they have with the environment. He 
says, “the forms of buildings arise as a kind of crystalisation of human activity within an 
environment” (Ingold. 2000. 186). This contrasts with a view that suggests one creates 
forms as idealised realisations of intellectualised intent. We will come back to this idea, 
that what we create in the world is directly infl uenced by our being in the world, again 
and again throughout this thesis.
A brief outline of Heidegger’s infl uence
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Heidegger used in architectural circles
Heidegger’s philosophy of dwelling has frequently been used in the architectural 
profession, and will be discussed more fully in Chapter Three. In some cases, as with 
Neil Leach’s Forget Heidegger, Heidegger is used in a pejorative sense. For others, such 
as Christian Norberg-Schulz, Heidegger’s work on dwelling forms a base on which to 
develop their own ideas.
With Heidegger’s emphasis on place in his later essays, it was perhaps inevitable 
that this work would be appropriated by the architectural community. “Responses to 
Heidegger were numerous,” writes Adam Sharr in Heidegger for Architects,
in writing from Christian Norberg-Schulz, Kenneth Frampton, Dalibor 
Vesely, and Alberto Pérez-Goméz, among others, and in building from 
Hans Scharoun, Christopher Alexander, Colin St. John Wilson, Steven Holl, 
Juhani Pallasmaa, and Peter Zumthor. (Sharr. 2006. 7) 
However, although Heidegger has been discussed much by architects, their focus is 
often not on the personal processes that form the focus of this thesis but on an inherent 
quality of space that can be accessed as inspiration for good buildings. It is always the 
product that is the goal in these cases, rather than the process. The following quote from 
Norberg-Schulz, who has used dwelling as a central part of his work, is typical:
A place is a space which has a distinct character. Since ancient times the 
genius loci, or “spirit of place”, has been recognised as the concrete reality 
man has to face and come to terms with in his daily life. Architecture 
means to visualise the genius loci, and the task of the architect is to create 
meaningful places, whereby he helps man to dwell. (Norberg-Schulz. 1980. 
5)
This focus is on fi nding the pre-existing essence of place and making this manifest 
in the building. Whilst bolstering architects’ claims for a privileged position in the 
building process, this undermines Heidegger’s essential understanding of how we dwell 
poetically. In any case one of the things that is unsatisfactory about referring to an 
‘inherent’ spatial quality is that it ultimately depends on the subjective response of the 
architect.
Heidegger used in architectural circles
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A slightly different interpretation by architects is through the use of tactile materials 
and designing rich environmental experiences. For instance, contemporary architects 
Stephen Holl and Peter Zumthor both quote Heidegger as infl uencing their work. 
Whilst these interpretations succeed in enacting a situation demanding of engagement 
that might be seen as dwelling, their focus is again on the building, not as process but 
as product. Thus, although they are offering a possible interpretation in building form, 
they are creating one that omits the most important aspect of Heidegger’s concept of 
dwelling, namely the importance of lived experience as poetic process. In doing this 
they enact, not Heidegger’s concept, but precisely the opposite: the split of the mind and 
world that Heidegger so rejected. From a position of detached intellect they apply an 
end product to the external world, stifl ing the potential for dwelling. 
Finally, Heidegger is sometimes used by architects aiming to apply a veneer of 
philosophical insight to a scheme. The 2008 RIBA Stirling Prize winner, the Accordia 
scheme published under Dwelling Accordia, references (without clarifi cation or 
exposition, presumably to add some intellectual weight) Heidegger’s “Only when we 
are capable of dwelling can we build; dwelling is the basic property of existence.” 
(Bradley. 2009. 19). Of course, the term ‘dwelling’ is in common use and is not owned 
by Heidegger. The book Dwellings - The House Across the World (Oliver. 1987), makes 
no reference to Heidegger whatsoever, so cannot be accused of misunderstanding him. 
However, the assumptions outlined above of genius-loci, product creation, and lazy 
appropriation, should be challenged. 
Heidegger used in architectural circles
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A reinterpretation 
A reappraisal of the architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling 
should not be dismissed. Although his work has been around for 60 years and discussed 
by many people we can still derive new insight from it. As George Steiner points out 
in Heidegger, less than one third of Heidegger’s writings exist in any defi nitive form. 
The rest includes unpublished work and various translations. Steiner states that as 
a result “any account of our judgement on Heidegger’s thought must, at present, be 
provisional.” (Steiner. 1992. 2-3). 
Additionally, it is clear that the problems of mass housing leading to alienation, as 
discussed by Heidegger in the early 1950s, are still relevant. We still build houses 
according to concerns other than the process of our dwelling. Consequently we still 
need to address our understanding of how to build to encourage our dwelling process. 
Furthermore, we can see inherent architectural problems that Heidegger leaves 
unexplored and unanswered in his texts. These are discussed further in Chapters 
Two and Three. It is therefore important to discuss a connection between Heidegger 
and architecture that accurately addresses his philosophy while acknowledging his 
reluctance to claim architectural prescription. 
In this thesis I will argue that by linking Heidegger’s thoughts with contemporary 
architectural theory we can develop from Heidegger’s view of how we dwelled in the 
past to how we might build for dwelling in the future.
This thesis aims to provide an alternative reading of the architectural implications of 
Heidegger’s concept of dwelling. It stresses the poetic nature of dwelling that Heidegger 
discussed in his less often quoted essay ...Poetically Man Dwells... This emphasises 
that dwelling, like the act of reading a poem is in fact a continual process of creation, 
of engaged involvement with the environment. Consequently this thesis suggests that 
if Heidegger is to continue to be used in architectural situations the poetic nature of 
dwelling should be recognised and brought to the foreground.
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In Chapter One Heidegger’s texts which are pertinent to the topic of dwelling will be 
discussed. The insights gained from these texts occurred through deep textual analysis 
but also through creative practice methods, particularly from sketches, montages, and 
models. These explorations through creative practice served to explore Heidegger’s 
texts in another mode - through experiences in spaces. These Heideggerian works are 
quintessentially about experiences in spaces. This relates directly to his assertion that we 
are in the world fi rst before any process of intellectualisation. It was the contemplation 
of these processes that illuminated the observation of dwelling as a continually ongoing 
poetic process.
Furthermore the process of creating these artefacts illuminated ways in which buildings 
could be built to improve our relationship with places. In Chapter Two an elaboration 
of the methods of building that Heidegger saw as occurring in the past will be 
explored. This, as with the creative practice artefacts, and indeed as with our dwelling, 
is a creative practice that occurs continually, always accumulating and changing. 
Heidegger’s example is a farmhouse in the Black Forest that stands as a palimpsest of 
the history of the families who have lived there. This will be explored as will an urban 
manifestation of this logic, as in a shanty town for example. However, this leaves a 
lacuna that requires further study. Building by dwelling in this way guarantees one’s 
dwelling in that process but doesn’t necessarily, in the form of the building, provide any 
guarantee of any future dwelling once the building process ceases. With this example 
Heidegger is only interested in the process of building the farmhouse, not the ongoing 
poetic process that may or may not occur in subsequent years and for subsequent 
owners.
Consequently, in Chapter Three this thesis revisits the nature of my creative practice 
artefacts to explore the ways in which they are, as artefacts rather than processes, 
conducive to encouraging dwelling, not just for me, but also for others.
This idea develops by drawing from Roland Barthes’s The Death of the Author, in 
which a text is determined to have more potential to engage with if we consider it as 
‘authorless’. Barthes develops the idea of a text’s openness to continual recreation 
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by re-reading. Relating this to some of Heidegger’s comments it will be determined 
that a particular kind of emptiness, found in what we will call a language of multiple 
fragments, is required in order to allow the dwelling we do as part of our being. This 
emptiness allows the dwelling process to continue unsuppressed. This observation 
serves to link various fi gures in the architectural profession to Heidegger’s texts despite 
their lack of awareness of this fact. 
The titles of these three chapters are: Heidegger’s Dwelling and Poetry; Building 
Buildings by Dwelling; and Buildings for Dwelling.
A reinterpretation 
A pictorial outline of the thesis including the three main chapters, introduction, and conclusion. Chapter One 
relates to Heidegger’s texts and my creative practice explorations of the same. Chapters Two and Three relate to the 
architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling as understood by this thesis. Chapter Two focuses on 
an extrapolation of Heidegger’s building ideas and Chapter Three develops an architectural approach that aims to 
compel one’s own experience of dwelling.
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Chapter One: Heidegger, Dwelling, and Poetry
An exploration of Heidegger’s texts on dwelling through creative practice 
Fig 8: (Heidegger. 1971). Poetry, Language, Thought. Front cover. Photograph (Williams. 2013)
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Chapter introduction 
This chapter is concerned with understanding and exploring Heidegger’s concept of 
dwelling.
This thesis will outline a way of thinking of the architectural implications of 
Heidegger’s discussion of dwelling that differs from previous interpretations. These 
insights came as a result of exploring Heidegger’s texts through focussed observations 
arising from creative practice. These creative works illuminated and embodied the 
fundamentally poetic nature of Heidegger’s dwelling concept that has hitherto been 
underrepresented by the architectural profession. Should the architectural profession 
wish to continue to use Heidegger as inspiration then this interpretation, more focussed 
on processes rather than products, should be understood.
The reason that Heidegger’s philosophy is being discussed here is its central relation 
to the concept of ‘place’, to built form and dwelling, and consequently to architecture. 
The discussion of dwelling illuminates the way in which individuals make sense of their 
feeling of belonging in places. Heidegger, more famous for his work Being and Time 
on the nature of being-in-the-world, believed that his career could be divided into three 
chronological periods. He said, “Three terms, which carry each other forward even as 
they mark the stages of the path of [my] thought: Meaning – Truth – Place.” (Casey. 
1997. 279). It is in this third period that Heidegger’s work on dwelling took place.
The book Poetry, Language, Thought consists of a collection of seven essays written 
in this latter, place-based, stage of Heidegger’s career. Each is chosen, according to the 
translator’s introduction, because in them Heidegger connects his earlier ideas of the 
nature of being to artefacts found in the world. These essays,
fi t together to bring out the main drift of his thinking that relates poetry, art, 
thought, and language to Being and to man’s existing as the mortal he is. 
(Heidegger. 1971. xxiii) 
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This chapter is concerned with those essays that relate to built form and dwelling. 
I follow the lead of Adam Sharr (2007) in saying that these are, Building Dwelling 
Thinking, The Thing, and ...Poetically Man Dwells... Each of these were presented as 
talks and published in the early 1950s. Hofstadter, the translator of Poetry, Language, 
Thought notes that, 
[Heidegger] is thinking always of the opening up of the possibility of 
authentic human existence—of a life in which man does not merely go on 
blindly, writhing in the grip of a basically false meaning of being, [...] but 
rather a life in which man truly dwells. (Heidegger. 1971. xiii)
It is the study of what it is to truly dwell that this chapter is concerned with.
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Heidegger’s philosophy has been of infl uence to a great many philosophers. Charles B. 
Guignon writing The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger in 1993 notes that “As the 
twentieth century draws to a close, it is increasingly clear that Heidegger will stand out 
as one of the greatest philosophers of our times” (Guignon. 1993. 1). He elaborates, 
His thought has contributed to phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty), 
existentialism (Sartre, Ortega y Gasset), hermeneutics (Gadamer, Ricoeur), 
political theory (Hannah Arendt, the early Marcuse), psychotherapy 
theory (Madard Boss, Ludwig Binswanger, Rollo May), theology 
(Rudolph Bultmann, Paul Tillich), as well as current postmodern and “new 
pragmatist” trends. (Guignon. 1993. 2)
Additionally, there have been various attempts to discuss Heidegger’s dwelling in 
architectural terms in the 60 years since he presented Building Dwelling Thinking for 
the fi rst time. His work here has been equally infl uential. As Adam Sharr notes in the 
introduction to Heidegger for Architects Heidegger was one of very few philosophers 
to write specifi cally for an audience of architects (Sharr. 2007. 1). Sharr goes on to list 
Zumthor, Norberg-Schulz, Pallasmaa, Vesely, Harries, and Holl each as “establishment 
fi gures [who] are responding in some way to Heidegger and his notions of dwelling 
and place.” (Sharr. 2007. 1). This book by Sharr and Pavlos Lefas’s Dwelling and 
Architecture (2009) shows the continuing appeal of Heidegger’s philosophy to the 
architectural profession. 
Heidegger’s dwelling is not about occupying a house but is a more fundamentally 
human experience of being. How the built environment can contribute to dwelling is a 
question that has had various answers. 
For Christian Norberg-Schulz, to be discussed more fully in Chapter Two, architects 
encourage dwelling by building buildings in keeping with local conditions. This allows 
one to more fully understand one’s location. For Peter Zumthor our dwelling can be 
enhanced through bodily interactions with sensorially stimulating environments. His 
buildings’ rich textures and materials ask us to engage with spaces.
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Whilst dwelling has been explored before by architects the interpretation of Heidegger 
provided in this thesis recontextualises dwelling into its poetic context. The focus on 
dwelling becomes the process of experiencing the environment rather than concentrating 
on products in the environment. To some extent this focus on process removes the 
dwelling conversation from the hands of the architectural profession, so it is not 
surprising that it has so far been underrepresented in the relevant literature. A discussion 
of Heidegger that points more to rules for building products is always going to remain 
more appealing to an audience of builders. This thesis discusses dwelling’s poetic nature 
and how we might build to encourage this process with the knowledge that it can never 
be guaranteed. Consequently, whilst some arguments will no doubt be familiar from 
other interpretations of Heidegger this thesis provides a new understanding of dwelling 
as a creative process. 
Heidegger’s texts alter our understanding of words such as dwelling, nearness, 
poetry, and building. Through this we come to see that the essence of dwelling is a 
poetic engagement with spaces, and that by continually constructing memories and 
associations in our minds we make places meaningful. Our dwelling is a poetic process 
of bringing places near to our hearts and this bringing near is a kind of building that we 
do continually. 
Fig 9: (Williams. 2013). For Heidegger we are always in our image of the environment. Our being is a fundamentally 
spatial phenomenon.
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These observations of Heidegger’s texts were made through close reading of his texts in 
conjunction with a variety of creative practices. These creative practices were intended 
to study Heidegger’s concepts through engagement in the world that refl ects a central 
focus of his thought; that a study of experience should begin with experiences. Through 
this process of creating his philosophy was brought by this thesis into a physical state 
and so became relevant for architectural discussion. Extrapolating Heidegger’s texts 
through physical examples and artefacts can alter the way that both Heidegger and our 
relationship to the environment can be understood. 
Frequently throughout this chapter I will attempt to illustrate Heidegger’s thoughts 
with examples and insights of my own. Due to the subject matter these necessarily 
have an autobiographical aspect. Dwelling is a subjective process. The subjective 
nature of dwelling was not seen as a barrier to the relevance of this research. Instead, 
the understanding of the subjective nature of what it is to dwell is a strength of self-
refl ective research methods. There is a long precedence for the auto-ethnographic 
method. Freud for example establishes an entire fi eld of enquiry on his refl ections and 
thoughts about his own experience.
The reasons for this practice-led research will begin this chapter. The area in which 
the study took place and the particular methods of sketch, montage and models will be 
outlined in the section Thinking by making. Following this, Heidegger’s arguments will 
be discussed in successive sections interspersed with portfolios of the creative practice 
that helped illuminate his philosophy. 
The section Dwelling will discuss that Heidegger’s focus on homelessness frames the 
importance of the need for a reappraisal of the state of dwelling in contemporary times. 
Heidegger’s methods will then be explored in the section Etymology of bauen 
(building). Heidegger here traces the linguistic roots of ‘building’ and ‘dwelling’ to 
‘being’, at which point this thesis briefl y explores Heidegger’s earlier work Being & 
Time (1927) for which he is most famous. 
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A discussion about poetry will make clear the importance of a lived re-engagement with 
space in the section Poetry. A portfolio of work including sketches and documentation 
of habitual walks will follow in which some of my experiences of the poetic will be 
discussed in the section Portfolio One - Experiences of poetry/Poetry of experiences. 
Heidegger’s diffi cult concept of the fourfold will be explored in the section Etymology 
of wohnen (dwelling) and the fourfold. Here, Heidegger’s focus on the perceptual rather 
than the abstractions of measurements is most clear. The building and preserving of our 
memories is seen to be the essence of dwelling. 
A discussion of the role of poetry in preserving the memories of experiences will follow 
in the section Preserving memories and perception. The exploration of this will be 
documented in Portfolio Two - Montages. 
Where we fi x memories we feel near to, in the same way that we can be ‘near’ to a 
friend who lives many miles away. The section Nearness to things will discuss this 
in more detail. These ‘built things’ can sometimes be regarded as ‘places’ in the 
architectural sense and those which are near to me will also be discussed. 
Heidegger argues that there is an essential emptiness to things that we are near to. It 
must be this way for us to ‘fi ll’ them with our personal interpretation, just as is the case 
with a poem. How this positions us as always inside something, never outside, will be 
discussed in the section on The emptiness of the jug.
An example of this poetic preserving of memories and experiences, building, dwelling, 
thinking, and being, will be explored in Portfolio Three - The preserving of Perth Road. 
Poetic preserving may be visualised in my creative responses but this section goes 
further and asks how the artefact aids the poetic experience of others as well.
In the chapters that follow, this theory and creative practice will be woven into an 
architectural discussion. Firstly by exploring Heidegger’s solutions to the fact that 
dwelling is being misunderstood and why this is often at odds with the way that the 
architectural profession conceives of building buildings, discussed in Chapter Two. And 
practice and theory merge when these two modes of inquiry meet in Chapter Three.
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Thinking by making
Fascinated by the idea of home, so clearly a physical entity but also with an emotional 
and philosophical depth that few other structure types possess, I began this research 
with a view that non-objective qualities of space were those that were most important. 
However, aiming to study these is inherently diffi cult. A magnifying glass focussed on 
this subject misses signifi cant details at the periphery. Specifi cally, there are memories 
and associations that dance on the peripheries of perception. In thinking about my own 
subjective responses, the reasons I feel at home are not quantitative, they are not due to 
the dimensions of the room alone. Gaston Bachelard puts it well when he says that,
the real houses of memory [...] do not readily lend themselves to description 
[...] All we communicate to others [about a memory of a home] is an 
orientation towards whichever is secret without ever being able to tell the 
secret objectively. [...] What would be the use, for instance, in giving the 
plan of the room that was really my room [?] (Bachelard. 1958. 13)
I was inspired by the work of architects who discussed the idea that there is a richness 
in architecture that transcends the measurable: people like the architect Peter Zumthor, 
for example, who writes “Quality architecture to me is when a building manages to 
move me. What on earth is it that moves me? How can I get it into my own work? [...] 
One word for it is atmosphere.” (Zumthor. 2006b. 10); or writers on architecture who 
emphasised the feelings of things, like Juhani Pallasmaa who states that, 
Standing barefoot on a smooth glacial rock by the sea at sunset, and sensing 
the warmth of the sun-heated stone through one’s soles, is an extraordinarily 
healing experience, making one part of the eternal cycle of nature. One 
senses the slow breathing of the earth. (Pallasmaa. 2005. 58)
Through these qualitative observations I was drawn to the idea of Heidegger’s later 
period philosophy. This work shares with architecture an interest in the subject of 
‘place’. The essay Building Dwelling Thinking was of particular interest and had been 
referenced by each of these architects. The idea of the word ‘dwelling’, so frequently 
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used in terms of housing, having a philosophical depth was something I felt unavoidably 
drawn to. In the title, ‘building’, ‘dwelling’, and ‘thinking’ are written without commas. 
This was not intended as a list but, intriguingly, a tripartite singularity. 
Heidegger’s texts seemed to imply that dwelling was something that occurred not only 
in one’s own home but also inherently concerned personal relationships with places. His 
work on being suggests that we are not an abstract intelligence perceiving an external 
world. Instead, we are always in the world before we analyse our experience of it. For 
Heidegger, this undermines the importance given, in Western society, to a dimensional 
view of space since this not only ignores aspects of embodied perception but through its 
totalitarian assertion of objective truth can serve to suppress the validity of experiential 
judgements. 
Consequently, Heidegger’s work alters the way we can think of our relation to the 
world. The world should, according to Heidegger, be understood in terms of our 
relationships to artefacts encountered experientially. This experience is not as a detached 
intellect engaging with a world ‘out-there’. For Heidegger, it is not that we are a mind 
and have a body but that we are a mindful body. This perceptual fl ip serves to demand 
that our encounters with the world are physical. In the body-fi rst mode of thinking we 
are always primarily perceiving the world as experienced. We experience the world at 
eye level and with kinaesthetic sensations in our legs, our balance, in our sensitivity to 
temperature and with all our memories and associations affecting what we perceive. 
Consequently any abstractions of the artefacts we encounter, measurement being critical 
amongst these, come as secondary. These abstractions in fact are a step away from lived 
experience.
Adam Sharr notes that Heidegger often used the idea of walking along a path as 
representative of thought. This path may or may not lead to a solution but along its route 
side branches might appear to allow one to alter course. Thought is therefore considered 
by Heidegger as a fundamentally experiential phenomenon. Sharr says that,
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For Heidegger, the scientifi c method of investigation which subjects 
an object to a system was alien to human experience [...] The scientifi c 
approach would, perhaps, be like exploring a forest by striking out 
according to a compass bearing. The compass suggests no attempt to 
understand how people have engaged with the forest intuitively before. 
(Sharr. 2007. 85)
Heidegger’s text was so clearly about the physical world yet his writing style is so 
convoluted that it is diffi cult to comprehend for the casual reader. Or perhaps as 
Theodor Adorno acidly states in The Jargon of Authenticity, in Heidegger’s texts, “[...] 
jargon overfl ows with the pretence of deep human emotion [...]” (Adorno. 1964. 6). 
In any case, in order to explore dwelling, the methods involved in this thesis explore 
my own sense of dwelling through a study of experiences carried out through creative 
practice. I was, like Edward Relph in Place and Placelessness, trying to “explore place 
as a phenomenon of the geography of the lived-world of our everyday experiences.” 
(Relph. 1976. 6).
Fig 10: (Williams. 2013). I used sketches, montages, and models as methods of exploring Heidegger’s concept of 
dwelling in places in which I dwelled.
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Through creative practice one is placed fi rmly in the world. This follows Heidegger’s 
texts that advocate understanding our fundamental in-worldness. Consequently creative 
practice is especially suited to this personal study of dwelling. A degree of this type of 
thinking through physical engagement was benefi cial as a complement to Heidegger’s 
philosophical thinking. This benefi t comes from the fact that although Heidegger’s text 
is strongly involved with the physical world it engages with it only through thought. 
The importance that Heidegger places on the lived experience suggests that a study of 
his texts through lived experience would be more educative than merely studying them 
as abstract, un-lived, theory. Whilst one way of exploring lived experience is through 
thought - this is after all the mode in which Heidegger worked - another method is 
through creative practice. In the context of this thesis creative practice is seen as a type 
of thinking that occurs through making. 
In The Thinking Hand, Juhani Pallasmaa discusses creative practice with a similar 
premise to Heidegger. Pallasmaa writes that in contemporary society we have become 
convinced that a disjunction exists between the mind and the body in the world. He 
argues for a connected understanding of the relationship between mind and body in the 
environment stating that “The senses are not merely passive receptors of stimuli, and the 
body is not only a point of viewing the world from a central perspective. [...] The human 
body is a knowing entity.” (Pallasmaa. 2009. 13. My italics). Once we begin to think 
of knowledge held through the body the distinction between mind and world becomes 
blurred. One walks up stairs without thought, it happens without any analysis of treads 
and risers. A stone weighs about as much in one’s hand as one might expect. In fact, an 
excess of conscious thought might serve to impede experience. The mind, therefore, is 
the body in the world, or at least one aspect of it.
When it comes to creative practice Pallasmaa continues, the use of a pencil, he states, 
“is a bridge between the imagining mind and the image that appears on the sheet of 
paper [...].” The act of drawing for Pallasmaa, it seems, offers a direct line to one’s mind 
unmediated by interpretation or spin. Through creative practice mind, body, and world, 
come together. The world is ‘seen’ differently in that moment and portrayed through 
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the work. “All art forms – such as sculpture, painting, music, cinema and architecture 
– are specifi c modes of thinking,” says Pallasmaa, “Creative work calls for a double 
perspective: one needs to focus simultaneously on the world and on oneself, the external 
space and one’s inner mental space.” (Pallasmaa. 2009. 19).
Creative practice entails a level of thought that demands engagement. One must by 
defi nition make something new. When carrying out a creative response with an agenda 
one’s observations cannot be ambivalently held because by externalising them they 
become illuminated. In the case of my work exploring my sense of dwelling, I was 
forced to ask how the creative practice was educative of my relation to space not simply 
representative of spaces. One might go so far as to say that the act of drawing, for 
example, can ‘draw forth’ attitudes and buried thoughts by making visible that which is 
repressed in other states. Consequently the resulting artefacts from this creative practice 
can be seen as exercises in exploring sensitivity to spaces. Creative practice in this 
context served as a mode of thinking rather than as a method of creating a product.
There is something inherent in the nature of making a physical artefact that 
demands thought and introspection. The process of using one’s hands entails a direct 
communication with the product. French art historian Henri Focillon in In Praise of 
Hands states that, 
Knowledge of the world demands a kind of tactile fl air. Sight slips over the 
surface of the universe. The hand knows that an object has physical bulk, 
that it is smooth or rough, that it is not soldered to heaven or earth from 
which it appears to be inseparable. [...] Surface, volume, density and weight 
are not optical phenomena. Man fi rst learned about them between his fi ngers 
and in the hollow of his palm. He does not measure space with his eyes, 
but with his hands and feet. The sense of touch fi lls nature with mysterious 
forces. (Focillon. 1934. 28)
It is the tactile experience of being in a space that is explored in the creative practice of 
this thesis. The quality of the artefacts was not, to begin with, considered as particularly 
relevant, what was important was the process of making them. The experience of 
thoughtfully making something by hand forces one to engage with the artefact. This 
engenders a relationship with the artefact that would never be possible if it were simply 
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given. Everyone can understand the romance involved with crafting a table or building 
one’s own home. These artefacts created in the course of this research, whilst never 
going to be considered high art, are for me embodiments of care and memory.
The creative work carried out during the course of this research formed the primary 
mode of thinking about dwelling. Insights gained through the process of creative 
practice, and refl ections upon this process, were developed in tandem with a close 
reading of Heidegger’s texts. Thinking through practice and thinking through theory did 
not occur in isolation from one another. 
I began to read Heidegger as saying that dwelling is a creative process by the individual 
rather than a passive reception of the space’s inherent qualities. Although places 
can be described in terms of their inherent qualities, perhaps their dimensions or 
colour, one’s nearness to a space is built through one’s experiences and does not exist 
entirely within the space itself. This observation begins a distinction between space 
as a product and as a process. On the one hand space is a product, a fi xed entity with 
qualities inherent and immutable. On the other hand, following Heidegger, we have 
individuals in space, fl exible and complex, accumulating space perceptions. Following 
this latter interpretation of space, we can see that instead of the built environment being 
dominated by architects, individuals are the makers and builders of the interpretation of 
the environment. 
Heidegger states that there is a gap in modern life between dwelling and building 
buildings, and by engaging with his texts in a physical way I hoped to begin to develop 
a method in which to bridge this gap. I began to pursue a self refl ective study of these 
ideas in the area in which I lived. This area would be my laboratory for exploring 
dwelling.
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By this point I had lived in Dundee for several years. Having recently moved into a new 
area, a study of how my feelings of home were experienced and how they developed 
seemed like the perfect opportunity to explore Heidegger’s philosophy. I was keen to 
see how consciously exploring this relationship would in turn affect it. 
The major access roads to Dundee consist of fi ve arterial roads leading to nearby towns. 
The names Arbroath Road, Forfar Road, Strathmartine Road, Coupar Angus Road, and 
Perth Road each refl ect their destinations. Perth Road begins at the edge of the town 
centre and heads west for several miles. The area along this road particular to my study 
begins at the university’s Matthew and Crawford buildings, where the architecture 
studios are, and ends at the Sinderins junction just south of the fl at that I had just 
bought. This section of road between the two points forming my habitual walk to and 
from work, consists largely of four storied, stone built, tenement buildings around a 
century old, with shop fronts at ground level and fl ats above. These shops form one 
of the satellite zones for grocery shopping from Dundee’s central hub. To the south of 
Perth road is the Roseangle area. 
Fig 11: (Williams. 2013). Dundee showing the Tay rail and road bridges to the south. The fi ve arterial roads are 
highlighted in red, the area of study, Perth Road, is highlighted in yellow.
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Looking at old maps reveals that the area was once made of ropework and mill 
buildings for Dundee’s jute, jam and journalism trades, interspersed with large houses. 
It is now a fascinating residential area consisting of a warren of interconnected streets, 
some still cobbled. The large gardens of the houses have over time been sold off for 
building plots but some still remain hidden behind large walls, secret gardens that only a 
very few ever see despite the heavy footfall on the narrow streets. 
The streets running downhill from Perth Road, through the Roseangle area, lead towards 
the Tay estuary. These are, from east to west, Westfi eld Place, Westfi eld Lane, Seafi eld 
Road, Seafi eld Lane, Thomson Street, Paton’s Lane, Step Row, Union Place, and 
Shepard’s Loan. Some of these offer spectacular views of the Tay and the famous Tay 
rail bridge, and to Fife beyond. 
Along the northern edge of Perth Road the line of tenements opens at several points into 
‘squares’ that offer respite from the urban enclosure. 
Top - Fig 12: (Williams. 2013). Perth Road, highlighting my home and my work
Bottom - Fig 13: (Williams. 2013). Perth Road, views and ‘squares’
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By exploring my relationship to this area through creative practice responses I hoped 
to more fully understand the way in which I dwelled there. The projects that follow 
consist of a variety of methods which can be seen as broadly psychogeographical. 
Defi ned by The Situationists psychogeography is “The study of the specifi c effects 
of the geographical environment, consciously organised or not, on the emotions and 
behaviours of the individuals.” (Ford. 2004. 34).
•
The process began in the most simple of ways, by walking into work each day and 
thinking about the area. This soon developed into sections, plans, and photographs of 
the walk that provided a survey of the area with traditional tools of the architectural 
profession. Sketching spaces in the area was carried out with the intention of focussing 
attention on aspects of the space through increased engagement. Photomontages were 
used to represent spaces in a way that could incorporate perception. Collages and screen 
prints of these montages were then used as a further layer of analysis. Finally models 
of the whole area were created, both as scale models with representative materials or as 
models that perverted the true form to convey my impression of the place. 
These various methods were used because I felt that a single viewpoint could never 
be enough to explore the richness of reality. Instead, by attempting to explore my 
perception of spaces through various attempts I was forced to look again and again 
at the same space, questioning and rethinking it each time thereby building on my 
Fig 14: (Williams. 2013). Photo series representing my habitual walk.
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relationship. Ideas were explored and explored again through repeated attempts and 
in different media. Each project was concerned with the whole concept of dwelling 
as it stood in my mind at the time, rather than about distinct ideas separated from one 
another. I found that the period of engaged contemplation during the creative process 
often brought about ideas that were not previously evident as my understanding of 
dwelling developed. 
This did not occur, however, in a neatly organised world of linearity but in a cyclical 
loop of initially interrelated ideas through which an intellectual path was necessarily 
traced in order to construct a cohesive argument. Through periods of contemplation both 
in creative practice and after the act, I attempted to situate the work – discarding some 
ideas, building others up – within my developing understanding of dwelling. 
I was, at this time, not sure how the creative practice would relate to the research: 
whether it would be a mode of thinking explored in an appendix; a site survey for a 
design project which I would later call the real work; or, as it turned out, a key step in 
developing the understanding of dwelling’s poetic nature.
What developed was an understanding of dwelling that focussed on poetic experience. 
This is a process of repetition and engagement. Through this work it was clear that 
the places on Perth Road were brought emotionally close to me. I began to understand 
that the place making we do every day as dwellers is a repeated process of poetic 
engagement, through which we accumulate memories and associations and construct a 
sense of nearness with places.
What I eventually realised was that my creative process mirrored the dwelling process 
and I was therefore enacting the process of dwelling in a physical fashion. This work 
would go on to become a bridge into the world of the physical from the way we dwell 
psychologically, discussed more fully in Chapter Two, that Heidegger had stated was 
unbridged in modern times.
With this creative practice in mind, at this point we should delve into Heidegger’s texts 
on the topic of dwelling.
Thinking by making
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Dwelling
The essay Building Dwelling Thinking (Bauen Wohnen Denken) was fi rst presented in 
Darmstadt, Germany on the 5th August 1951 at the conference “Man and Space” to 
an audience of architects, engineers and philosophers (Sharr. 2007. 36). In its densely 
packed pages Heidegger questioned the relationship that exists between people and 
spaces. He set out a deepened understanding of what it means to dwell that is based on 
being and building as processes. Heidegger’s aim with this essay was to make this true 
nature of what it is to dwell more prominent in our thoughts. 
For Heidegger dwelling doesn’t just relate to housing. The term ‘a dwelling’ was 
in his view a noun that represented a more modern, in Heidegger’s mind a lesser, 
understanding of a primal verb ‘to dwell’. The verb dwelling is for Heidegger  an act 
that we carry out continually, we are dwellers. Through dwelling we come to feel 
belonging in places.1 We have, he argued, begun to concern ourselves more fully with 
the noun form than the more important verb form. We are more concerned with the 
acquisition of buildings to house us than with understanding the process by which 
we come to belong somewhere. Bluntly put we are more concerned with houses 
than homes. This is, in Heidegger’s view, a reason for many people in contemporary 
society’s sense of alienation, what he calls ‘homelessness’. As with Heidegger’s 
earlier work, that will be discussed in due course, this act of dwelling is predicated 
on the observation that we are not separate from the world. We are not an abstract 
intelligence perceiving a world out-there. Instead, we are in the world fi rst before we 
analyse our experience of it and subject this experience to abstractions like measuring. 
Any judgement of the environment, including a study of dwelling, must begin with an 
awareness of this unity. 
1 A note on the translation of the text: Heidegger uses the words ‘Ort’, ‘Platz’, and ‘Raum’ in his text. 
Hofstadter translates these as ‘location’, ‘place’, and ‘space’ respectively. However the German word ‘Ort’ would be 
a better translated as ‘place’ since it better conveys notions of belonging and concern. ‘Platz’, in turn, is in fact closer 
to the English for ‘site’ or ‘area’. Following Adam Sharr (2007. 51) this thesis will use the term ‘place’ as meaning 
both ‘Ort’ and ‘Platz’. This is also in keeping with other English language traditions of Norberg-Schulz and Seamon.
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Set against the backdrop of post WWII housing shortages Heidegger emphasised 
‘homelessness’ as a key issue of concern. Ultimately this focus on homelessness comes 
as a result of what Heidegger saw as the widespread ambivalence with which we think 
of our being-in-the-world. 
He was not interested in physical homelessness. This problem would be solvable simply 
by building more houses, an issue that was already of great importance to the country 
at the time. In the mass housing and sprawling placelessness of post WWII Germany 
Heidegger saw no authentic human existence, no dwelling occurring. He discusses 
mass housing being built on a vast scale as consisting of houses that “may even be well 
planned, easy to keep, attractively cheap, open to air, light, and sun” (Heidegger. 1971a. 
144). These are of course important aspects but Heidegger’s fear was that they did not 
answer our need to dwell and in fact become all that is considered to be important, 
thereby stifl ing true dwelling. He goes on to ask rhetorically, “but – do the houses in 
themselves, hold any guarantee that dwelling occurs in them?” (Heidegger. 1971a. 144). 
Heidegger’s homelessness is a lack of feeling at home. This is a feeling of alienation, 
a distance between the individual and their environment that cannot be bridged by 
proximity. These were problems that Heidegger saw resulting from the large quantity of 
cheap post-war housing but remain familiar problems in today’s society. 
The main tendency toward this homelessness occurs, as Heidegger sees it, because we 
have lost concern with our dwelling, we have stopped thinking of the act of dwelling as 
being related to our being. Thus the philosopher’s concern was with the essence of what 
it is to dwell as opposed to the constructions of dwellings. 
Heidegger evidences a lack of interest in architectural style or solutions, his aim is 
instead to articulate the problem. He clearly notes that he “does not presume to discover 
architectural ideas” but instead that, “Enough will have been gained if dwelling 
and building have become worthy of questioning and thus have remained worthy of 
thought.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 158). 
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The problem of our dwelling is, for Heidegger, not the production of more buildings, 
but the truer engagement with the process of what it is to dwell, “the real plight of 
dwelling does not lie merely in a lack of houses. [...] The real dwelling plight lies in 
this, that mortals ever search anew for the nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn 
to dwell.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 159). Heidegger is saying that the reason that we become 
homeless is that each of us must concern ourselves with our own dwelling and continue 
repeating this mindfulness. This is something that is smoothed over and ignored by the 
focus on aspects of mass housing that are only well planned, easy to keep, attractively 
cheap, open to air, light, and sun. In actuality the relationship we have with our 
environment is never given to us fully formed, instead we are always learning, and re-
learning this. Heidegger says that we try to solve our homelessness with the acquisition 
of products, by “planning the whole architectural enterprise” (Heidegger. 1971a. 158), 
but this is always a misunderstanding of what it is to dwell.
One’s perception of places is changeable; somewhere that was once home can become 
semi-forgotten as we dwell somewhere else. We fi nd a feeling of belonging in other 
places after a memorable experience or an accumulated relationship. This can occur 
as much in a building called ‘a dwelling’ as it can in a factory or a public park but 
the relationship must be maintained through our engagement. We can see then that 
true dwelling must be in a fragile state, never fully attained but constantly sought. By 
saying that we ‘must ever learn to dwell’, it seems that Heidegger is saying that we are 
always slipping toward homelessness, disorder is always increasing and it is through 
the process of our dwelling that our perception of the world holds together. However, 
we have forgotten to dwell. Thus he identifi es dwelling as an act that each person must 
attain toward themselves. In order to combat one’s own existential homelessness one 
must give thought to the process of dwelling. “What if man’s homelessness consisted 
in this,” he says, “that man still does not even think of the real plight of dwelling as the 
plight? Yet as soon as man gives thought to his homelessness, it is a misery no longer.” 
(Heidegger. 1971a. 159). 
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The way we perceive places can be seen as a personal nebula of memories and 
associations that we superimpose upon spaces. We each perceive a different reality due 
to our individually unique pasts. Some spaces become close to us and we consider them 
to be meaningful places, others do not. This is ever changing, accumulating and eroding 
with each new experience. We keep on making places through our continued negotiation 
with them, making them anew with changes.
However, this is not to say that one’s particular perception of a space is any more or 
less ‘true’ than any one else’s, or indeed the objective measurements of the space. 
Individuals are not controlling the environment by building and preserving their 
memories in places, simply responding to it in the manner of a dweller. As is stressed 
throughout this thesis the anthropocentric impulse - to put humans on a higher level 
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Fig 15: (Williams. 2013). Through this research I have studied my changing relationship to a place through giving it 
thought in the form of walks, sketches, montages, and models. In the beginning Perth Road was a place that I did not 
feel any particular connection with. Through the series of projects however it has become a place with a particular 
series of individual memories and associations that I hold near. My homelessness in this place has been replaced 
with a feeling of belonging and a fondness that I had not thought possible. Rather than this occurring through the 
addition of a new building, an architect “planning the whole enterprise”, this occurred through my shifting perception 
of the area. Heidegger in Building Dwelling Thinking calls for individuals to concern themselves more fully with 
their own dwelling. “But how else can mortals answer this summons than by trying on their part, on their own, to 
bring dwelling to the fullness of its nature? This they accomplish when they build out of dwelling, and think for the 
sake of dwelling.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 159). Only in this way, with mental rather than physical changes, can one’s 
homelessness be reduced. 
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than the world which becomes their subject - is one that Heidegger’s philosophy rejects 
completely. We are always part of the world through our mindful body, never separate 
from it. 
The way that an accumulative building of images affects our unconscious mind is 
described by Freud in the introduction to Civilization and its Discontents. Freud 
provides us with an image of Rome, but not of contemporary Rome, nor of Renaissance 
Rome, nor even of the Rome of the Roman Empire, but of Rome throughout all time, 
overlaid upon itself with different buildings existing simultaneously (Freud. 1929. 7).
This serves as a model through which Freud sees the diffi culty of discussing the 
richness of the unconscious mind in simple terms, consisting as it does of layers and 
layers of experience, memory and associations. We ‘see through’ these accumulated 
layers of experience to a coloured perception of our personal reality. Where in Rome 
“... the Coliseum now stands we could at the same time admire Nero’s vanished Golden 
House.” (Freud. 1929. 7). In our mind the space before us contains all our previous 
Fig 16: (Williams. 2013). We perceive all out memories and associations superimposed seamlessly upon all space. 
For each person these are different based on their unique lives.
Dwelling
43
experience. Perceiving the world thus consists of one’s ineffable nebula of memories 
and associations projected upon all space. It is an ever changing and incomplete 
perception of space which allows for the potential of new experience. Every act affects 
the relationship with that place through additional layering.
Freud also develops an understanding of the weight that our memories and associations 
have on our perception of a space in A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis (1936). 
In this short letter he discusses an old memory that he has been studying. 
Once, when he and his brother were on holiday in Greece, they received an opportunity 
to visit the Acropolis. Oddly, before they agreed to go, they spent the morning dejected 
but neither discussing their feelings with the other. He describes two competing feelings 
when they fi nally arrived. Firstly he expresses the surprise that the Acropolis did in fact 
exist and was more than just images in books, “When, fi nally, on the afternoon after 
our arrival, I stood on the Acropolis and cast my eyes around upon the landscape, a 
surprising thought suddenly entered my mind: ‘So all this really does exist just as we 
learnt at school!’” (Freud. 1936. 241). Secondly, he realises with surprise that he had 
doubted it at all. His memories and associations altered the way that this place was 
perceived.
Fig 17: (Williams. 2013). We see through these layers and layers of perception to a coloured view of reality.
Dwelling
44
He traces their feelings of dejection earlier that morning to the fact that the opportunity 
was unexpected and tinged with a feeling of it being ‘too good to be true’. They had 
expected the confrontation with one of the most famous remnants of antiquity to be 
‘unreal’ since it existed, till then, only in books. Additionally they had had no time to 
prepare for this confrontation. Further to this he expresses that there was also a personal 
sense of repressed guilt for surpassing his father’s achievements, in both the extent of 
his travels and the extent of his education that allowed him to fully comprehend the 
importance of the Acropolis. This is a famous place, one that Freud was clearly aware 
of beforehand. The fact that his response to it could be so idiosyncratic shows to what 
extent our memories and associations play on our perception of any experience. If a 
place that has been discussed many thousands of times can be so personally affecting, 
other places must also be open to vast discrepancies in an individual’s perception.
Bachelard too discusses the weight of memory in our perception of spaces. His book 
The Poetics of Space delves into the ways in which we perceive signifi cance. For 
Bachelard places that are near to our hearts and changeable, breathing, entities. “It is 
a strange situation.” he says, “The space we love is unwilling to remain permanently 
enclosed. It deploys and appears to move elsewhere without diffi culty; into other times, 
and on different planes of dream and memory” (Bachelard. 1958. 53).
As with my repeated walks along Perth Road every day, the relationship we have with 
places is built up piece by piece and step by step through experience. It is a repeating 
process of engagement. I aimed to manifest this process in the artefacts. Each of my 
projects consists of another look, another iteration of experience. Step by step and 
project by project my relationship to Perth Road developed.
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Fig 18: (Williams. 2013): My own confrontation with Ronchamp that began this discussion was coloured by my prior 
knowledge of it and the fact that I had travelled so far to see it just as remarked by Freud. The fi rst day felt like an 
enormous let down due to the busy crowds and my own raised expectations. It wasn’t till the second day, under more 
peaceful circumstances that I was able to feel its incredible nature.
Fig 19: (Williams. 2013): Each refl ection on Perth Road added another layer of experience to see through, altering the 
way it was perceived each time. 
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Dwelling
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Asking “What is it to dwell?” Heidegger states that although we don’t term all buildings 
dwellings - his examples are bridges and hangars, stadiums and power stations - they 
nonetheless all belong within the domain of our dwelling. Therefore dwelling is not 
only to do with houses. All buildings belong in the realm of dwelling. Hinting that he 
means to elaborate on what dwelling’s true nature is, Heidegger says, “These buildings 
house man. He inhabits them and yet does not dwell in them, when to dwell means 
merely that we take shelter in them.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 144). This rhetorical style, so 
typical of Heidegger, implies that to dwell in fact means more than taking shelter. We 
can feel ‘at home’ in our house, but also in the places with which we have a relationship 
such as places associated with a fond memory. He lists truck drivers who are “at home 
on the highway”, the working woman who is “at home in the spinning mill”, and the 
chief engineer who is “at home in the power plant”. None of these people would call 
these places their dwelling place (noun), however they do dwell there (verb). 
Heidegger begins to elaborate. “Dwelling and building are related as end and means.” 
(Heidegger. 1971a. 144). It appears for a moment that Heidegger has settled on a 
statement: ‘we build in order to dwell’. However, as he goes on we see that their 
essential nature is yet more complicated, 
However, as long as this is all we have in mind, we take dwelling and 
building as two separate activities, [...] by the means-end schema we block 
our view of the essential relations. For building is not merely a means and 
a way toward dwelling – to build is in itself already to dwell. (Heidegger. 
1971a. 144)
For Heidegger, building and dwelling are not separate activities, nor is one purely a way 
to achieve the other. Instead they exist as mutually supporting experiences of being. 
The way that we are, the way that we exist in the environment, is a balance between 
building-then-dwelling-amongst-our-buildings, and dwelling-that-defi nes-how-we-
build. Adam Sharr gives a concise explanation of this with regards to a dinner table 
(Sharr. 2007. 41). He notes that the way a table is used can be a metaphor for dwelling, 
and setting the table is a kind of ‘building’ that is carried out in order to satisfy the 
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requirements of the diners. The way that people use the table, that is to say how they 
dwell with the table, is directly linked to how the table was set. But the way in which 
the table was set was directly linked with how the builder envisioned the dwellers using 
it. There was no means-end relationship since the processes of building and dwelling 
were linked. Sharr goes on to describe the idea that building a house is conceptually 
not too far from this process. As one’s requirements change one might alter the house 
to refl ect this. Similarly the arrangement of the house will defi ne how one lives. “To the 
philosopher, this would be the same activity as the arrangement and rearrangement of 
the dining table, but on a larger scale.” (Sharr. 2007. 42). This is an idea that we shall 
return to with greater focus in Chapter Two.
How Heidegger comes to know this entwined relationship between building and 
dwelling is through a study of language. “Who gives us a standard at all by which we 
can take the measure of the nature of dwelling and building?” he asks, “It is language 
that tells us the nature of a thing, provided we respect language’s own nature.” 
(Heidegger. 1971a. 144). In respecting language’s ‘own nature’ Heidegger believes 
that by tracing the etymology of a word we can retrace the original impulse behind 
its meaning, clouded and corrupted by time and misuse. Heidegger’s use of words in 
seemingly unconventional ways that result from his etymological studies was due to his 
desire to discuss more specifi cally aspects of experience that were hitherto not possible. 
This previous inability was due to the clouded and imprecise way that language is 
frequently used. By tracing the etymology of a word we gain insight into its roots, we 
glimpse where the word originated, how it developed, and in what context it was used. 
When Heidegger uses an etymological study of building (bauen) and dwelling (wohnen) 
he believes that this illuminates the original impulse behind these acts. Heidegger traces 
both words back to a relation with being. To build and to dwell are, he says, to be.
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Etymology of bauen (building)
Heidegger begins by tracing the etymological roots of the word building (bauen from 
the title Bauen Wohnen Denken). He says “What, then, does Bauen, building, mean? 
The Old English and High German word for building, buan, means to dwell. This 
signifi es: to remain, to stay in a place.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 144). 
Researching this etymology confi rms that the Old High German būan, from where 
bauen originated, means to build, as does the Old Saxon būan. Old English’s būan 
however means ‘to live or dwell’ and each of these comes from the Proto-Germanic 
būanan which also means to dwell. Interestingly the fact that ‘to dwell’ therefore means 
“to remain, to stay in a place” can also be seen in a contemporary English use of dwell 
(to dwell on a topic) and in the contemporary Scottish Gaelic use of the word buan 
meaning long-lasting and durable. Consequently, Heidegger argued, the contemporary 
German bauen came from words relating to building, dwelling, and remaining. Shadows 
of this connection remain in a few words like ‘neighbour’ which comes from words 
relating to “neah, near, and gebur, dweller. [...] the Nachgebaurer, the near-dweller, he 
who dwells nearby.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 145). However, apart from a few exceptions the 
link Heidegger made, he states, has almost completely been forgotten.
Fig 20: (Williams. 2013): An etymological diagram of the roots of the word bauen. Through his study, and elaborated 
by this thesis into Scottish Gaelic, Heidegger relates building to dwelling and to being. 
Etymology of bauen (building)
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Taking the exploration further, Heidegger says that we can fi nd out how this building/
dwelling relationship occurs. He traces bauen further to bin, as in, ich bin, I am. This 
tells him that we are always dwelling, as we are always being. Thus we can see that ‘to 
be’ also means ‘to build’ and ‘to dwell’. The three are linked as variations of the same 
impulse.
Heidegger’s linking of building to being is not intended to be read as saying “when 
one says ‘building’ one really means ‘being’” in a manner of sub-conscious word 
association. Instead, it suggests that in the evolution of language when a verb describing 
the act of ‘building’ originated it came out of a pre-existing verb meaning ‘being’. This 
implies for Heidegger that at one time humans related the act of building to the act 
of being. We are and we build. This fundamental use of building has been corrupted 
to the point where ‘building’ is understood as a particular act; we now express that 
one is either ‘building’ or ‘not building’ at any one time. Heidegger sees the value of 
reminding ourselves that we are in some sense building all the time, as we are dwelling 
all the time, as we are indeed being all the time, not as synonymous activities, but as 
quintessentially linked activities.
If we trace further the etymology of the word ‘būanan’ (to dwell) we see that it has 
roots in a proto-Indo-European word bhuh that means to become, to grow, to appear, 
so Heidegger’s assertion could well be correct. We fi nd that to build and to dwell are 
manners of being. He says “I dwell, you dwell. The way in which you are and I am, 
the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is Buan, dwelling.” (Heidegger. 
1971a. 145). To be, to build and to dwell, are verbs that we are enacting continually. 
No matter what else we are doing, we are always being, building, and dwelling. In 
contemporary times we think of the word building as solely a physical act but through 
this connection to dwelling, Heidegger shows that it was once conceived of as an action 
that defi ned our being. The noun, ‘a building’, came after this original impulse and 
became associated with the meaning, to build. The result of this is that all of the original 
overtones of ‘building’ as ‘dwelling’ and ‘being’ have been lost, “The real sense of 
bauen, namely dwelling, falls into oblivion.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 146). The problem that 
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this misunderstanding causes is, Heidegger says, that we never think of dwelling as “the 
basic character of human being.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 146) and so we do not act in a way 
that considers our dwelling as important. 
•
This connection of ‘building’ and ‘dwelling’ to ‘being’ links back to Heidegger’s earlier 
work in Being and Time. Various sources discuss this period, Steiner’s Heidegger (1992) 
for example, or Casey’s The Fate of Place (1997) which places Heidegger alongside 
other philosophers who have discussed the idea of place. For a discussion of this period 
of work with a creative angle, Mitchell’s Heidegger Among the Sculptors (2010) is a 
good example. 
Heidegger’s main focus in his earlier work was on the question of being. Despite 
the fact that we are surrounded by things we forget to question the fact that there is 
something at all. We do not study our being or take joy from the is-ness of things. 
The history of much Western thought makes it seem odd to even question this. How 
one conceives of the world is reinforced from all sides by a tradition of thought that 
discusses what things are, but not what is is. The question of being, in Heidegger’s 
mind, should be addressed by poets discussing that things exist, a celebration of the 
mindful, rather than a study of the matter of things. Aristotle stated that all things have 
both ‘substance’ and ‘attributes’: what something is, its substance, and a description 
of it, its attributes. But, although this now seems perfectly reasonable and obvious, 
Heidegger questioned the fact that ‘the thing is’, is also a statement that can be made 
that is neither about substance nor attribute. Similarly, concepts such as numbers are 
real and without inherent substance. Our emotions are real and without substance also. 
For Heidegger, a philosophy that didn’t discuss these is indicative of an impoverished 
world view. Heidegger’s observations can be seen as suggestive of an alternative 
way to conceive of our world view. In doing so he undermines thousands of years of 
post-Platonic philosophy arguing that the discussion is constructed of terms that are 
predicated upon a system that fundamentally misunderstands our being. 
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Heidegger’s work is predicated on the observation that we are in the world, 
experiencing it before we abstract observations about our experience into quantifi able 
data. This emphasis on the importance of our lived perception is key to understanding 
Heidegger’s philosophy. This idea dramatically re-imagines our world view from a 
perspective that places us as detached observers, objectifying reality. Mitchell in Being 
and Time states that, 
Heidegger explores the existential nature of Dasein (literally “being there”) 
as a being-in-the-world. This is surely a departure from the metaphysical 
tradition of objectivity and the idea of a self-present subject independent of 
the world around it. [...] Heidegger argues against the primacy of a detached 
or isolated subject that would regard the world around it as objects of 
scientifi c observation or investigation. (Mitchell. 2010. 3-5)
This is Heidegger’s paradigm shifting focus. We perceive the world before any process 
of abstraction. His philosophy explicitly places the individual in the world. As Steiner 
notes “To be human is to be immersed, implanted, rooted in the earth, in the quotidian 
matter-of-factness of the world. (“human” has in it humus, the Latin for “earth”).” 
(Steiner. 1992. 83). By considering our being-in-the-world Heidegger raises individuals 
from being subject to the world. Due to the fundamentally different conception of being 
that Heidegger outlines it is no wonder that his work has been appropriated in ways that 
do not fully fi t his ideas. Architects have attempted to use his ideas but do so from a 
position of detached intellect. If we are to reinterpret Heidegger’s theory we must join 
him down in the dirt of our being-in-the-world.
Marcel de Certeau in The Practice of Everyday Life echoes Heidegger in saying that 
“the everyday has a certain strangeness that does not surface, or whose surface is only 
its upper limit, outlining itself against the visible.” (de Certeau. 1984. 93). He contrasts 
this experience against the view of a city from a removed position, for instance at the 
top of a skyscraper where, the distanced voyeur “must disentangle himself from the 
murky intertwining daily behaviours and make himself alien to them.” (de Certeau. 
1984. 93).
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Any philosophical view that, like Platonic essentialism, or Cartesian dualism, or 
Kantian theory of knowledge, removes the individual from direct and immediate contact 
with the world is of no use to a study of our being. Heidegger uses the phrase being-in-
the-world to reiterate the fundamental presence of being.
As Steiner notes, Heidegger’s title Being and Time is a manifesto. Our being is a 
temporal experience. Investigating being was traditionally thought of, post Plato, as 
an investigation of immutable essence. This is a view of being that is constant. In 
Steiner’s words the search for being prior to Heidegger was “precisely a quest for 
that which is constant, which stands eternal in the fl ux of time and change.” (Steiner. 
1992. 78). But Heidegger places temporality alongside being. Steiner writes that, “We 
do not live “in time,” as if the latter were some independent, abstract fl ow external to 
our being. We “live time”; the two terms are inseparable.” (Steiner. 1992. 78). Again, 
instead of considering ourselves as separate from the world, living-in-time as it were, 
we are part of the goings on of the world. Any attempt to see something as having an 
immutable essence distances us from experiential judgement and the realisation of 
the fact that our being is temporal. It makes any being an “objective entity.” Steiner 
states that this view of the world, as consisting of objective entities and resulting in 
our sense of alienation, is seen continually throughout Western thought (Steiner. 1992. 
79). “This conceptualizing impetus edges [Western thinkers] away from the genuinely 
ontological to the merely theoretical, from immersion in being to a technical diagnosis 
of the concept of existence.” (Steiner. 1992. 79). For Heidegger this is unacceptable. In 
terms of our perception of a place, were were to only consider the theoretical we might 
overlook the infl uence that one’s real experiences have. Only through engagement can 
we understand our relation to reality.
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•
With the expanded concept of dwelling that relates to how we feel near to places. 
Heidegger elaborates on what it is that we are continually building as part of our 
process of being, “The making of such things [places that are near to us] is building.” 
(Heidegger. 1971a. 156). Thus building can be understood as the mental construction 
of memories that make places feel near to us. Heidegger extrapolates on this idea of 
making. This making is not the making of something physical but a mental construct. 
Usually we take production to be an activity whose performance has a 
result, the fi nished structure, as its consequence. [However, through this we] 
never touch its nature, which is a producing that brings something forth. 
(Heidegger. 1971a. 157)
What we are making, building, here is an ongoing experience of being. We make places 
meaningful to ourselves in our minds. Heidegger writes that only if we dwell can we 
build this relationship, “Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then do we build.” 
(Heidegger. 1971a. 157). We build places through our dwelling, our being. This is 
temporal, continuous, and accumulative, “building and thinking – belong to dwelling.” 
says Heidegger, “one as much as the other comes from the workshop of long experience 
and incessant practice.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 158). 
In doing this, we build our relationship to places. This, as we will now see, is a 
fundamentally poetic experience of engagement and recreation.
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Poetry
For Bonfi res
The leaves are gathered, the trees are dying
for a time.
A seagull cries through white smoke in the garden fi res
that fi ll the heavy air.
All day heavy air
is burning, a moody dog
sniffs and circles the swish of the rake.
In streaks of ash, the gardener drifting
ghostly, beats his hands, a cloud
Of breath to the red sun.
(Morgan. 1973a. 62)
The interpretation of dwelling that occurs in this thesis is one that strongly emphasises 
Heidegger’s focus on poetry. Reading Building Dwelling Thinking without reading 
...Poetically Man Dwells... could result in an appreciation of dwelling that does not 
fully understand its fundamentally poetic process. Heidegger’s concept of poetry 
fi rmly places the discussion of dwelling as being a highly personal lived experience. 
Although ...Poetically Man Dwells... (...dichterisch wohnet der Mensch... presented as a 
lecture October 6 1951) is a later text than the essays The Thing and Building Dwelling 
Thinking. An understanding of the focus of ...Poetically Man Dwells... is required 
in order to see dwelling’s true essence. Through poetry we see that the architectural 
implications of dwelling places a focus entirely on engagement, through one’s body, 
with spaces. Dwelling poetically is a creative process of engagement rather than a 
passive reception of the environment. Recognising this opens up the associations of 
spatial dwelling in a manner akin to reading poetry with focussed concern.
The phrase ‘poetically man dwells’ comes from a late poem by the German Romantic 
poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) entitled “In lovely blue”. Heidegger analyses this 
poem, using it to gain insight into the truth of dwelling. However, Heidegger begins 
by attempting to clarify some potential misunderstandings. He considers the thought 
that dwelling and poetry might be seen as incompatible since dwelling is a physical 
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experience and poetry is words written on paper. Dwelling he says “is harassed by the 
housing shortage. Even if that were not so, our dwelling today is harassed by work, 
made insecure by the hunt for gain and success” (Heidegger. 1971c. 211). Heidegger 
scorns the fact that whenever dwelling is considered ‘poetic’ all that is of concern 
are the aesthetics of the building product. We can see that Heidegger has higher aims 
than surface aesthetics. Concerning the common understanding of what poetry is 
Heidegger writes that “Poetry is either rejected as frivolous mooning and [...] a fl ight 
into dreamland, or is counted as a part of literature.” (Heidegger. 1971c. 211). Indeed, 
as Heidegger points out, poets do not make tangible things. However, we can see 
that Heidegger has a broader defi nition of poetry than this suggests. Poetry for him is 
something that doesn’t simply involve words on paper. With another, albeit briefer, 
etymological study, he links poetry, through the Greek poiesis, to ‘making’. All poetic 
acts are a kind of making. Dwelling becomes a type of poiesis, a creative act. Perhaps, 
Heidegger suggests, poetry and dwelling are less incompatible than one might at fi rst 
say. If we look at the “essential nature” of these terms - dwelling as a process of being, 
poetry as a creative act - we fi nd that they are in fact linked to the point that the dwelling 
process relies entirely on poetry and our being is a creative poetic act. We recreate the 
world continually by building new layers of memories and associations through which 
we perceive all spaces. What we perceive is not just the space - its size, its material 
qualities - but we also bring a lifetime’s collection of experience that affects how we 
think of the space.
Heidegger continues his study of the poem. He expands the phrase ...Poetically Man 
Dwells... into its proper context within the poem. 
Full of merit, yet poetically, man
Dwells on this earth. (Heidegger. 1971c. 214) 
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Fig 21: (Williams. 2013). An etymological diagram of the root of the word poesie (poetry).
 Ancient Greek
poiesis
(to make)
Contemporary German
poesie
(poetry)
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Heidegger points out the implicit understatement in the phrase, “Full of merit, yet [...]”. 
The way that we dwell is full of merit, we build buildings to house us and our families, 
but it is also true that we dwell in some way poetically. Poetry is more important than 
dwelling’s merititious pursuits. He says that “Merits due to this building, however, can 
never fi ll out the nature of dwelling. On the contrary, they even deny dwelling its own 
nature when they are pursued and acquired purely for their own sake.” (Heidegger. 
1971c. 215). If we concern ourselves too fully with the acquisition of products then we 
deny dwelling its own nature. Whilst dwelling and building of the kind we normally 
consider as dwelling and building are merititious something else remains true too: we 
dwell poetically. 
However, this poetry isn’t some empty fantasy, “[...] on this earth.” is, in Heidegger’s 
view, an advocation of seeing poetry as having a fundamentally grounded nature. It is 
not that dwelling poetically is something that takes one away from the world. One might 
be tempted to think this, since poetry is sometimes considered as belonging to the realm 
of dreamers. Instead, Heidegger and Hölderlin are saying that our poetic dwelling is 
on this earth (Sharr. 2007). The idea of our poetic dwelling is therefore not something 
that need only be available to the romantic dreamer in an exceptional moment but is 
common to everyone’s daily experience at all times. 
This is understood because Heidegger states that poetry’s original meaning is that of 
creation. A poem cannot be skim read, it is not read with ambivalence and nor is it 
suitable for easy summation. The poem above by Morgan demands one’s engagement. 
We are asked to consider a similar experience, for me it conjures memories of similar 
bonfi res that I experienced many years ago in the heavy autumnal air of the Scottish 
Borders’ countryside. For Morgan it is entirely possible that it was a more urban 
scene, probably Glasgow. He was “a poet of urban life” says Robyn Marsack in A 
Declaration of Independence: Edwin Morgan and Contemporary Poetry, but one who 
focussed most on the human story (1990. 31). What distinguishes Morgan from his 
contemporaries is, in Marsack’s view, “the unembarrassed, true voice of feeling, the 
life of the community beating in his poems.” (Marsack. 1990. 37). Whatever Morgan’s 
view was, his interpretation is less important than my own creation. The reader becomes 
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part of the scene, drawn into the poem making its recitation a new act. The reading 
of the poem is itself a creative act. In the same way that reading poetry in this way 
demands an active engagement with language, a poetic act is an active engagement 
with space. The opposite of poetry is not prose, but something like ambivalence. In this 
way all thoughtful creative acts can be seen as poetry. Painting is poetic. Our being is 
poetic. In the poetic act we recreate something for ourselves and inhabiting the space of 
recollected experience is also poetic.
Dwelling (“The basic character of human existence.” (Heidegger. 1971c. 213)) is poetic, 
a creative act in the environment with every step, every new memory. Poetry is no 
longer seen as “merely an ornament and bonus added to dwelling. [...] Poetry is what 
really lets us dwell.” (Heidegger. 1971c. 213). How do we make a dwelling place, asks 
Heidegger before answering, “Through building. Poetic creation, which lets us dwell, 
is a kind of building.” (Heidegger. 1971c. 213). This process of making something, 
building, is not how we usually conceive of production that results in a fi nished product 
at the end. Conceived of in this way, Heidegger states, we will never touch the true 
nature of making. What we make, are experiences in spaces. A poetic engagement with 
a space builds memories. Heidegger is reminding us that the nature of our dwelling 
and building is creative. At the root of Heidegger’s concept of building is the focus that 
dwellers poetically build their own perceptions of places. Now we can see how it is 
that building is something that is continually ongoing, since it is the building of poetic 
engagement with spaces. 
When we think of poetry in its usual context, relating to poems, a few extra insights 
arise about the poetic experience of the environment through our dwelling. Tied in with 
Heidegger’s view of our being as a fundamentally embodied in-the-world experience, 
reading a poem is something that must be lived actively rather than passively. What is 
poetic in a poem is the recreation by the reader who gives over a little of themselves. 
Our own memories and associations form a uniquely personal interpretation of the 
poem. The poem is nothing without its reiteration by the reader. What is poetic in the 
poem is like a genie in a lamp, waiting. 
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Additionally, a poem is rarely unilateral in its possible interpretations. Shria Wolosky 
writes that,
poetry is a language in which every component element – word and word 
order, sound and pause, image and echo – is signifi cant, signifi cant in that 
every element points toward or stands for further relationships among and 
beyond themselves. Poetry is a language that always means more. (Wolosky. 
2001. 3)
This can happen precisely because of the aforementioned embodiment of the poetic 
recreation. Although each poem has, of course, its own subject matter the reader brings 
something of themselves into each recreation. Consequently we can see the poem as, 
in some way, incomplete. It has a space that allows us to inhabit. This will be discussed 
further in Chapter Three with regards to Roland Barthes’s concept of the death of the 
author.
In the experience of poetry these two, embodiment and interpretation, have a symbiotic 
relationship. If it weren’t for our embodiment we wouldn’t see various interpretations 
but if the poem was so closed that interpretations weren’t possible then we would not 
be able to ‘live’ the poem, so to speak. We can see this same experience occurring in 
Heidegger’s concept of poetic dwelling. The environment can be seen as fundamentally 
‘lived’ and having a rich set of possible interpretations and emotions. It is this rich 
potential that allows us to see ourselves as embodied in the environment.
•
By expanding the context of the poem still further Heidegger elaborates on what poetry 
is in essence. He states that poetic experiences in a way aid our understanding of our 
place in the world. We can look up from our place on earth toward the sky (‘heaven’ in 
some translations, as the German word Himmel means both sky and heaven), from the 
merititious pursuits to something loftier. Heidegger goes on, “The upward glance spans 
the between of sky and earth. This between is measured out for the dwelling of man.” 
(Heidegger. 1971c. 218). 
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Heidegger is saying that we measure ourselves against the heavenly when we are 
poetically dwelling, it is a continual creative gesture of measuring ourselves in the 
world. He says that this is what makes us what we are, “Man does not undertake 
this spanning just now and then; rather man is man at all only in such spanning.” 
(Heidegger. 1971c. 218). This measure of our place, it will be no surprise, is not 
considered by Heidegger to be quantitative. Normally we think of measuring as an act 
where we multiply or divide something known to ascertain a quantitative knowledge 
of something unknown. For instance we know that a metre is one ten-millionth of the 
distance from the North Pole to the equator. This is, Heidegger says, not the nature 
of measure, it is not how we measure our being-in-the-world with the emphasis 
on experience over abstraction. The fact that we have begun to dwell unpoetically, 
Heidegger suggests “derives from a curious excess of frantic measuring and calculating” 
that separates us from experience (Heidegger. 1971c. 226). 
The fact that the heavenly against which we measure ourselves is absent by defi nition 
is fundamental to this understanding. Were it a knowable entity we could measure it 
in its dimensions. By saying we measure ourselves against this immeasurable entity 
Heidegger emphasises the worth of experiential measuring, itself a creative act.
Adam Sharr comments on the essence of poetry and measure,
To Heidegger, when someone with poetic inclinations submits themselves 
to the world and deliberately or instinctively takes measure of its things and 
phenomena through creative acts, she or he creates poetry themselves. For 
the philosopher, any outcome of this poetry also becomes a measure, added 
to a reservoir of human measures. (Sharr. 2007. 82)
However, Heidegger is not saying that this is only for those who have poetic inclinations 
as Sharr suggests. Instead, “on this earth” places poetry down in the dirt of the everyday. 
We all dwell poetically, it is the way we are. In terms of our being and dwelling, we are 
all poets. Poetic inclinations and poetic actions defi ne our dwelling and, consequently, 
our being. 
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Portfolio One - Walks and Sketches
Experiences of poetry/Poetry of experiences
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This poetic nature of dwelling, that gives so much importance to one’s individual 
interpretation, is the key element that is so often omitted in discussions of Heidegger’s 
dwelling. This is perhaps because observations of poetry in practice serve to undermine 
much of the importance that architects place on the designs of buildings as the sole 
infl uence on our perception of the environment.
My experience of the city is, however, drastically changed by things that are not 
generally considered as of architectural merit. These can be poetic moments. When on 
my habitual walk a seagull has ripped apart a bin bag and strewn rubbish across the 
pavement I interact with the moment with a changed perspective. The city is a different 
city experienced from under an umbrella on a windy day than on a warm summer 
evening. Puddles in the pavement, and those that risk splashing up from passing cars, 
require circumvention. They act not dissimilarly to impassable permanent objects. 
Temporary or not they affect passage through space in much the same way. Over time 
I discovered that some areas are more likely than others to have litter on the pavements 
and interact with the area differently, eyes lowered. These are the invisible poetics 
of the city: poetic because they are fundamentally experiential, not because they are 
necessarily beautiful. Of course, many of these poetics are found in buildings too. 
Passing by the place where a friend once lived conjures memories of times spent there, a 
red door set back from the street is indefi nably appealing, the views towards the Tay are 
unlike any experience I’ve ever come across in a city.
These experiential poetics of the city are in many ways the defi ning aspects of the 
city since they alter the way the city is experienced. This observation places all spatial 
conditions on equal levels. What is ‘architecture’ becomes uncertain. As does the 
question of who is the author of space. 
Walking through the city again and again I began to fi nd distinct zones within the whole. 
Turning the last corner before home can be a very happy moment. Even though nothing 
much has changed in the form of the street, and many other people would barely notice, 
it feels to me like a weight has been lifted and I’m fi rmly back in my place. These 
invisible thresholds occur throughout the city. Sometimes their boundaries are physical, 
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like crossing a busy road or the Tay estuary. Other times they are less so. Walking the 
entire length of Perth Road, three miles in total, the feeling of the area changes a dozen 
or so times. At one point it is bounded by bars and galleries, at another it becomes shops 
and tenements, at another schools and hospitals. Often the threshold between these 
zones is barely perceptible; there is no exact moment where the change is clear, instead 
it changes by gradient. When walking through the city these might relate to the uses of 
the area, such as shopping or industrial areas. When I cycle the topography has a greater 
impact, the thresholds between areas relate to the effort I’m putting in. When I’m 
driving the thresholds are traffi c lights, junctions and the width of the road.
In the BBC series Civilisation, Kenneth Clark describes the Romantic movement’s quiet 
submission to things-as-they-are. Their opinions of beauty were a big change from the 
way that civilisations had previously perceived beauty from cathedrals, monasteries, and 
city squares. Beauty became available from a cottage. Walking was seen as a means of 
connecting with the place that you were in and was linked to this appreciation of things-
as-they-are and consequently beauty. Clark says that “for over a hundred years, going 
for a walk was the spiritual as well as the physical exercise of all intellectuals, poets and 
philosophers.” (Civilisation. The Worship of Nature. 1969). 
Fig 22: (Williams. 2013). Photo series from my habitual walk.
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Top - Fig 23: (Williams. 2013) The route of my walk.
Bottom - Fig 24: Cullen’s Serial Vision (Cullen. 1961. 17).
My exploration of Perth Road through creative practice began with documentation 
of my daily walk by taking a series of photographs along the route. As in Cullen’s 
Townscape (1961) in which he coined the term ‘serial vision’ to describe a series of 
perspective drawings illustrating the temporal aspect of moving through a space, in this 
project we see a storyboard of spaces from start, at my home, to end, at the University 
of Dundee. Relph says of these serial visions that Cullen “analyses the experiences 
we have of urban space from the perspective of the person in the street, and seeks 
to establish the fundamental components of that experience, noting particularly the 
importance of serial vision, of places or centres, and of the content of those places.” 
(Relph. 1976. 18). In my series we pass friends and neighbours, the local greengrocer 
and butcher. I speculate that I cross the roads at the same points each day. Day by day 
this walk is repeated, step by step, accumulating experiences. The spires of Perth Road’s 
fi ve churches come into view, come closer, and pass. Open spaces occur at various 
points along the north side of Perth Road, breaking up the otherwise continual urban 
edge. These form seating areas, graveyards, car parking or wider pavements. 
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Fig 25: (Schaub. 2005. 50). A screen shot of the audio editing process that Cardiff undergoes in the creation of her 
multi layered immersive walks. 
The artist Janet Cardiff explores poetic qualities of spaces through audio walks, ideas 
behind which are documented in The Walk Book. 
Cardiff’s voice takes charge. She tells us which way to go, where to fi x our 
gaze. At the same time our ears are fi lled with remarkable sounds. They 
might evoke a sense of the improbable, like the beating wings of a swarm 
of fl ies, or the curiosity concerning the scraps of conversation from a nearby 
bench. They might point out the rustling noise of leaves crushed underfoot, 
or bring back the drifting notes of a long-forgotten piece of music. While 
guiding us gently across an invisible stage, Cardiff’s audio tracks transform 
the world around us. (Schaub. 2005. 14)
The audio walks themselves are temporal events and so cannot be documented fully 
in the book. A user wears headphones and follows a route narrated by Cardiff and 
a selection of auditory stimuli. One is drawn into the work, unsure if what is being 
heard is in the recording or reality. Cardiff draws the listener into the poetics of the 
experience, the smells, the idiosyncrasies, the invisible stories swimming beneath the 
visible surface.
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Through creative involvement with a place, Cardiff was able to look intently and 
capture an aspect of her response to it. To deepen my involvement with Perth Road and 
echoing the repeated walks I began to draw sketches of my walk through the area. 
Creative practice not only requires engaged contemplation but is also an experience 
itself. What began to be evident was that through creative practice relating to place, 
my relation to that place was changing. When making a representation of a place I 
was inherently questioning and looking at that place in a way that does not happen 
through mere thought. Consequently making and thinking about a place changes one’s 
relationship with it. 
Sketching is a temporal act, both chronological and mindful. A pencil makes a mark on 
the blank page, forever altering the potential for all future marks. Each subsequent mark 
is infl uenced by each preceding and each that follows is in turn infl uenced by all that 
happened before. Additionally the sketch is a physical act, the marks on the page are 
made by the sketcher. None of the experience is given without effort. Consequently the 
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Figs 26-29: (Williams. 2013). In the same way that we build spatial experiences in our mind through creative 
engagement, creative practice can form another layer of spatial knowledge. These layers of experience and layers of 
creative practice can continue to affect our unconscious perception of places as we build them up time after time. 
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Fig 30: (Williams. 2013). The act of drawing a sketch was, in my mind, originally conceived as forcing the act of 
looking intently at the surrounding environment. Through this I was trying to increase the level of experience that I 
had with Perth Road. The act of sketching alters the way that the place is perceived.
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experiences one has of the place are added to by the act of drawing. This interpretive act 
that occurs through creative practice affects the way that the place is remembered. The 
experience is reinforced by the drawn image, in effect, the memory is doubly reinforced.
By limiting myself to short periods per sketch the major aspects of the scene were 
focussed on. One also ‘discovers’ what the unconscious prioritisation has been in one’s 
perception. Photorealism was not the goal here. The intention was to examine the 
feeling and focus and to increase my relation with the place through accumulative action 
and experience. When one is sketching one is forced to think about the place. Paul 
Laseau in Graphic Thinking for Architects and Designers describes the act of thinking 
through sketches as “a conversation with ourselves in which we communicate with 
sketches.” (2001. 8). Through the process of creating something by which to explore 
spatial experience, I found that I was forced to give serious thought to the nature of the 
experience itself. The memories, associations, and emotions that I had were examined 
and externalised. In doing so, they were strengthened. Through engagement with place 
I more fully dwelled by preserving my memories. As the drawing proceeded, so my 
perception of the place changed. It was no longer only the place, but was now seen 
through the lens of the sketch. 
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Figs 31 & 32: (Williams. 2013). The place of the creative act becomes altered. One perceives the place with an 
additional layer of experience upon it. This is also exactly the process of an engaged interaction with place that occurs 
through dwelling. 
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What was particularly important was that the engaged aspect of creative practice added 
a layer of experience to the area being studied. This is also exactly the experience 
of a poetic involvement with a place. After a memorable experience the place is 
fundamentally altered in one’s minds eye. Creative practice therefore altered the way 
that I understood dwelling to be taking place. With this chronologically iterative and 
temporal view of the sketching process we can see the act of sketching as embodying 
the poetic process of dwelling. Sketching the same place many times is a metaphor for 
the creative practice of dwelling and building memories. 
Thus the worth of creative practice in the context of this thesis is not just the resulting 
product. This can be seen as a testament to the experience in space that is the real work. 
The worth of the real work is the engagement with space that occurred in the creation 
of the work. The process was the goal, not just the product. What was illuminated by 
this study was that this process of documenting my experience is also the same as the 
process of dwelling. Consequently the work takes on a new meaning. It was built by my 
dwelling in that moment, not simply in response to it, as it were, after the fact. 
The research shines light on how Heidegger’s emphasis on the poetry of dwelling is not 
strictly to do with buildings being in themselves poetic.2 Instead poetry is understood as 
our own involvement with spaces, ongoing, open-ended, and continually revisited.
We exist poetically and poetic actions (through the experience of making places 
meaningful to ourselves) “causes dwelling to be dwelling. Poetry is what really 
lets us dwell.” (Heidegger. 1971c. 213). Were we not creative, we would not dwell. 
Consequently, an exploration of poetic process became key to the rest of the projects. 
2 perhaps by having beautiful richly tactile materials as suggested by Zumthor’s interpretation of Heidegger.
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Etymology of wohnen (dwelling) and the fourfold
Having linked building to dwelling and to being in Building Dwelling Thinking, 
Heidegger then traces the etymology of the word dwelling, wohnen (again from the 
title Bauen Wohnen Denken). He moves quickly and laterally through his etymological 
exploration this time to the Old Saxon wuon and Gothic wunian which, like bauen he 
says also mean “to remain, to stay in place.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 147). 
But wunian says more too. He claims that this comes from the word ‘peace’ and the 
contemporary German word for peace, friede, comes from fry meaning sparing from 
harm and danger. 
So, if we follow Heidegger, to dwell means to remain, which comes from ‘to be at 
peace’, which came from the sparing from harm. “Real sparing is something positive 
and takes place when we return it specifi cally to its being, when we leave something 
beforehand in its own nature” (Heidegger. 1971a. 147). This is allowing something to 
be: a positive sparing, not sparing through inaction but preservation. When we dwell, 
we are allowing everything its own nature, not imposing restrictions or signifi cance, or 
being prescriptive of how to interpret it. Fundamentally what comes out of this dance 
through a maze of linguistics is that “The fundamental character of dwelling is this 
sparing and preserving.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 147). 
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Fig 33: (Williams. 2013): An etymological diagram of the roots of the word wohnen. Heidegger links dwelling 
through words that mean ‘to remain’ to an idea of ‘sparing’ and ‘preserving’.
Contemporary German
wohnen
(to dwell)
 Gothic
wunian
(to remain, to be at peace)
Old Saxon
wuon
(to remain, to stay in a place)
Contemporary German
bauen
(to build)
Contemporary German
friede
(peace)
(to remain)
fry
(preserved from harm, 
to free, to spare)
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But what is it exactly that we are sparing and preserving? It has been suggested that 
Heidegger is advocating a low impact lifestyle (Seamon) or preservation of local 
conditions (Norberg-Schulz) but considering the focus on poetry taken by this thesis, 
meaning a focus on creativity, perceptual interpretation, and engagement, we can deduce 
that he is talking about the sparing and preserving of our memories and associations of 
spaces that give us a uniquely personal interpretation. Dwelling and building, in their 
fundamentally poetic sense, preserve our perceptions of spaces through their re-creation 
time and again (echoing the step by step repetition of my walks and layering of memory 
by my experiences and my sketches). We are not preserving something tangible, but as 
is so often the case with Heidegger, something mental.
Heidegger now introduces his concept of ‘the fourfold’ as the psychological construct 
which is being preserved. The fourfold is perhaps one of Heidegger’s most complex 
concepts and is frequently ignored by studies of Heidegger. In his essay, The Fourfold in 
The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Julian Young states that,
Among the many mysteries surrounding “the fourfold” is the almost total 
absence of any attempt by Heidegger scholars to explain what it is. Usually 
the topic doesn’t even make it to the index [...] Baffl ed by Heidegger’s 
poetic brevity, commentators have consigned it to the silence of the too-hard 
basket. (Young. 2006. 373) 
Similarly, Sharr notes that this “probably marks the moment of furthest distance on 
Heidegger’s travels outward from conventional philosophy into free-fall writing from 
his own experience of his own being.” (Sharr. 2007. 33). If this is the case then it 
also marks the point at which Heidegger is most Heideggerian, fully committing to 
observing the world as poetically engaged inhabitant seeing the world as it is interpreted 
by the individual through lived experience. 
The fourfold is the ‘earth’, the ‘sky’ (or heavens), the ‘mortals’, and the ‘divinities’ 
(or immortals). This thesis interprets these as belonging in the realm of personal 
interpretation of perception.3 In the fourfold Heidegger therefore places the spiritual 
3 This is not to be considered perception in the empirical sense but instead concerns the idea that how we 
perceive spaces alters as a result of new experiences. 
Etymology of wohnen (dwelling) and the fourfold
72
alongside the physical. Earth is related to the heavens, mortals to the immortals, and all 
four belong together in a oneness. This is Heidegger’s poetic view of our experience 
suggesting, like in much art, that there is something outside our sensory understanding 
that is always just on the edge of our perception. Although we perceive the world’s 
physical artefacts we also perceive that something greater is just out of view. We project 
meaning onto the heavens’ constellations and, in the tradition of the Ancient Greeks, 
pray that the Gods will intervene. Heidegger keeps his description deliberately vague, 
as if he were aware that to pin it down exactly is not only not possible but any attempt 
would be to trivialise the experience of being-in-the-world. Additionally, we can suggest 
that the fourfold is intended to be vague so as to be interpreted and embodied in a 
poetic fashion. Were it explicitly stated (if it could be) then the text would be closed and 
lifeless. By keeping the text open to interpretation Heidegger allows us to live amongst 
it and try to consider our own interpretation of our perception.
The use of the fourfold makes no absolute distinctions between individuals and the 
things in the environment. From a Western perspective this is hard to conceive but 
relates to long traditions of mind/world connections in other traditions. The phrase Tat 
Tvam Asi, for instance, in certain Hindu philosophies translates as “Thou art that”. It 
suggests that what is the self is indistinguishable from reality. What we are and what we 
perceive are one and the same. On the other side of the world a similar unity is found. 
Discussed by David Orr in The Nature of Design, Native Americans,
made no clear distinctions between themselves physically and the land in 
which they dwelled. Land contained the memory of past deed and the spirits 
of their ancestors. […] We who regard land as a commodity to be bought 
and sold or as a resource can scarcely comprehend such a view. Our lack of 
comprehension is, in the view of tribal people, a mark of our adolescence 
and immaturity. (Orr. 2002. 11)
Heidegger is arguing for a similar or parallel - possibly more mature - view of the world 
in which we are placed. By recognising that how we perceive is inherently tied with our 
worldly experiences rather than being empirically reducible Heidegger’s emphasis on 
individual experiences being of central importance is continued. Seen through the lens 
of individual experience the fourfold encompasses all things. It is a way for Heidegger 
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to ignore distinctions that he believes are petty. By doing this the distinction between 
man-made or natural, old or new, is eliminated since all things become unifi ed within 
one’s perceptual realm. When Heidegger says dwelling ‘preserves’ this reading suggests 
that dwelling preserves perception, that is to say, memories of experiences in spaces. 
Of the earth Heidegger says, “[it] is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, 
spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 
147). The earth can be seen as not just the literal earth, the solid stuff at our feet, but is 
extended to everything that is tangible and touchable. It is earth as in soil that provides 
nutrient for life. We dwell in that we ‘save’ the earth where, as before, ‘saving’ is 
positive and active, “Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate 
it, which is merely one step from spoliation.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 148). 
Where the earth is that which is solid, the sky (heavens) is all that which is not and 
everything that occurs in that realm. “The sky is the vaulting path of the sun, the course 
of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the stars, the year’s seasons and their 
changes, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night, the clemency and 
inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth of the ether.” (Heidegger. 
1971a. 147). Equally possibly translated as ‘the heavens’ this one of four comprises that 
which is out of our control. We cannot affect any change on the heavenly realm, it exists 
outside of our infl uence yet still in our perception as something supersensible. We still 
gaze up at it, and exist beneath it naming constellations and giving them stories.
Connected inseparably are the divinities. If there is a seeming opposition between the 
earth and the sky, then we can also see that there is an opposition between the mortals 
and the divinities (In The Heidegger Reader, the translator translates the fourfold as 
earth, sky, immortals, and mortals (Figal. 2007). This is an interesting difference that 
adds to the indeterminacy and interpretability of Heidegger’s texts). If we had no 
concept of death then there would have been no need to invent the divinities. “The 
divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the holy sway of the 
godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into his concealment.” The 
hardest to understand of the fourfold, particularly from a “secular Western outlook” 
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(Sharr. 2007. 44) the divinities are perhaps understood as the great unknownability of 
life and the feeling that the world in some way speaks to us, that it has a message. We 
“await” these divinities says Heidegger but it is important to realise that they never 
appear. 
Tying the four together in “simple oneness” are the Mortals. “The mortals are the 
human beings. They are called mortals because they can die.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 148). 
This knowledge of mortality separates us from the animals that are found in the earth. 
The discussion of us as ‘mortals’ and not ‘people’ for example, places our being and 
our perception fi rmly on a temporal continuity. We are mortal because we will die. This 
again relates to the temporal and incompletable nature of dwelling. The concept of 
mortality, rather than humanity for instance, announces our brief presence on earth. If it 
were not for our knowledge of mortality our measure of our passage through life would 
be very different. Our mortality in Heidegger’s fourfold is not something to be feared 
or to be overcome but a fact to be embraced. As mortals we remain “on earth, under the 
sky, before the divinities.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 148).
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Fig 34: (Williams. 2013). The earth, sky, divinities, and mortals make up the fourfold as the constituent parts of what 
we perceive. A blend of the physical and metaphysical, and completely unmeasurable in objective terms. Heidegger 
places the focus of our existence in a spiritual realm that we are each faced with in the course of our lives.
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Although placed into categories the fourfold exists “in primal oneness”. Dwelling is the 
sparing and preserving of this fourfold. The preservation of these in our mind occurs 
through the act of dwelling, recalling them into existence whilst sparing them from 
change. We hold onto our memories unmolested and although they continually decay, 
we preserve them through dwelling with them, bringing them up to the surface again 
and again.
Due to the fundamentally embodied nature of Heidegger’s philosophy there can be no 
such thing as a memory without it being physical in some way. The essence of what 
we remember is the physical place in which the memory was made. Consequently we 
preserve our memories in places.
This can perhaps be seen as similar to the traditions of aural storytelling before literacy. 
In Songlines by Bruce Chatwin (1987) the aboriginal tribes he comes into contact with 
are deeply connected to their environment. They identify with the land through songs 
and as they walk from place to place the landscape forms cues to the song. It is believed 
by the tribes that through this action the landscape is sung into existence. They preserve 
their memories, and metaphorically the physical land itself, through their actions of 
remembering and engaging.
We carry out a similar act. We remember our perception of places thereby preserving 
them in our minds. What is preserved are our memories, held in places that we 
consequently come to think of as meaningful places. These are like anchors onto which 
we know our environment and ourselves. It is easy to imagine the environment around a 
memory of a meaningful place, this is the preservation of perception, the preservation of 
the fourfold. We remember ourselves (mortals), the place (earth), the atmosphere of the 
place (heavens) and perhaps a profound sense of otherness (immortals). In doing so we 
remember, measure, and understand our place in the world.
Heidegger’s thoughts on memory should here be expanded upon by drawing from a 
later work What is Called Thinking? Here, Heidegger notes that the way we are near to 
memory is not strictly the remembering of a single moment, this becomes remembrance, 
but is instead the constant revisiting of myriad memories bringing them up to the 
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surface of our attention over and over. This memory, thinking of our memories, is a 
form of thanks, we honour that which we remember. In the focus of this thesis we see 
that we are near to these memories.
Heidegger begins What is Called Thinking? by saying that “We come to know what 
it means to think when we ourselves try to think” (Heidegger. 1954. 3). In order to 
understand thinking we must already be thinking. This reminds one of the argument 
from Building Dwelling Thinking in which we are all always building and dwelling as 
we are always being. We are always present in the world. This adherence to the idea 
that one must be ‘in’ the world in order to study the world’s effects was described 
by a biographer as “studying the laws of free fall whilst falling” (Safranski. 1998. 
107). Heidegger therefore reiterates that whatever follows in his discussion remains 
in the immediate and the personal, “Meaning is the gathering of thought” he suggests 
(Heidegger. 1954. 3). Again, as with the fourfold, Memory is a gathering act, inclusive 
rather than exclusive. To remember is not to single out a moment but, when we think of 
memory as something that we are doing continually, it gathers all previous memories 
and brings them together in nearness.
Heidegger notes the complexity of the question, ‘what is called thinking?’. He remarks 
that it is in fact four questions: “what is it that we call ‘thought’ and ‘thinking,’ what do 
these words signify [?] how does this traditional doctrine conceive and defi ne what we 
have named thinking? [...] what are the prerequisites we need so that we may be able to 
think with essential rightness? [and fi nally] what is it that calls us, as it were, commands 
us to think?” (Heidegger. 1954. 113-114). For our purposes it must be the third, “what 
are the prerequisites we need so that we may be able to think with essential rightness?” 
that is surely the most interesting of these. What conditions must apply in order for us to 
think and to dwell.
What we think of, Heidegger calls ‘memory’ and he arrives at this through a typically 
etymological route, 
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‘Memory’ initially did not at all mean the power to recall. The word 
designates the whole disposition in the sense of a steadfast intimate 
concentration upon the things that essentially speak to us in every thoughtful 
meditation. (Heidegger. 1954. 140. My italics) 
Memory for Heidegger is a focus on meaningful things, things that are near to us. He 
goes on, “Originally, ‘memory’ means as much as devotion: a constant concentrated 
abiding with something - not just with something that has passed and with what may 
come.” (Heidegger. 1954. 140) Memory is not a passive recollection but, in a manner 
that is by now familiar, an active creation. Memories are not the exceptional moment 
or the nostalgic but the accumulation of many that we then see through to experience 
spaces.  
He distinguishes memory from retention which “is mostly occupied with what is 
past, because the past has got away and in a way no longer affords a lasting hold.” 
(Heidegger. 1954. 140)  We have to try to retain these recollections. In contrast memory, 
for Heidegger occurs continually, it “recovers again and again” (Heidegger. 1954. 140). 
We know that memory is more complex that recalling the past, at arms length as it were, 
by our need to coin a word for the specifi c act of retention and recovery, that is to say, 
“remembrance” (Heidegger. 1954. 141).
Heidegger develops the honour of that which we remember. He suggests that the Old 
English for ‘to think’ thencan and ‘to thank’ thancian are closely related, to give thanks 
is also to give thought (Heidegger. 1954. 139). Therefore the memory that is brought 
up and re-lived, we may remember that it is near to us like my bus shelter, is also that 
which we would suggest we are thankful for, “Original thanking is the thanks owed 
for being” (Heidegger. 1954. 141). This linking of think, thank, and memory is a much 
richer understanding of the terms than their current use. In Heidegger’s understanding 
perhaps “The supreme thanks, then, would be thinking? And the profoundest 
thanklessness, thoughtlessness?” Memory, the gathering of thinking, is the highest sort 
of thanks. We bring up again and again, re-living and re-experiencing our memories 
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making them near to us. We do this to that which we are most near, giving thanks to 
that which we care most about. The places we are most near to are where we gather our 
memories, recreating anew, are a physical form of our thanks.
Etymology of wohnen (dwelling) and the fourfold
79
Fig 35: (Lynch 1960. 147) Lynch’s image of Boston derived from interviews with locals. The map shows paths, 
edges, districts, nodes and landmarks illustrating how people relate to the places within the whole. A stronger mental 
image, argues Lynch, gives a stronger feeling of belonging. 
Preserving memories and perception
Various people have discussed the ways that we can understand our place in the world. 
For instance Kevin Lynch in The Image of the City argues that, 
A good environmental image gives its possessor an important sense of 
emotional security. He can establish an harmonious relationship between 
himself and the outside world. This is the obverse of the fear that comes 
with disorientation; it means that the sweet sense of home is strongest when 
home is not only familiar but distinctive as well. (Lynch. 1960. 4)
The degree to which we have a strong environmental image Lynch says, comes from the 
nature of the environment. In the context of this thesis Lynch’s studies of a city’s image 
can be seen as suggesting that the anchors onto which we fi x our memories come in a 
variety of forms. His studies relate to the legibility of the city form based on information 
gathered through interviews with city residents. From these interviews Lynch discerns 
different types of element that one perceives in the environment such as paths, edges, 
districts, nodes and landmarks. 
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Paths are the routes along which an individual moves, these are often the primary ways 
that people perceive their city. For instance, my choice of Perth Road as an area of 
study is a path from my home to my work. When we experience a place we are always 
experiencing it in relation to what happened before and where we plan to go next. 
Edges are the boundary between one thing and another but not normally conceived of as 
routes. These can be physical boundaries, such as the edge of a river bank or edges that 
link two zones. 
Districts are zones within a larger area identifi ed by character. For instance the area 
of Perth road that formed the study of this thesis is a distinct district for me. It has a 
character that is different from the adjacent areas and has a different character even from 
the further ends of the same road. 
Nodes are distinct points into which an individual can enter; these can be junctions, like 
the Sinderins junction of Perth road, or focal points, like any of the squares along the 
length of Perth road. 
Finally, landmarks, like nodes, are points of interest that occurred in the environment. 
In the study of Perth road the landmarks I used would be my home, my work, particular 
shops, or friends’ apartments. 
Lynch states that it is not necessarily the simplicity of a system that makes its 
imageability, instead it is the strength of these anchoring elements. As with Heidegger’s 
thought it is the elements with which we engage our experience that are remembered 
and dwelled with.
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The act of constructing buildings can also be a method of anchoring oneself physically 
and mentally in place. Witold Rybczynski, an architect documenting his building 
process in The Most Beautiful House in the World writes “Each shovel of gravel, each 
nail hammered, each board sawn, settled me more fi rmly in the meadow […] I was now 
rooted in place.” (Rybczynski. 1989. 192). Throughout architectural theory buildings 
have attempted to construct miniature worlds that protect against, and make sense of, 
the larger world outside whilst not removing completely, like my bus shelter in the 
storm. “Building by hand was a romantic idea” notes Rybczynski,
When we were fi nished, this place, this particular place, would be changed: 
the meadow would be occupied. It was the reenactment of a primeval 
process that began with the fi rst hut erected in a forest clearing, and it gave 
me the feeling of playing out an ancient ritual. (Rybczynski. 1989. 129)
Aben and de Wit’s The Enclosed Garden chronicles the “ever rejuvenating tradition in 
which man tries to reconcile himself with his surroundings by bringing these within 
the closest proximity.” (Aben & de Wit. 1999. 11). ‘Reconciling’ here can be seen as a 
method of Heideggerian measuring, we are trying to fi nd our place by making the world 
understandable. They say that,
The garden gathers the landscape around it (garden) and at the same 
time shuts itself off from it (enclosed). The enclosed garden is as broad 
as the landscape, in that it incorporates the expansiveness of the sky, and 
as contained as a building. Thus it is an intermediary between man and 
landscape. (Aben & de Wit. 1999. 10)
This is shown beautifully if we think of Robert Frost’s poem Atmosphere - Inscription 
for a garden wall (Frost. 1928. 146),
Winds blow the open grassy places bleak;
But where this old wall burns a sunny cheek, 
They eddy over it too toppling weak
To blow the earth or anything self-clear;
Moisture and color and odor thicken here.
The hours of daylight gather atmosphere.
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This small place gathers the surrounding landscape in a variety of ways. It slows the 
wind which hints at the bleak fi elds around, the sun’s heat becomes stored in the weight 
of the walls. The sun vaulting overhead reminds the inhabitant of the world around them 
outside of the garden whilst bringing it into immediate and personal contact. The idea 
that “Moisture and color and odor thicken here,” suggests that for the inhabitant these 
things are experienced more fully, and remembered more fully afterwards. 
The measuring of our place in the world that Heidegger says we do continually is 
maybe an attempt to confront our feelings of inadequacy in the face of the world. We 
are merely mortals standing in the face of the heavens and gods. This is exactly how 
I experienced the bus shelter that provided refuge from a storm. Here I experienced 
a confrontation with the awesome power and scale of the world, manifest in a 
thunderstorm, but was suffi ciently removed, yet not too far, so as to feel safe and able 
to feel joy rather than fear. The measuring of our place, as mere mortals against the 
world, becomes not terrifying as it perhaps should, but something beautiful and life 
affi rming. What was nearly a sense of fear was transformed into a sense of connection. 
In understanding the world we face a confrontation with the sublimity of nature, even at 
the distance of remove we have in our contemporary urban culture.
We can perhaps read Heidegger, by placing us as mortals in the face of the gods and 
heavens, as bringing religious awe into the everyday experience of being. That same 
experience of uplifting connection usually reserved for buildings like cathedrals, 
is, through Heidegger, seen in the everyday. Relph notes that “When the fusion of 
dwelling and building, of the earth and the sky and the gods and mortals, is total, then 
geographical space is essentially sacred.” (Relph. 1976. 18). 
Florentine Sack in Open House discusses architecture that is connected to nature as 
giving similar sensations, “I suddenly became aware of the unity of all things.” she says 
of a beautiful experience in a building,
I realised at this point that I was part of a great, overall connection without 
beginning or end. [...] Here, I discovered an architect’s highest aim: giving 
human beings the opportunity to enter this dimension. (Sack. 2006. 8)
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We anchor ourselves mentally in spaces by dwelling, the ‘preserving and sparing’ of 
our fourfold perception of the world. This can be a beautiful experience of oneness with 
the world, as suggested by Sack, but it can also be the general day to day experience of 
being. This is always a creative act, whether through building, sketching, walking, or 
simply being.
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I began to develop my poetic engagement with places. If we can interpret Heidegger’s 
measuring of our place in the world as being an uplifting sense of connection (to the 
earth, gods and heavens), that we carry out at all times, I was keen to explore this in 
places along my habitual walk. Since the layering of repeat experiences in a place 
accumulates I decided to attempt another method of spatial representation to add 
another type of layer onto my perception of the spaces. To achieve this I experimented 
with montage photography. 
I began with a concern that a photograph did not embody the same poetic engagement 
that I had found with a sketch. Like Henri Focillon I felt that my conception of 
photography was not one of temporal engagement. He writes that “Even when the 
photograph represents crowds of people, it is the image of solitude, because the hand 
never intervenes to spread over it the warmth and fl ow of human life.” (Focillon. 1934. 
35). It was precisely this warmth and fl ow that I wanted to explore.
Exploring the potential of photography David Hockney developed a method of 
photomontage that he referred to as ‘joiners’. In Hockney’s Photographs this was 
described as follows,
By now it is well-known that Hockney fi nds the still photograph still to the 
point of being frozen, that a photograph excludes more than it reveals and 
is constructed in ways that are contrary to natural vision and traditional 
art. On the face of it, his solution seems simple. Over the last two years he 
has been adding a photograph to a photograph to a photograph - or scores 
of photographs to each other - as a challenge to conventional photography. 
(Hockney & Haworth-Booth. 1983. 2)
These photomontages, the fi rst exhibition of which was titled ‘Drawing with the 
camera’, show a sense of temporality and a variety of perspectives that might be equated 
to cubism’s portrayal of reality.
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Inspired by the temporal embodiment of these joiners, particularly their refl ection of 
the multiplicitous nature of memory I began to produce a series of photomontages of 
places along Perth Road. These would embrace the fragmentary and incomplete nature 
of memories and associations. 
The fact that these montages are comprised of a series of photographs imbues each 
with a temporal aspect. The light quality changes, the same pedestrians occur in several 
images as they walked along the pavement. I allowed the composition of the montages 
to follow lines of sight and single point perspective.
To reinforce the idea that it was my dwelling that was being studied, not the place itself, 
I decided that I would make it evident that I was also a subject of these images and 
place myself somewhere in each scene even in only by implication. Consequently, my 
feet and legs are included in many scenes. Additionally, in many of the scenes there 
is a focus of one kind or another from where perspective lines project, drawing in the 
viewer. In some cases this is a view, as in the scenes depicting the streets facing the Tay 
estuary, in others, as in the scenes depicting the series of spaces along Perth Road, the 
focus is the perception of the space and its context. 
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Fig 36: Luncheon at the British Embassy, Tokyo. (Hockney. 1983. 28). Time and fragments of perception are made 
evident by Hockney. What results is a representation of a moment that is in many ways more true than a conventional 
image.
87
Portfolio Two - Montages
After taking all the photographs on site and having them developed, the montages of 
Perth Road were arranged by hand. This demanded a level of engagement recalling 
Focillon, the hand was intervening to spread human warmth. The photographs could 
no longer be considered as the passive ‘click’ of the shutter but were now deliberate 
arrangements. Thoughtful time spent turns into relationship, poetic inhabitation of the 
artefact makes it personally meaningful.
Fig 37: (Williams. 2013). Adding another layer of interpretive action I pasted characters as representative of aspects 
of the place. This space provides little more than an apathetic backdrop on which to plant advertisement billboards. 
Cursory seating has been provided but it exists in limbo, partly owned by Perth Road but cut off by recycling bins and 
gravel, partly its own entity but exposed rather than enclosed by the retreating heights of the buildings behind and the 
constant stare of those passing by. 
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Fig 38: (Williams. 2013). Another scene depicts St. Peter’s graveyard on the north side of Perth Road. The church, set 
back from the road, overlooks the space populated with historical fi gures at a wedding who pose for my photograph 
from the opposite pavement. The trees form a focus and respite from the street edge that extends both to the east and 
west. From these directions two models dressed in white approach. Perth Road can be seen as a historical artefact 
evidencing the changing nature of Dundee, old tenements with shop fronts cut into their sides exist alongside new 
housing. Church spires along the length signify graveyards, community centres, and apartments. The young student 
population, drawn by the proximity to the university campus, walk on the surface of the historical depth. This place 
along Perth Road forms a threshold between the eastern and western sections of my walk. It is unusual for the area, 
the pavement is narrower, the buildings on the south edge are lower, the openness and intrigue of the graveyard is 
counterpointed by its fenced inaccessibility.
Fig 39: (Williams. 2013). From my position at the Sinderins junction of Perth Road, Hawkhill, Shepard’s Loan, and 
Blackness Avenue the open sky is allowed access whilst the character of the road is retained. Edges are held and one’s 
eye is drawn up to the sky. In the manner of Turner’s Fighting Temeraire (1838) an elderly man and a young child set 
the sky in relation to the road.
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Fig 40: (Williams. 2013). Looking down Taylor’s Lane from Perth Road at the view to the Tay Bridge and to Fife 
beyond, the thin street and height of the buildings give a sense of enclosure with promise of release beyond. On 
another day the scene would be populated by dour faces, a grey sky and strewn litter. From my vantage point I see a 
couple enjoying the view and a group of picnickers claiming a place in the sun. The ramshackle nature of this area, 
old mills developed into fl ats, grand gardens appropriated by developers, country houses swallowed by the city makes 
a heterogeneous mix of building types hinting at innumerable stories and other interpretations of this place. 
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Fig 41: (Williams. 2013). Standing on Westfi eld Place by a handrail attached to the Kwik-Fit garage I am opposite a 
multi chimneyed stone built house. The cobbled street slowly descends past modern gates, overgrown buddleia, and a 
patchwork of different types towards a view of the Tay and an overcast sky.
Fig 42: (Williams. 2013). Smithson, Serra, and Friedrich’s Wanderer look down Step Row to the sunset.
Fig 43: (Williams. 2013). The walls of Westfi eld Lane keep an almost continual edge. Sometimes buildings, 
sometimes walled gardens, some stone, some brick, the walls run unbroken occasionally punched through by walls 
and doors. On the other side of these rational walls the scramble for space reasserts itself. 
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Fig 45: (Williams. 2013). Diagrams of each of these eight scenes showing their true dimensions. As will be discussed 
later, these diagrams are only representative and should not be confused for the real artefact.
Fig 44: (Williams. 2013). The weak corners by the police station swim with uncertainty.
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These photomontages began to develop a language of multiple fragments. They refl ect 
multiple experiences, multiple viewpoints and perhaps a more natural representation 
of Perth Road. As opposed to a single image that appears whole, unambiguous, in 
which the idea of completeness is strong, the fragments of these montages seemed an 
appropriate visual metaphor for our incomplete dwelling process. 
We can also see this idea of repeated engaged acts and multiplicity in the work of 
Cézanne. Discussed further in Chapter Three, Cézanne, like Heidegger, was endlessly 
searching and re-searching for a connection to places through his art. Hajo Duchting 
writes in Paul Cézanne 1839-1906 that “he was looking for the very roots of human 
existence, a coherent and indestructible core where harmony prevailed between Man 
and the universe.” (Duchting. 1989. 62). 
Duchting sees an honesty in the work of Cézanne,
our resulting impression that Cézanne by no means approaches Nature 
with artistic preconceptions, that he by no means has the despotic aim of 
subjugating Nature to some law or adapting to some formula, will inevitably 
be strong. (Duchting. 1989. 137)
Cézanne represents honestly, as free of artifi ce as possible, without preconceptions 
or formulaic style. In a series of painting of Mont Sainte-Victoire by looking and 
looking again, time after time, Cézanne constructs a hint of the experience of the place. 
However a letter to his son suggests that Cézanne himself seems to feel that this was a 
task that was never possible, 
I want to say that my vision as a painter is made keener by Nature, but 
recording what I feel is always an arduous process. I cannot achieve the 
intensity that is present to my senses, I do not have at my disposal that 
wonderful wealth of colour that gives Nature its freshness. (Duchting. 1989. 
62)
Portfolio Two - Montages
93
He tried again and again, looking and re-looking, to convey this ‘wonderful wealth’. 
These are like the multiple experiences of walking down Perth Road, multiple 
viewpoints of the same trip seen again and again, endlessly. Each of the images of 
Mont Sainte-Victoire works independently to impress a view of the mountain on a 
viewer, but when seen together another layer becomes evident. The multiple nature of 
repetition allows the viewer a richer impression that is greater than the sum of its parts. 
For Cézanne this was a way of engaging with the place again and again. Merleau-Ponty, 
quoted by Relph, notes that Cézanne’s engagement with the place was utterly specifi c; 
he “did not paint landscapes, he painted the landscapes of Provence.” (Relph. 1976. 42). 
Figs 46 - 49: (Düchting. 1989. 214-223). In looking and looking again, Cézanne portrays a richer interpretation of 
what this experience is than would be possible in a single attempt. Each of these images is correct but seen together 
the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
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Following the completion of my photomontages, and since there was consequently no 
continuing process going on, I aimed to reappraise them by copying them and working 
them through in different ways and using different methods. In doing so I aimed to 
deepen the study of the place. In these new works I intended to distil an aspect of the 
spaces I had perceived as important, in this case the sense of enclosure and exposure 
that I found on Perth Road. To do this I took the montages and collaged areas of sky 
behind the buildings, outlining different spatial volumes in each scene. I explored 
whether the space felt enclosed or exposed, and what thresholds occurred between 
spaces. These were intended as exercises in thinking through creative practice that 
added another layer to the experience of the places that began with walks and was 
developed by sketches and photomontage. Like the poetry of dwelling - piecemeal 
accumulation of experiences and memories that are fi xed in spaces - these further layers 
of creative practice added to the step by step idea behind dwelling. This is an idea 
explored by Stuart Walker in Sustainable by Design where he produces artefacts then 
supplements these with visual analogies in poster form. He says that, “the visual piece 
is judged to be an appropriate rendition of an essential ingredient that was fundamental 
to the aesthetic defi nition and character of the original work to which the work refers.” 
(Walker. 2006. 102). In the case of my work both the collages and the photomontages 
are intended as means of seeing to the experience of the place.
Fig 50: (Williams. 2013). A reappraisal of the montage, this time exploring the qualities of enclosure.
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Figs 51 - 53: (Williams. 2013). Further collage reappraisals of the montages. Looking again and again providing 
layers of accumulating experience. I am here highlighting elements and enclosures in the spaces.
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Figs 54 - 57: (Williams. 2013). Further reappraisals, this time by screen printing. Different colours exploring route, 
sky, and overlooking windows.
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Nearness to things
In Building Dwelling Thinking, Heidegger expresses his concern that any judgement of 
the world must begin with an awareness of the unity between subject and world. This 
was a reaction against what he saw as the increasing prevalence for reductive scientifi c 
attitudes that demand the dimensioning of space. This dimensioning is obviously a 
useful tool but it ignores what he sees as the all important aspect of one’s interpretation 
of perception. He warns that the “nearness and remoteness between men and things 
can become mere distance, mere intervals of intervening space.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 
153). What he means by this is that we could cease to think of dimensions as abstract 
tools and confuse them for the reality of space. Using this type of quantifi able space 
conception, he says, can only lead to an impoverished understanding of space whilst 
precluding any possibility for a discussion of experiences and memory. 
Heidegger says that rather than experiencing nearness to things in a dimensional sense 
through the poetic dwelling process we bring things near. 
Heidegger’s concepts of nearness and thingness are discussed most prominently in the 
essay The Thing (Das Ding, presented as a lecture at the Beyerischen Akademie der 
Schönen Kunste, June 6 1950). This is again predicated on the observation that the 
world should be understood through lived experiential judgements. The way that we 
make things meaningful to us - that in this thesis we see as preserving memories - is in 
Heidegger’s view not in the least bit measurable by abstract quantities. For Heidegger 
the complexity of our relationship with the world can never be reduced to objective 
facts. The implication of this is that the objective mode of perceiving leads to “mere 
objects” consisting only of quantitative values, whereas an embodied understanding of 
the world provides us with things that we fi nd meaningful. 
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In The Thing Heidegger states that nearness doesn’t consist of proximity. Instead we 
are near to things that we are engaged with. Thus, as with so much of Heidegger’s 
philosophy, nearness is not concerned with quantifi able distances but with qualitative 
engagement. Heidegger provided a useful example in Being & Time that when 
contemplating a picture on the wall the glasses on the end of one’s nose are less near 
than the picture engaging one’s attention on the wall 
When, for instance, a man wears a pair of spectacles which are so close to 
him distancially that they are ‘sitting on his nose’, they are environmentally 
more remote from him than the picture on the opposite wall. (Heidegger. 
1927. 141)
He begins The Thing with a lament that distances in time and space are reducing. He 
mentions various technological marvels such as air travel as a way in which “Man now 
reaches overnight, by plane, places which formerly took weeks and months of travel.” 
(Heidegger. 1971b. 163). Similarly radio spreads news instantly to all people and is 
received as background noise whereas previously it had to take time and personal 
engagement to pass through regions. Heidegger mentions the television, “The peak of 
this abolition of every possibility of remoteness is reached by television, which will 
Fig 58: (Williams. 2013). The glasses on one’s face are less ‘near’ than the image on the wall.
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soon pervade and dominate the whole machinery of communication.” (Heidegger. 
1971b. 163). Each of these brings immediate gratifi cation at the cost of engagement 
(we can only imagine what Heidegger would think of the Internet). These technological 
advancements, he says, bring no sense of nearness “for nearness does not consist 
in shortness of distance.” (Heidegger. 1971b. 163). Nearness it seems is something 
more complicated than proximity. Even those things that are aggressively proximate 
to us, like the television, “can remain far from us.” Conversely, he says that what is 
objectively distant from us can be felt as near. “Short distance is not in itself nearness. 
Nor is great distance remoteness.” (Heidegger. 1971b. 163). 
The artefacts that I made in the course of my creative practice research are near to 
me, as are the places they explored. As a way of thinking about nearness in this non-
objective way we may briefl y relate it to our interpersonal relationships. Deciding if one 
is near to a person is far more complex than studying one’s family tree or measuring 
one’s relative physical proximity. I am in relatively close proximity to various people at 
any one time and I am genetically close to members of my family. However, the people 
I describe as being most near to me need not be part of either of these groups. As it so 
happens, I do feel near to some members of my family and frequently those with whom 
I share spaces, but I am also near to individuals many hundreds of miles away. The 
weighting of this nearness cannot be explained objectively under any headings, it is not 
wholly due to the length of our relationship, the distance between us, or the time since 
we last met or spoke. It is due to whatever compatibilities in personality and fate led to a 
feeling of nearness. 
What is true of our relationships with people is also true of our relationship with things. 
Things that I am near to need not be proximate. Nor do they need to be large or small, 
long owned or briefl y glanced. Nearness does not consist of proximity. We are near to 
things that we dwell with despite any lack of proximity. Equally, and as with nearness to 
people, it is easy to understand what someone means when they say that they are near to 
a memory. This is an emotional nearness. What we are near to in Heidegger’s terms are 
the memories that are preserved in things. When Heidegger says we are near to things 
and places, we can see that we are near to the relationships we have with them.
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Heidegger’s lament about reducing distances refl ects a concern that by insisting 
on quantitative measurements we are in fact abolishing emotional distances by 
ignoring experience and separating ourselves, in mind/world duality, from reality. He 
believes that the abolition of distance by modernity doesn’t make everything near, 
instead it reduces everything to a condition of being without distance. The abolition 
of distance results in a world of uniformly spread stuff that doesn’t permit real 
nearness and consequently doesn’t permit one to fi nd places. This lack of nearness 
leads to homelessness that began his concern for dwelling. The inverse of this is that 
environmental engagement brings things near through the attentiveness of the lived 
experience.
•
The artefacts that we are near to, Heidegger calls things.
As an example of a thing, Heidegger discusses a jug. He says that we perceive the jug 
“so it seems - as a thing and never as a mere object.” (Heidegger. 1971b. 165). This 
“so it seems” as Adam Sharr so sharply notes, forms a statement of the privileging of 
experiential judgement. As discussed already, Heidegger’s focus is always on perceptual 
judgements achieved via experience. When thinking of things “so it seems” is always 
implied. 
In this phrase Heidegger also distinguishes things from “mere objects”, which are 
distant, objectifi ed and inherently separate from us due to being conceived through a 
position of detached intellect. We exist with things but against objects. Heidegger’s 
phrase “mere object” implies a hierarchy whereby a thing is something more important 
than an object (so it seems). 
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For an example of a thing, I hold in my hand an old mechanical pencil. I repaired a 
crack in the side with green electrical tape which distinguishes it from all other pencils, 
marking it as mine. I understand the weight and texture of the pencil through my 
fi ngertips and the tape forms a pleasingly ergonomic profi le. It becomes the conduit 
through which writing, an almost entirely cerebral process, becomes known bodily. 
Even though we can represent a thing in object terms, my pencil has set dimensions for 
instance, this is not the essence of the thing. Heidegger says, 
An independent, self-supporting thing may become an object if we place it 
before us, whether in immediate perception or by bringing it to mind in a 
recollective re-presentation. However, the thingly character of the thing does 
not consist in its being a represented object (Heidegger. 1971b. 164-165) 
Fig 59: (Williams. 2013). My mechanical pencil, a thing with which I have preserved a relationship.
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A thing can be seen as an object but always at its root remains a thing. That is, we can 
objectify something thingly by “plac[ing] it before us” and considering it as something 
detached but through dwelling it always remains a thing since we are in the world 
with it, not against it. This connects us to a discussion in Being & Time (1927) that has 
relevance in the discussions to come. Heidegger says that we exist amongst entities 
experienced as ready-to-hand and their present-at-hand conception is an abstraction, a 
useful but not entirely true tool.
For Heidegger all ways of being have an idea of concern at their heart. This is a concern 
with entities that are encountered in the environment and the way that our being is 
in-the-world consists of relationships to these entities. These are put into two groups 
by Heidegger, those that are ready-to-hand, and those that are present-at-hand.4 The 
discussion of these entities is in many ways similar to Heidegger’s later discussion 
regarding the nature of thing and object respectively. 
Entities that are ready-to-hand are understood through experience. As an entity that is 
found ready-to-hand Heidegger uses the example of a hammer. One’s relationship to 
this hammer changes through use. This is a relationship of concern that requires bodily 
interaction, emphasising our being-in-the-world. He says “the less we just stare at the 
hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does 
our relationship to it become [...]” (Heidegger. 1927. 98). Swinging the hammer and 
feeling its weight and inertia one understands it in a different way than if just theorised. 
It is as though it becomes an extension of one’s body. 
Heidegger also discusses this ready-to-hand-ness in terms of a room. This room is 
encountered fi rst and foremost as a room, as “equipment for residing” (Heidegger. 1927. 
98) rather than in any dimensional sense. “No matter how sharply we just look [...] at 
the ‘outward appearance’ [...] of Things in whatever form this takes we cannot discover 
anything ready-to-hand.” (Heidegger. 1927. 98). 
4 On the translation: The distinction between ready-to-hand and present-at-hand come from the words 
zuhanden and vorhanden respectively. The German prefi x zu translates as a preposition including the words for 
‘to’, ‘for’, ‘at’, ‘in’, ‘with’, and ‘into’. The prefi x vor translates as ‘ago’, including prepositions ‘before’, ‘against’, 
‘in front of’, ‘outside’, and ‘ahead of’. The English translations perhaps do not have the same grace as the German 
compound words but we can see that the former word includes ideas of involvement and the latter includes ideas of 
separation.
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Instead, we understand the entity through use. Heidegger continues, “But when we 
deal with them by using them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; 
it has its own kind of sight [...]” (Heidegger. 1927. 98). Although the room does have 
dimensions these are not the reason for our concern.
As Steiner notes, anyone who uses tools, whether for craft or sport, will understand 
this idea. Equally, it could be said for the pencil in one’s hand or the house one lives 
in. The way one sees with one’s body can be imagined in the way one catches a ball 
without having to understand its velocity or trajectory in any quantifi able sense. Or the 
way when hammering in a nail the hammer becomes an extension of one’s elbow, arm, 
wrist, and fi ngers, capable of hitting the target more naturally even than if one was to hit 
it with one’s own fi nger. The objective view of the world in numerical abstractions, for 
Heidegger, undermines how the world is perceived as ready-to-hand. Steiner notes that, 
Heidegger’s differentiation is not only eloquent in itself; it brilliantly inverts 
the Platonic order of values which sets the theoretical contemplator high 
above the artist, the craftsman, the manual worker. (Steiner. 1992. 90)
Instead, Heidegger’s work celebrates engagement with entities and thereby draws the 
world nearer.
In contrast, entities that are present-at-hand are encountered as separate from 
experiencing. This is the mode of thinking of the modern sciences, discussing matter 
in terms of its aspects that are quantifi able. Whilst this inarguably forms one way of 
thinking about entities, as we see through Heidegger’s concept of the ready-to-hand, it 
is not the only way. Nor is it necessarily the most useful way, especially when studying 
our being (Collins & Selina. 1998. 56). As we have seen in earlier discussions, when 
the pursuit of the present-at-hand conception is too greatly embraced it can serve to 
undermine one’s engagement.
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An example of the difference between these types of entity are my photomontages and 
their diagrammatic representations. The montages themselves are, for me, ready-to-hand 
since they formed a way of thinking about my relationship to the places on Perth Road. 
The diagrams serve only to provide their real life size.
Another example is the use of contour lines on an OS map. A continuous line joining 
the points of equal height, these are useful abstractions for understanding the reality of 
a hill. But it is the walk to the top that forms one’s true understanding of the hill and 
one’s relationship with the environment. The lines are present-at-hand but the mountain 
is ready-to-hand. Both are ‘true’ but in different ways. Heidegger’s philosophy here is 
not a wholesale rejection of considering present-at-hand entities but a far more subtle 
statement that the world is fi rst experienced as ready-to-hand and then intellectualised as 
present-at-hand. 
Figs 60 - 61: (Williams. 2013). The artefact itself (of which this is just a copy) was a way of engaging with the place. 
Using creative practice as a method of thinking, making, through one’s bodily interaction. The diagram is only a 
representation of the size of this. This distinction has relevance in later discussions on the use of the plan and section 
in architectural practice.
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The same concepts of nearness to entities hold true for our relation to places. We can be 
engaged with places that are far away. As an example of how our nearness to a space is 
constructed through an engagement with the space we can look to Building Dwelling 
Thinking. Here Heidegger discusses a bridge 30 miles from Darmstadt that those in his 
lecture would have found familiar,
If all of us now think, from where we are right here, of the old bridge in 
Heidelberg [...] From this spot right here, we are there at the bridge [...] 
From right here we may even be much nearer to that bridge [...] than 
someone who uses it daily as an indifferent river crossing. (Heidegger. 
1971a. 154)
This is a comment on one’s engagement that puts the individual in control of their own 
perceptual world. Rather than be near to what we are physically near to, we are near 
to what we think of, what engages our minds. Thus Heidegger is again emphasising 
that our perception is predominantly subjective and affected by all our memories and 
associations rather than objectively quantifi able. Or, to be more precise, that one is 
nearest to things that are most engaged with through a full experience of being.
Fig 62: (Williams. 2013). Nearness to places is similar to nearness to the picture on the wall. Consequently we can be 
in one place and be ‘near’ to another.
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In my thinking about this topic I was aware that the places that I felt most near to were 
not necessarily those in which I had spent most time, or had visited most recently.
On a large map of Scotland I mapped places I knew or had memories of, and routes 
along which I had travelled. Some were easy to remember, places that I was near to, like 
my childhood home or where I currently live. Those that I was less near to came more 
slowly like a half remembered trip to Thurso, an impression of a loch in the north west. 
Sometimes when I remembered an event from long ago other memories were triggered 
that were related in some way. In this way I thought through places I had visited and 
what I remembered of their character. A hierarchy began to develop of the places that I 
was near to.
Fig 63: (Williams. 2013). My memory map of Scotland. Based on places that I feel close to.
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I tried to draw each of those places from memory. By drawing from memory I was 
forced into a position of externalising and thereby testing my assumptions. Some places 
were very easy to draw, a strong mental image suggested a key viewpoint. Other places, 
despite my assumptions that I knew them well, remained elusive when I could think 
of little that was physical in the area on which to fi x my memory. For some of these 
I eventually decided upon a view and I disregarded others. The hierarchy developed. 
Places that had the strongest mental image for me were generally those which were 
most familiar (and in several cases familial). However, some other places that I assumed 
would be less familiar also brought about strong mental images. These places have the 
most meaningful memories associated with them: perhaps friends live there or I spent a 
pleasant day there once. By drawing memories of these places I could test where I felt 
near to. 
This began to shine a light on Heidegger’s thinking about nearness. For me (so it seems) 
the relationship between myself and these places is not just dimensional, as in the map 
of Scotland on previous page. Instead, I am near to those that are meaningful to me. In 
addition the places I am near to are not near due to their proximity in time, nor do they 
necessarily relate to places where I have spent the most time. 
Fig 64: (Williams. 2013). Sketch diagrams of what holds my attention in places.
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The architectural survey that I carried out along Perth Road included plans and sections. 
Each section depicted a change in spatial conditions. These could be anything from a 
change in building height to a view towards the Tay. The sections show the road varying 
from a sense of enclosure to exposure. However, the resulting artefacts conveyed only 
the quantifi able measurements of the space, and these are not things in the Heideggerian 
sense. Equally, the scale plans of the area showed the spaces but not the experience. 
Although it is precisely seeing through this and having the empathy to imagine the 
experience that is the skill of a good architect the plan nevertheless remains a tool, an 
abstraction of ready-to-hand reality into a present-at-hand view. Again we can think of 
Bachelard writing that,
the real houses of memory [...] do not readily lend themselves to description 
[...] All we communicate to others [about a memory of a home] is an 
orientation towards whichever is secret with out ever being able to tell the 
secret objectively. [...] What would be the use, for instance, in giving the 
plan of the room that was really my room. (Bachelard. 1958. 13)
However, through the action of making the sections, a poetic engagement of walking 
along the road and focussing my attention, the relationship I had with the area was 
enhanced. As with the sketches, the rigor of choosing a section at each changing 
condition forced me into a mode of close observation of the area. I conceived of each 
of the refl ections on Perth Road - the habitual steps of my walk, the serial visions in 
photographs, the plans and sections, the sketches, the montages, and the models - as 
being connected. Each is concerned with a reiteration, another repeating poetic act. 
Each is a piece of the rhythmic progression, piecemeal, step by step accumulation, 
which acts as an allegory of the repetitive process of poetic dwelling. By committing 
this act to paper the nature of the experience was subtly changed as my understanding of 
the places developed.
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Figs 65 - 67: (Williams. 2013). The sections were fi rst drawn on site forcing a different type of looking at the 
surroundings. They are visually iterative, but also show a magnitude of experience linked by steps, engagement, and 
drawing.
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The emptiness of the jug
Heidegger elaborates on the thing/place relationship by continuing his study of the jug 
to illustrate ‘thingness’. This, more than the pencil, begins to have an impact on spatial 
studies due to the emptiness that forms the jug’s centre. Heidegger explores thingness by 
saying that its vessel-nature is not in its solidity but in its emptiness and the engagement 
we have with it.
But not so fast! When we fi ll the jug with wine, do we pour the wine into the 
sides and bottom? At most we pour the wine between the sides and over the 
bottom. [...] The emptiness, the void, is what does the vessel’s holding. The 
empty space, this nothing of the jug, is what the jug is as the holding vessel. 
(Heidegger. 1971b. 166-167) 
It is in the emptiness of the jug that is its use, its absence is a not a negative aspect 
but is a positive one. Whilst the jug does have a physical nature that we can discuss 
objectively, its dimensions for instance, we always perceive it in terms of its use.
Fig 68: (Williams. 2013). The jug’s essence is not its material but its emptiness
The emptiness of the jug
112
Heidegger’s choice of the jug is reminiscent of a similar passage in the Tao Te Ching by 
Lao-Tze. 
The thirty spokes unite in the one nave; but it is on the empty space (for 
the axle), that the use of the wheel depends. Clay is fashioned into vessels; 
but it is on their empty hollowness that their use depends. The door and 
windows are cut out (from the walls) to form an apartment; but it is on the 
empty space (within), that its use depends. Therefore, what has a (positive) 
existence serves for profi table adaptation, and what has not that for (actual) 
usefulness. (Lao-Tze. c.300B.C.E. 8-9)
As in the case of Lao-Tze, Heidegger’s jug is connected metaphorically to the idea of 
space in, and around, buildings. Space in this conception becomes much more than 
just the void between objects. It is not the literal emptiness of the jug or apartment 
that forms the useful aspect of the jug and of the space. It is a fi gurative emptiness that 
allows for appropriation. It is a particular kind of emptiness that is more akin to an 
emptiness providing potential than absence. The emptiness of space is more like the 
emptiness of a blank sheet of paper than the emptiness of a cupboard. 
Lao-Tze tells us that it is the empty space within the apartment that is the actual use of 
a home. We are near to this emptiness in the same way that we are near to the picture on 
the wall and distant from the glasses on our nose. The emptiness of the apartment has 
become a meaningful thing, a meaningful place.
This emptiness of space is like the emptiness found in poetry. As we will see in Chapter 
Three, a building that we understand as empty is open to additional interpretations. The 
jug may be fi lled with water or with wine; the apartment used however one wishes; the 
bus stop became an opportune refuge from a storm; Perth Road contains a thousand 
stories being continually redefi ned. A building that is ‘full’ is prescriptive of how we 
are intended to see it. Like a pristine house where each ornament has a specifi c place, 
or a shopping centre that yells adverts from every surface. Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish 
Museum in Berlin, also discussed in Chapter Three, is so full of its own meaning that an 
individual’s poetic nature is overwhelmed.
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Our poetic experience of the environment demands the perception of the environment 
as empty. Due to the embodied and interpretive nature of our poetic being we require 
an emptiness of spaces in which to dwell. There is an emptiness in any poem. It has 
symbols but is not prescriptive of how these are interpreted. The gaps that it leaves 
allow us, in our poetic recreation of it through reading, to get inside it and it inside 
us. The opposite of emptiness is not fullness as we normally think of it, but is a type 
of fullness of meaning that does not allow our poetry to develop. Metaphorically, our 
relation to places is like the emptiness of the jug and its ability to be fi lled by us; spaces 
are fundamentally empty in some way which allows our appropriation. Emptiness is 
therefore also connected to the idea of the incompleteness of our dwelling. 
Heidegger elaborates on the nature of spaces and their emptiness. The word ‘Raum’, 
‘space’ has in its ancient meaning a connotation of a space “cleared and free, namely 
within a boundary” he says (Heidegger. 1971a. 152). This tells us that space is always 
bounded, however this need not be a physical boundary. We can imagine that a corner 
of a park can be seen as different to the rest of the park; this difference can be read 
as a type of inside space bounded within the park, which itself has boundaries. There 
can be insides within insides. My desk is a zone within a room. Where I write on this 
desk is an inside in the area of the desk. This room is an inside of a building within 
an inside of a street. We are able to perceive the world as a series of insides that exist 
next to each other, through each other, within each other. Their edges are blurred, they 
form perceptual thresholds between one inside and another. This type of thinking is 
necessarily relational (i.e. the desk in relation to the room) and connects rather than 
excludes.
We can infer from Heidegger’s reference to space as cleared room that that which 
is bounded, namely our perception of place, is something expansive rather than 
constrictive. Centrifugal not centripetal. There is not a fence clearly bounding a place, 
as stated by Frampton in Towards a Critical Regionalism when, discussing Building 
Dwelling Thinking, he says that “the condition of ‘dwelling’ and hence ultimately of 
‘being’ can only take place in a domain that is clearly bounded.” (Frampton. 2002b. 
85). This is a misunderstanding of Heidegger’s thinking as saying we need physical 
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boundaries when in fact Heidegger’s spatial boundaries are much more subtle and 
personal. Norberg-Schulz, too, suggests that there is a distinction between insides and 
outsides, 
Whereas landscapes are distinguished by a varied, but basically continuous 
extension, settlements are enclosed entities. Settlement and landscape 
therefore have a fi gure-ground relationship. In general any enclosure 
becomes as a “fi gure” in relation to the extended ground of the landscape. 
A settlement loses its identity if this relationship is corrupted, just as much 
as the landscape loses its identity as a comprehensive extension. (Norberg-
Schulz. 1980. 12)
Seen through this thesis’s focus on poetry, insisting that we are always in the experience, 
this observation by Norberg-Schulz is fundamentally at odds with Heidegger’s concept 
of dwelling because it removes us from being ‘inside’.
This creation of these bounded insides that we feel is instead like lighting a lamp in 
thick fog. The lamp creates a distinct zone which was not previously apparent in the 
indistinct light. The lamplight has created a new place, an ‘inside’ zone within the fog 
constructed by boundaries of light. Due to the poetic nature of Heidegger’s dwelling 
we can see that the perceptions of these insides are perceived by the individuals who 
happen to be within. Our experiences in spaces are like the lamp in the fog and as we 
engage with spaces we become aware of them more fully. The degree to which they 
are unknown reduces. As with the poem, space should have a propensity to be seen as 
empty but it is through one’s experience that it becomes known. The poem becomes 
Fig 69: (Williams. 2013). Understanding a place through experience.
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meaningful to an individual, the place becomes near. Echoing Heidegger, Relph 
notes that, “To be inside a place is to belong to it and to identify with it, and the more 
profoundly inside you are the stronger is this identity with the place.” (Relph. 1976. 49). 
Thus it is possible that we end up with a perceptual view of the world as a series 
of expanding insides. By defi nition we can never be outside of space in this poetic 
interpretation of Heidegger’s texts. However, as Heidegger suggests, our memory of 
insides is continually eroding; we must ever learn to dwell. As we forget the experiences 
of the insides they can become faded, as though the lamp is going out. Details become 
less clear in one’s memory until the space once more ceases to exist. Of course some 
memories hold up against forgetting better than others. By preserving our memories 
of insides we continue to dwell in them (“the nature of dwelling is this sparing 
and preserving”). We thereby continually keep places and memories near through 
our ongoing engagement, by keeping ourselves ‘inside’ them. I think I will always 
remember and remain near to my bus stop that sheltered me from the storm, not least 
because I have spent several years discussing it. We preserve these memories, their 
fundamentally spatial nature transforms the space into a meaningful place. A place for 
Heidegger is a personally meaningful area of space that one feels near to despite any 
intervening distance. Much like the way that we construct nearness to things in our 
Fig 70: (Williams. 2013). We can claim a place through our actions, redefi ning it in our perception.
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minds we construct nearness to places through our dwelling. Places act as nodal points 
that form the skeletal structure of our perception of the world. Like an infl ated balloon 
these retain the boundary of space even when we are not present. 
As an example, for many years my impression of Dundee showed this occurring. My 
main navigation through the city was based on the routes along which I habitually 
travelled. As shown in the fi gure below this linked the area of Perth Road with the 
centre of the town, to the area around Baxter park to the east. However, I had little 
conception of other areas. My understanding of the city was as a strip running parallel 
to the Tay bounded by an unknown mystery to the north. Gradually over the years, with 
both a deliberate effort and many summers spent as a gardener, my understanding of 
Dundee has expanded greatly. Through experience one’s mental construct of that space, 
that was previously undefi ned, becomes formed. 
Our poetic process of dwelling is the means by which we continually revisit experiences 
so that they do not disappear from memory. Dwelling continues indefi nitely, continually 
accumulating spatial experiences. This is the repeating poetic engagement shown 
through my creative practice. Step by step, looking again and again. Our dwelling as a 
continual reengagement preserves the essential emptiness of the environment.
Fig 71: (Williams. 2013). An image of Dundee exploring the routes along which I habitually walked. Those areas that 
I felt I knew the character of the buildings are built up, those that were a mystery were not. The limited boundaries of 
my perception of Dundee several years ago are clearly shown.
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Figs 72 - 74: (Williams. 2013). Various studies of areas in which I preserved memories in Dundee.
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The emptiness of the jug
In Heidegger’s Topology Malpas notes that “a central if neglected, concept at the heart 
of philosophical inquiry is that of place.” (Malpas. 2006. 1) Like Edward Casey he notes 
that “Heidegger’s work is of special relevance to any place-oriented thinker.” (Malpas. 
2006. 3). In terms of the relationship between ‘place’ and ‘space’ Malpas references 
Casey noting that,
the history of place within the Western philosophical tradition has generally 
been one in which place has increasingly been seen as secondary to space 
- typically to a particular notion of space as homogenous, measurable 
extension - and so reduced to a notion of position, simple location, or 
else mere “site.” The way in which place relates to space, time, and other 
conceps and the manner in which these concepts are confi gured has seldom 
been the object of detailed philosophical exploration. (Malpas. 2006. 3)
Place is only ever considered as ‘a’ place, ‘this’ place or ‘that’ place. A measurable 
objective phenomenon. However seen via Heidegger place becomes, in the view of 
Malpas and this thesis, a matter of central importance. The concept of place is linked 
inexorably to our being-in-the-world.
Malpas distinguishes place from space but comments that in the necessarily dimensional 
nature of each there is a degree of overlap. Equally there is overlap between place and 
time. In fact he suggests that place is “a more encompassing notion than either space 
or time, the latter two being presented as complementary modes of dimensionality ties 
to simultaneity and succession respectively. (Malpas. 2006. 27-28) Space relates to 
place in that things happen together in proximity, and time relates in that things occur in 
temporal proximity.
The diffi culty, for Malpas, in clarifying the place/space relationship comes not just that 
there is this necessary overlap but also that place has often been considered as solely a 
spatial phenomenon, 
place is most often treated as either a certain position in space or  else as a 
certain portion of space [...]. This way of understanding place is itself tied 
to a particular conception of space as identical with physical space [...] and 
so as essentially articulated in terms of the measurable and the quantifi able. 
(Malpas. 2006. 28)
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It is not that place is a point in space, ‘a place, but space and time are components 
of place. We experience place as our being with dimensional and temporal aspects. 
Place is, as I noted above, a result of the non-objective way in which we have built 
relationships to the things and built things in our lives, where we have preserved 
memories that we continually revisit while being in the world.
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As a fi nal study I began to explore Perth Road through physical models. These models 
don’t show a single fi xed viewpoint and consequently can be seen as thematically linked 
to the photomontage ‘joiners’. However, these models show aspects of my perceptual 
image of Perth Road in its entirety as opposed to the single fi xed perspective of the 
joiners. When we stand in one place we know well, we are aware of what lies around 
the corner. Consequently these models have many individual moments represented 
together that previously had been considered in isolation. By working through the 
models, once again through poetic engagement and recreation, I was again making 
myself more near to the places along Perth Road. This time however the places were not 
existing separately from one another as they had been in the photomontages but they 
were joined. I was therefore also considering those joining spaces, getting inside them, 
forming more nodal anchor points for the preservation of memories.
What was most important once again was the process by which the model was made 
rather than a preconceived idea of the resulting product. As before, this process allowed 
for my developing relationship to the places that were being represented. Model work 
differs from the work of the previous projects primarily in the time that it takes to 
complete. A sketch takes only moments. The instant of a photograph is prolonged by the 
engagement with handmade montaging afterwards. Models demand engagement over a 
longer period. One is forced to look, look again, and rethink. This continues the layering 
process key to my research. 
I began a scale model with the street pattern of Perth Road showing the adjoining streets 
truncated after a few metres. Using a combination of the sections and photomontages I 
built up the urban edge of the road in a variety of types of timber and card. Whilst the 
proportions are accurate the material choice has no relation to the materials on Perth 
Road. Instead I was interested in studying the sense of enclosure along the route. Areas 
in which I felt exposed, by the police station, by the billboard seating, were built in 
card. White card was used to signify unused spaces, black card indicated exposed but 
populated spaces, perhaps for loading areas or car parks. Timber was used to show areas 
of enclosure and areas that I felt held to the general character of the area. 
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The model was built to appear incomplete. It stands on stilts and its form is spiked. This 
emphasises the spinal route of Perth Road and becomes visible as an inside of a space 
rather than an outside. In addition it creates an air of emptiness, as though more could 
be placed into its gaps. Like our dwelling the piece is not static but full of potential.
Fig 75: (Williams. 2013). Scale model of Perth Road exploring the feelings of the spaces along its length.
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Figs 76 - 79: (Williams. 2013). Views of the street space of the model, the inside of the street
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In another model I carried out an exploration where different centres and qualities were 
portrayed using different materials. This model perverted the scale and form of Perth 
Road in order to give greater importance to the meaningful places, paths, thresholds, 
and things throughout the domain. It consists of a series of cardboard rectangles placed 
unglued side by side like dominoes. My intention was that it would begin as a blank row 
representing Perth Road. I saw each piece of card as continuing metaphor of repeated 
experience as with the walks, sections, sketches, and montages. Each piece of card has 
the resonance of repeated footsteps and repeated experiences. In the same way that the 
step by step of repeating experience has been discussed throughout this chapter, the 
cardboard pieces are each an act of contemplation and ultimately of bringing me near to 
Perth Road. Over the course of making the model I would, by removing rectangles and 
replacing them with more detailed pieces, build up the model’s complexity. In this way 
it is genuinely unfi nishable since pieces can forever be replaced.
Fig 80: (Williams. 2013). Abstracted model showing individual footsteps, implied thresholds, squares, landmark 
elements, and views towards that Tay.
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Through this process I built up the adjoining streets and lanes, some of which I 
furnished with my sketches of views along their length. The nature of thresholds 
between differing ‘insides’ was explored with wire arches roughly at the hazy border 
between perceptual zones. For instance, there is the space near my home that I feel most 
strongly upon entering after a long day; the space around the university is bounded by 
a turn in the road on one side and a park on the other. Other areas between these two 
are derived from views to the Tay or the width of the pavement and a variety, of other 
almost insignifi cant cues are visualised with simple wires or pieces of card.
Fig 81: (Williams. 2013). A square representative of the graveyard outside St. Peter’s church. Another manifestation 
of the experience that adds further layers to my perception of the reality of the place.
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Fig 82: (Williams. 2013). A view all the way from the university to my home. The model shows the step by step 
accumulation of walks and memories and the accumulation of a variety of observations such as the sketches reprinted 
and attached to the model on the left hand side.
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Concluding remarks to the chapter
In Building Dwelling Thinking Heidegger says that we have forgotten that we are 
dwellers. By drawing on his thoughts of poetic engagement from ...Poetically Man 
Dwells... and the relationship that we have with places in The Thing we can see that 
being dwellers consists of a continual creative and engaged building of experiences in 
particular spaces that affects our perception of spaces in general. 
For Heidegger, dwelling is a topic that stretches far beyond the discussion of houses. 
It goes to the heart of what it is to be. We are insofar as we dwell; the process of this 
consists of a building of memories and experiences in spaces, which we then remember 
and preserve. The nature of places is that they are near to us. They can be near to 
us because they have the essential emptiness found in poetry. They form centres, 
nodal points in which we preserve our memories. These are the skeletal frame of our 
perceptual image of the world, as everything hangs off the important places in our 
perception.
Heidegger states that we need this real meaning of dwelling and building in order 
to understand the nature of building buildings. We are building, adapting, and 
reconsidering our relationships with places continually. We do this as a repeating 
poetic engagement with places. My creative practice made this evident: by exploring 
my dwelling I was dwelling. Heidegger says “Yet as soon as man gives thought to his 
homelessness, it is a misery no longer.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 159). 
My creative practice on places connected me more deeply to these places. This 
experience can be extrapolated to the construction of buildings and will be discussed 
in the following chapters. If one were to build a building in a place then the qualities of 
that place would become intimately known through the experience, just like my creative 
practice. What would have been made would be not only the product, the building, but 
fi rst and foremost the memories and experiences in that place. Experientially one would 
be nearer to that place than before.
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However we can go further. We continually create place associations and memories 
which we then refl ect on and alter our actions in the future. This is an iterative process, 
a back and forth between creating and thinking. Like my creative practice, sometimes 
we build buildings in this fashion, as noted in Adam Sharr’s comments about the 
relationship between setting and using the dinner table. In the following chapter the 
iterative building process will be developed with respect to a farmhouse in the Black 
Forest that Heidegger mentions as an archetype of the way in which buildings were built 
as dwelling processes in the past. This building strategy of repeated poetic engagement 
will be referred to as Building by Dwelling since it is building in a similar fashion to the 
process of dwelling. That is to say this is dwelling as an engaged temporal act similar to 
my own creative practice. 
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Chapter Two: Building Buildings by Dwelling
Building buildings as an externalisation of the continual process of dwelling.
Fig 83: (Sharr. 2006. 16). Heidegger’s own hut. 
131
Chapter outline
Architectural interpretations of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling
Bringing places near
Cities built by dwellers
Architectural control 
Providing frameworks
Building continually provides no guarantee of dwelling.
Heidegger’s lack of interest in architecture
Concluding remarks - Building for Dwelling
132
Chapter outline
In this chapter we will begin a search for the architectural implications of Heidegger’s 
concept of dwelling. In Chapter One we saw that Heidegger’s texts on dwelling are a 
call to remember the link between building, dwelling, and thinking. These three are 
continually ongoing simultaneously, they “come from the workshop of long experience 
and incessant practice.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 158). Through this thesis we can understand 
dwelling as a poetic process of engaging with our surroundings and bringing them near 
to us.
We will now see that we can bring places near to us through creative practice, as with 
my sketches, montages, and models. Additionally, and recalling Ingold’s statement that 
“the forms of buildings arise as a kind of crystallisation of human activity within an 
environment” (Ingold. 2000. 186), we will see that by building buildings the site of the 
building can become a meaningful place.
Going further we will see that, by building the building as a response to the always 
changing needs of our dwelling, a house that suits our continual process of dwelling 
poetically is created. Heidegger’s example of this is of a farmhouse in the Black Forest 
of Germany. This house, like our dwelling, can be seen as never fi nalised since it 
remains open to change and appropriation as our lives develop. This continual building 
process can be considered building by dwelling. It is a process that externalises the 
relationship we have with a place, building memories upon memories accumulating 
experiences by our dwelling.
Following this Black Forest farmhouse, Heidegger’s deepest foray into architectural 
critique, we will extend the logic of building for oneself by proposing an urban theory. 
Heidegger’s original problem was with the feeling of homelessness that he saw resulting 
from mass housing. This proposed urban theory will suggest that a realisation of the 
architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling is manifest by a society of 
self builders.
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Architectural interpretations of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling
First, however, we should explore how Heidegger has been interpreted by the 
architectural profession in the past. The fact that his texts have been misunderstood by 
the architectural community is clear. For Christian Norberg-Schulz dwelling is an act of 
becoming at home in an environment. In Genius Loci - Towards a Phenomenology of 
Architecture (1980) he states that we dwell most fully when we can both orient within 
and identify with our environment. That is to say when we know where we are and we 
understand what the environment is. The two major elements that we understand in the 
environment are, he says, landscape and settlement“… the structure of a place ought to 
be described in terms of “landscape” and “settlement”, and analysed by means of the 
categories of “space” and “character” (Norberg-Schulz. 1980. 11). Space, for Norberg-
Schulz, is three dimensional actuality of the environment, character is its atmosphere. 
As we saw in the previous chapter however, this leads Norberg-Schulz to a distinction 
between the apparent solid-void relationship between settlements and landscapes. As 
seen by this thesis, this view places an unacceptable separation between the dweller 
and the environment. Seen in this fashion Norberg-Schulz is placing barriers between 
an individual and the world by taking an extreme birds eye view and seeing the city as 
solid, the environment as void.
He develops his relationship with Heidegger in The Concept of Dwelling (1985) saying 
that we understand our environment at various scales of settlement, urban space, 
institution and house each of which have differing degrees of personal and public 
interaction and differing degrees of specifi city. Seen altogether, from the largest scale 
to the smallest, gives our impression of our place in the world. “Together, settlement, 
urban space, institution and house constitute a total environment. This environment, 
however, is always related to what is given, that is, to a landscape with general as well 
as particular qualities. To dwell, therefore, also means to become friends with a natural 
place.” (Norberg-Schulz. 1985. 7) More specifi cally, when these environmental scales 
agree and support one another, so that for instance, perhaps a material on a street corner 
can inform one of the greater environmental situation, we feel a sense of dwelling more 
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fully. This connection between levels lead to his assertion, discussed in the introduction 
to this thesis that the task of the architect is to visualise the spirit of the place, build in 
accordance with this, and thereby help us to dwell.
Norberg-Schulz states that an understanding of Heidegger leads to the conclusion that 
the task of the architect is to visualise the “distinct character” of places. In doing so, he 
writes, the building will fi t in with existing conditions and help individuals to sense their 
place in the world.
Since ancient times the genius loci, or “spirit of place”, has been recognised 
as the concrete reality man has to face and come to terms with in his daily 
life. Architecture means to visualise the genius loci, and the task of the 
architect is to create meaningful places, whereby he helps man to dwell. 
(Norberg-Schulz. 1980. 5) 
Norberg-Schulz’s aim is to tap into the qualities of places and build an architectural 
product that fi ts into the surroundings as an ‘intensifi er’ of these existing qualities. 
The building will in some way make evident the beauty of the surroundings or the 
materiality of the local stone, for instance. This, in Norberg-Schulz’s view, aids our 
fi nding an ‘existential foothold’ which he claims is synonymous with dwelling. Through 
the interpretation provided by this thesis we can suggest that this is a misunderstanding 
of Heidegger’s fourfold which as we saw in Chapter One concerns the fi xing of our 
memories upon things rather than fi xing the local conditions in buildings. Although 
Norberg-Schulz’s texts on Heidegger are the most common reference for architectural 
Heideggerians, the underlying philosophical position taken by this thesis - that if 
we look to Heidegger’s comments on poetry as suggesting that we are actively and 
continually involved in the creation of our perceptions of our environment - differs 
so greatly from Norberg-Schulz’s position that there is little more profi t in continued 
analysis.
Heidegger writes that “Dwelling insofar as it keeps or secures the fourfold in things, 
is, as this keeping, a building.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 149). The fourfold as we saw in 
Chapter One is the earth, sky, divinities, and mortals, an intensely diffi cult metaphysical 
concept that is ignored by many who discuss his work. It seems that Norberg-Schulz 
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reads the above quote as saying that buildings should secure the existing local 
conditions (the earth, sky, divinities, and mortals) and thereby visualise the essence of 
that place. However, with the focus on creating an architectural product he interprets 
this as securing physical elements. 
In contrast, with this thesis’s focus on poetry, the fourfold can be seen as elements of 
our perceptual understanding of the world. The fourfold understood in this way can not 
be distilled into aspects of building and placed on site, thereby making us more aware 
of local conditions. Instead, the securing of the fourfold in things is the securing of 
our perception. It is the way we fi x memories of experiences in places. These ‘places’ 
are afterwards remembered as signifi cant. We have an experience, a picnic under a 
tree in a fi eld, and we secure the memories of that event - the earth, sky, unknowable 
divinities, and ourselves as temporal mortals - to the place, to the tree and the fi eld. We 
remember this and we are near to the memory and therefore near to the place. A reading 
of Heidegger’s quote above with this view now suggests that, “Dwelling [the process] 
secures [our perception of] the fourfold in things, [this is a process of] building.”
Due to many architects understanding the fourfold as physical elements, Heidegger’s 
thoughts are often used to support the advocacy of a contemporary vernacular style. 
In copying local styles the essence of a place is upheld and, it is assumed, dwelling 
proceeds. This vernacular interpretation of Heidegger’s texts is augmented by the 
vernacular style of Heidegger’s architectural example of dwelling, namely the Black 
Forest farmhouse, despite the fact that this style was not what Heidegger sought for 
architects to emulate. He clearly states that “Our reference to the Black Forest farm 
in no way means that we should or could go back to building such houses; rather, it 
illustrates by a dwelling that has been how it was able to build.” (Heidegger. 1971a 
158). We will see later that the farmhouse in the Black Forest can be seen as a metaphor 
for the way that we dwell poetically.
Given Heidegger’s use of historical romanticism and etymological studies - as well 
as the appropriateness of vernacular buildings to the local climate, local society, and 
a sense of place that Heidegger is interested in - it is seductive to link the vernacular 
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with an idea of Heideggerian dwelling. Were it not for a full reading of Heidegger’s 
texts then this link between dwelling and the vernacular would seem clear. Indeed, 
the term ‘dwelling’ is frequently used in this context without reference to Heidegger 
at all. For example the book Dwellings published by Phaidon consists purely of 
traditional buildings from across the globe and makes no reference to Heidegger’s 
particular type of dwelling. However, this book is a good example of how Norberg-
Schulz misunderstands Heidegger’s concept of dwelling. Vernacular buildings are 
considered here as archetypal dwellings. The igloo, for instance, is chosen since, “in its 
authentic form it clearly demonstrated how resources, technology, climate, environment, 
settlement patterns, lifestyle, values, and meanings all play their part in shaping a 
dwelling type appropriate to a particular culture.” (Oliver. 1987. 212). This study of 
vernacular building is informative and well constructed and makes no reference to 
Heidegger so cannot be said to be misinterpreting him. However we must remember 
that with his concept of dwelling Heidegger is always talking of poetic experiences, not 
mimicking traditional styles.
Additionally, the linking of Heidegger to vernacular styles might be an attempt by 
architects to distance themselves from Heidegger’s romanticising of rural Germany that 
many see as tainting his philosophy with associations of the “Volk” rhetoric of the Nazi 
party in portraying a particular German People. This is a topic that has been discussed 
in depth elsewhere, particularly by Malpas - who argues that Heidegger’s philosophy on 
place developed long after his association with Nazism (Malpas. 2006) - and Bourdieu 
- who argues that Heidegger’s philosophy is irrevocably intertwined with the rhetoric 
of the Nazi party (Bourdieu. 1991). It might be that by using the common defi nition of 
‘dwellings’ - the vernacular buildings - and incorrectly assuming that Heidegger is using 
the word in the same way, architects can distance themselves from this discussion.
Sometimes the connection to the genius-loci is carried out in more contemporary 
styles. In the recent case of Herzog & de Meuron’s Parrish Art Museum in Long Island, 
documented in The Architectural Review, this building “wants to be a matrix of the 
landscape itself: it makes visible what is otherwise only conceptually accessible.” 
(Slessor. 2013. 34). This understanding comes from an interpretation of Heidegger as 
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saying that “nature does not simply predate the insertion of the architecture [...], but 
architecture frames the landscape so that it becomes, for the fi rst time, visible with all its 
inherent qualities. [It] makes things accessible to consciousness and thus renders them 
intelligible.” (Slessor. 2013. 34). However this, as we have seen, is not what Heidegger 
meant. What becomes intelligible is one’s relation to that place, not the place itself.
•
Another, different, interpretation of the architectural implications of Heidegger’s 
concept of dwelling is the way in which Heidegger’s texts are sometimes used to argue 
for richly sensory environments that compel one’s experiential engagement. 
For instance Peter Zumthor in Peter Zumthor Works begins by quoting Building 
Dwelling Thinking, illustrating the infl uence that Heidegger’s work has had on the 
architect. This teaches Zumthor that, “The thought process is not abstract, but works 
with spatial images.” (Zumthor. 1998. 7). In his design process Zumthor suggests that 
he aims to draw from his own spatial experiences in order to realise a design concept, 
In my mind, I envisage what it will feel like to live in the house I am 
designing, I try to imagine its physical emanations, recalling at the same 
time all the experiences of place and space we are capable of making, those 
that we have made and those that we have yet to make, and I dream of the 
experiences I would like us to make in the house as yet unbuilt. (Zumthor. 
1998. 8)
In his buildings Zumthor often uses evocative lighting and sensuous material choices. 
These are buildings that one wants to engage with, to caress. We will know these 
buildings not only through sight but through our body. His writing about his work 
frequently invokes subtleties of memory and association. In Thinking Architecture he 
fondly recalls a memory of a door handle leading through a house from the garden,
That door handle still seems to me like a special sign of entry into a world 
of different moods and smells. I remember the sound of the gravel under 
my feet, the soft gleam of the waxed oak staircase, I can hear the heavy 
front door closing behind me as I walk along the dark corridor and enter the 
kitchen, the only really brightly lit room in the house. (Zumthor. 2006a. 7)
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However, for Heidegger, the entire building profession separates the dweller from 
building. Sharr notes that although “Zumthor attempts to reconcile Heideggerian 
building with architecture […] the philosopher would fi nd the role of architects and the 
notion of architecture unhelpful. For Heidegger, Zumthor would be part of the problem, 
not part of the solution.” (Sharr. 2007. 98). 
Zumthor’s buildings, and the sensorially stimulating phenomenological branch of 
contemporary architecture that they represent are always objects, complete products. 
One’s own securing of experiences in space is subdued by the intense fullness of the 
building. Although they are worthwhile in terms of a discussion of the architectural 
implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling, often their infl uence stops at their 
borders and Heidegger’s philosophy deserves a larger place in the study of the 
environment. It is more fundamental than building design and strikes at the heart of the 
conception of our place in the environment.
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Fig 84: (Zumthor. 1998. 151). Zumthor’s Thermal Baths, Vals. The enveloping nature of our environment is made 
especially evident here by placing the building’s user in water. The building plays with the way that water sounds in 
different spaces, how we feel in different temperatures. The experience of different textures and sensuous materials 
attempts to draw us into engagement with the building. 
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Bringing places near
As we have learned from Heidegger, we bring places near to us through our dwelling. 
This is the continually repeating engaged experience of being-in-the-world. Discussing 
the idea of home, a place to which we are surely most near, Gaston Bachelard in 
The Poetics of Space expresses ideas that are relevant to this ‘bringing near’. Like 
Heidegger, Bachelard believes that the measurements of a space are less interesting 
and less useful than an exploration of emotional responses to a space, “a house is fi rst 
and foremost a geometrical object, one which we are tempted to analyze rationally.” 
Bachelard states,
A geometrical object of this kind ought to resist metaphors that welcome 
the human body and the human soul. But transposition to the human plane 
takes place immediately whenever a house is considered as space for cheer 
and intimacy, space that is supposed to condense and defend intimacy. 
(Bachelard. 1958. 47-48) 
For Bachelard, although the house is describable by its measurements it always 
becomes something more, the nearness we feel towards it is immeasurable. The way 
that our experiences affect our relationship to the house is expressed by Bachelard when 
he quotes the poem ‘Wind House’ by Louis Guillame,
Long did I build you, oh house!
With each memory I carried stones
From the band to your topmost wall
And I saw your roof mellowed by time
Changing as the sea
Dancing against a background of clouds
With which it mingled its smoke.
..................................................................
Wind house, abode that a breath effaced.
(Bachelard. 1958. 54-55)
This house represents all of our houses and all of the places to which we feel near. 
“Long did I build you, oh house! With each memory I carried stones.” This is not the 
literal building of the house but the accumulation of memories in a way that we can 
now recognise as dwelling. We all place our metaphorical stones among the places we 
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experience, like Hansel leaving a trail of bread crumbs we identify meaningful places by 
the cairns that accumulate. Thus through experience we become near to a place through 
each successive use of it. However, nearing, that is the process of becoming near, can 
be more than just a coincidental nearing of places through experience and instead be 
something deliberate. 
•
Nearness also increases through creative refl ections. This should be no surprise, 
dwelling itself, as discussed in Chapter One, is a creative act. By creating an artefact 
with the same engaged focus we simply give form to the act of dwelling we do always. 
As an example, we can see nearness increasing in the writing of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
Rousseau documented relationships with places in his Reveries of a Solitary Walker 
(1782), a series of short essays remarking on his memories of experiences. This is 
particularly evident in his ‘Fifth Walk’ when he discusses his engagement with a 
particular place. Made twice homeless, once by exile from his native country, another 
time stoned out of his home in Môtiers, and about to be deported to England, Rousseau 
fi nds a home on a small island on a lake. 
I could have desired that this place of refuge be made my lifelong prison, 
that I be shut up here for the rest of my days, deprived of any chance or 
hope of escaping and forbidden all communication with the mainland, so 
that not knowing what went on in the world, I should forget its existence 
and be forgotten by those who lived in it. [...] I could have written [a book] 
about every grass in the meadows, every moss in the woods, every lichen 
covering the rocks – and I did not want to leave even one blade of grass or 
atom of vegetation without a full and detailed description. (Rousseau. 1782. 
82-85)
Even many years later, when writing of this time in his life, Rousseau retains a sense 
of nearness to this home that belies its temporal and spatial distance. “I should like to 
know what there was in it that was attractive enough to give me such deep, tender and 
lasting regrets that even fi fteen years later I am incapable of thinking of this beloved 
place without being overcome by pangs of longing.” (Rousseau. 1782. 87).
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Rousseau states that the nature of writing about his experiences provides a link, despite 
any intervening period of time or spatial distance, back to the event. He has anchored 
himself in this place through the act of writing about it and the essay now forms a link 
back to remembering the place. He states that in years to come, “I shall recall in reading 
them the pleasure I have in writing them and by this reviving times past I shall as it 
were double the space of my existence.” (Rousseau. 1782. 34). 
Rousseau’s creation of something that explores a relationship with a place brings to his 
mind the experience of that place and preserves the nearness that he felt. The creative 
act, inherently questioning and necessarily self refl ective, increases the strength of the 
original sense of nearness by making nearness a deliberate focus of thought. This is 
more than Bachelard’s incidental bringing near of one’s home (Long did I build you, oh 
house!), it can become a method for nearing; for dwelling.
I have mentioned already the unforeseen fondness and nearness that I began to feel 
towards the interior of my tent whilst travelling. This was an increasing nearness simply 
through living, carrying stones with each memory as Bachelard might have put it. A 
similar experience occurred when attempting to draw places from memory, discussed 
briefl y in Chapter One. Once the places had been sketched they were perceived 
differently when I actually revisited them. The place where I had stood, in my mind’s 
eye, now had an additional layer of experience upon it. The creative refl ections on 
places, such as with these memory sketches and all of my Perth Road work, added 
layers of experience onto the perception of the places. I see through these, as I see 
through all my memories, colouring the perception of these particular places.
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Figs 85 - 86: (Williams. 2013). Through my creative practice I was bringing the places nearer to me. Adding a layer 
of experience through which my perception of that place was altered. 
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•
Extending this logic, we can also build to alter our relationship with a place. A sense 
of nearness can develop through a physical altering of the environment. For Rousseau 
nearness develops through the creating of textual responses, and for me it developed 
through creative practices. For Simon Unwin the familial ritual of setting up a picnic 
at a beach is an enactment of primal place making that we can see as making this sense 
of nearness. It is an example of how our refl ections upon the place and our experiences 
there can be envisioned in buildings (Unwin. 2006). Like Sharr’s example of a dining 
table, explored in Chapter One, the ‘building’ of the picnic arrangement and the 
‘dwelling’ of individuals around the picnic area are inseparably linked.
This connection between actions and organisation is picked up by Adam Sharr as 
being particularly Heideggerian. The many decisions about where and how to lay 
out the picnic, in the sun or shade for instance, or who sits next to each other, is “a 
choreography of small scale place identifi cations.” (Sharr. 2007. 53). 
Figs 87 & 88 (Unwin. 2006). For Unwin these are primal place making decisions that serve to structure a relationship 
between place and user. They are defi ned by factors as large as the solar path and the fl ow of wind, and as small as 
where the sandwiches are in relation to the kids playing in the sand. The place exists in the memories of the family 
even after it has been deconstructed.
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As with the effect of Rousseau’s writings and my creative practice, the site of the picnic 
will be altered in the minds of the picnickers: it will have become near through their 
direct engagement with the site. We can imagine that the site may become remembered 
as ‘their’ corner of the park, or be under ‘their’ tree. This picnic construction, of 
incremental decisions based on foreseeing dwelling whilst remaining inherently fl exible 
in the face of altering conditions, is a sort of building by dwelling. By building in a 
place that place becomes near to the builder. This is the same when we are ‘building’ 
memories, ‘building’ a creative response, ‘building’ the arrangement of a picnic or a 
dinner table, or indeed ‘building’ buildings.
Heidegger outlines this in his discussion of a hypothetical farmhouse in the Black Forest 
that forms his deepest foray into architectural critique. For the philosopher this is an 
archetypal example of dwelling and building having happened together in a way that 
he believes rarely occurs anymore. The farmhouse is shown as resulting from many 
years of dwelling having happened, again recalling Ingold’s comments about buildings 
being the crystalisation of human activity. The form and character of this example was 
almost certainly infl uenced by Heidegger’s own small hut in the same area of southern 
Germany, the relationship with which Adam Sharr discusses in Heidegger’s Hut 
(Sharr. 2006). This small hut, where he frequently went to write and to think, provided 
Heidegger with a place that he seemed to feel nearer to than his other residence in a 
nearby town. In addition to his understanding of this hut, other houses in the Black 
Forest area provide Heidegger with a farmhouse that he sees as resulting from a long 
process of dwelling having happened. 
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Fig 90: A style of building typical in the Black Forest, Germany (Sharr. 2006. 69). Heidegger’s example of the Black 
Forest farmhouse was likely derived from examples such as these two buildings.
Fig 89: (Sharr. 2006. 16). Heidegger’s own hut. 
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The example of the Black Forest farmhouse comes at the end of Building Dwelling 
Thinking and encompasses all of Heidegger’s views on the engaged poetic nature 
of dwelling including: one’s increasing nearness to place through poetic actions; a 
rejection of the dimensional measurements of space; the preservation of memories; 
and the fourfold perception of oneness with the world. Although it is tempting to 
see Heidegger’s reference to the farmhouse as advocation of vernacular building by 
studying the buildings that infl uenced it, Heidegger is clear that it is not the style of the 
house that is important, as we have already seen (Heidegger. 1971a. 158). The poetic 
interpretation taken by this thesis suggests that what is important is the process by 
which the farmhouse was built. 
Heidegger says that this farmhouse was “built by the dwelling of peasants” (Heidegger. 
1971a. 157). Note that it was not built by the usual practices of building, such as sawing 
or hammering. At the very least Heidegger’s language suggests that these are ancillary 
to the real process of building. Heidegger is clear that dwelling built the building. 
Central to this idea is that the acts of building and dwelling did not occur one after the 
other, as though the building was built fi rst and then the inhabitants began to use it to 
dwell. Instead the processes of dwelling and building were linked organically, as with 
the picnic or dining table. The requirements of life ordered the arrangement of the 
building, from the rooms and the roof to the paint, presumably changing over the years 
as family members were born, died, married, or changed their requirements in the many 
other ways that life demands. At the same time the building imposed conditions upon 
the lives of the inhabitants through its solid form. The house faces south and is sheltered 
from the wind. Its roof pitch holds the winter snow and protects it from stormy weather. 
In many ways the house is typical of the vernacular style of the area; but Heidegger’s 
point is that it is unique to the families who lived and continue to live there, due to 
their infl uence on it through their dwelling and building. Sharr notes that in this house 
“Every layer of paint, every drill mark, fi tted hook, or gouge in a wall is akin to the 
soot-blackened timbers or carved stones which provide archaeologists with clues.” 
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(Sharr. 2007. 70). It has this archaeological potential due to the fact that it has been built 
over time, incrementally, as a response to the dwelling of the inhabitants. As conditions 
changed the building form changed and adapted. It stands as a palimpsest of their lives.
Heidegger contrasts this with contemporary buildings. His example is of mass housing, 
in which he perceived homelessness to be occurring due to a lack of personal poetic 
growth. Mass housing is not built, as it were, from the ground-up by individuals, rather 
it is arbitrarily superimposed from a position of detachment upon a subjugated site and 
people.
Heidegger’s example of building buildings by dwelling is an externalisation and 
crystallisation of the nebulous processes of building, dwelling, and thinking that occur 
within us as part of our being. It is a process of incremental building over time in a 
physical fashion that matches dwelling’s mental accumulation. We recognise that our 
inner self is never complete; similarly, we can see that it is impossible to complete a 
home in any idealised dwelling form. This iterative, temporal, process is similar to the 
idea of sketches developed in the previous chapter, where each action is defi ned by the 
actions it follows whilst defi ning the actions it precedes.
Jonathan Hill notes that, “Whether or not they are architects, when the designers are also 
the users of the building the building process has the potential to be not the production 
of a fi xed object but an endless, fl owing cycle of designing, making and using.” (Hill. 
2003. 58). The strong bond that develops between the dweller and the building is easily 
imagined. As we saw in Chapter One when architect Wiltold Rybczynski built his own 
home he noted that “Each shovel of gravel, each nail hammered, each board sawn, 
settled me more fi rmly in the meadow […] I was now rooted in place.” (Rybczynski. 
1989. 192). He discusses the romance of building one’s own home, of “playing out an 
ancient ritual” (Rybczynski. 1990. 129). He goes on to describe the similarities between 
two families who built their own homes. One, a Swedish architect couple who built their 
house over a period of years, adding to it whenever necessary. The other, a relatively 
poor Mexican family, who built and adapted their home over a period of years. For 
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Rybczynski, and in a particularly Heideggerian fashion, both instances showed 
“evidence of how individuals can transform a place, and hence make it particular, not by 
grand design but by the small celebrations of everyday life.” (Rybczynski. 1990. 185). 
With my creative practice I was becoming near to two entities, the place of study but 
also the artefact itself. When a building is built, however, the place and the artefact are 
fully linked in place. By this process of engaged making one becomes near. 
The concern for the task of building, both by making-an-artefact and engaging-with-a-
place, is what we can learn from the farmhouse in the Black Forest. Bachelard in The 
Poetics of Space discusses the poetics of concerned actions. 
The minute we apply a glimmer of consciousness to a mechanical gesture, 
or practice phenomenology while polishing a piece of old furniture, we 
sense new impressions come into being beneath this familiar domestic duty. 
For consciousness rejuvenates everything, giving a quality of beginning 
to the most everyday actions. It even dominates memory. How wonderful 
it is to really become once more the inventor of a mechanical action! [...] 
Objects that are cherished in this way really are born of an intimate light, 
and they attain to a higher degree of reality than indifferent objects, or those 
that are defi ned by geometric reality. (Bachelard. 1958. 67-68)
In this he echoes Heidegger in saying how much nearer this made artefact will be to the 
maker and at the same time forms by implication what we might be tempted to see as a 
critique of mass housing or detached architectural processes.
Thoreau, too, advocated the benefi ts of building one’s own home over purchasing ready 
mades as something more fully in keeping with the essence of our being.
There is some of the same fi tness in a man’s building his own house that 
there is in a bird’s building its own nest. Who knows but if men constructed 
their dwellings with their own hands, and provided food for themselves 
and families simply and honestly enough, the poetic faculty would be 
universally developed, as birds universally sing when they are so engaged? 
But alas! we do like cowbirds and cuckoos, which lay their eggs in nests 
which other birds have built, and cheer no traveller with their chattering and 
unmusical notes. Shall we forever resign the pleasure of construction to the 
carpenter? (Thoreau. 1854. 29) 
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Thoreau’s hut on the edge of Walden pond was his retreat in response to his general 
sense of misanthropy. It was a place where he could muse on the conditions of life. 
In this hut, built by his own hands, he found a sense of belonging. However, unlike 
Rybczynski’s house, Thoreau built not just with his hands, but, like Heidegger’s 
farmhouse, iteratively in response to the conditions of life. In this process he sees 
beauty,
What of architectural beauty I now see, I know has gradually grown from 
within outward, out of the necessities and character of the indweller, who 
is the only builder, - out of some unconscious truthfulness, and nobleness, 
without ever a thought for the appearance; and whatever additional 
beauty of this kind is destined to be produced will be preceded by a like 
unconscious beauty of life. (Thoreau. 1854. 30)
It should not be assumed that by advocating the benefi ts of self-building as a means of 
dwelling this thesis intends to extol the virtues of some imagined and idealised ‘simpler 
time’. However, arguably, this is something that Heidegger was frequently guilty of. Nor 
is it an echo Williams Morris and the Arts and Crafts movement’s desire to romanticise 
the humbleness of toil, however Heideggerian this attitude might be as well. In Change 
by Design, Tim Brown describes William Morris as “the most articulate spokesman for 
the view that the industrial revolution had ushered in a world of unimaginable riches but 
one drained of feeling, passion, and deep human engagement.” (Brown. 2009. 113). In a 
similar fashion to Heidegger, Morris held an overly romantic view of the past, he “gazed 
backward toward a hopelessly idealised vision of the medieval craftsman producing his 
own goods.” (Brown. 2009. 114). 
Instead, we might agree with Matthew Crawford who in The Case for Working with 
Your Hands discusses the worth of manual work arguing that it is both more emotionally 
and intellectually stimulating than much knowledge based work. The central point of his 
argument is that the engagement with one’s task, combined with the tangible outcome 
makes working with one’s hands emotionally and intellectually stimulating (Crawford. 
2009). Crawford states that, 
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I want to avoid the precious images of manual work that intellectuals 
sometimes traffi c in. I also have little interest in wistful notions of a 
‘simpler’ life that is somehow more authentic, or more democratically 
valorous for being ‘working class.’ (Crawford. 2009. 6)
Nor does he believe that manual work is in response to frugality. Instead, his desire is 
to show, like Thoreau, that manual work can address a deeper aspect of ourselves. He 
says that “We want to feel that our world is intelligible, so we can be responsible for it.” 
(Crawford. 2009. 8). In this, Crawford echoes Heidegger’s idea that engagement with 
things allows one to make them meaningful and draw them near.
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Cities built by dwellers
Putting aside for a moment the advantages of building one’s own home, as seen in the 
farmhouse in the Black Forest, the problem that begins Heidegger’s thought in Building 
Dwelling Thinking was that of homelessness caused by mass housing. Mass housing 
is symptomatic of a society that has forgotten that they are dwellers. Consequently 
this society allows the process of building buildings to become separated from the 
process of dwelling. Mass housing becomes symptom, cause, and manifestation of 
our homelessness. It fools us into thinking that we are complete when we are in fact 
made up of a process of fragments continually building and eroding. The homogenous 
sprawl provides no potential for one’s own bringing places near save within the physical 
boundaries of one’s own house and garden and within limits of DIY and redecorating.
The solution that Heidegger offers, the farmhouse in the Black Forest, has clear parallels 
with the beautiful house that Rybczynski built and Thoreau’s hut by Walden pond. 
However, when we think of the architectural implications of these examples we see 
that they are rural solutions to an urban problem. Heidegger’s concept of dwelling is of 
course more nuanced than a qualitative judgement between rural and urban building; 
however, given the distinction between urban and rural in architectural theory, this is an 
interesting problem. If we all remembered that we were dwellers, as Heidegger wished, 
then an urban solution would surely result. Primarily, the importance of this observation 
is that it seems it was an issue that Heidegger did not address in any way. What might an 
urbanism that resulted from a society of dwellers be? It seems probable that individuals 
building buildings as dwellers would construct a city of continually changing spaces as 
they alter and adjust the requirements of life, just like the Black Forest farmhouse.
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Can we imagine housing on a large scale built by dwellers, like those at the Black Forest 
farmhouse? Houses would be built by the individuals who owned them, individuals who 
accumulate experiences and are incomplete. A society of builders building their own 
homes that would stand as a palimpsest of a lifetime of decisions. The houses would be 
incomplete too, developing depending on one’s requirements and means. These houses 
would not foster the idea that the owner is complete since the owner, as a dweller, 
recognises their ultimate incompleteness and continually develops the house.
Freud’s discussion of Rome, is again educative. Used in Chapter One to elaborate 
the way we iteratively construct memories and associations, and the fact that we ‘see 
through’ these to perceive spaces, Freud shines a light not only on our mental landscape, 
but also the nature of cities. Rome is, he says
[...] an entity, that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into 
existence will have passed away and all the earlier phases of development 
contrive to exist alongside the latest one. [...] Where the Coliseum now 
stands we could at the same time admire Nero’s vanished Golden House. On 
the Piazza of the Pantheon we should fi nd not only the Pantheon of to-day, 
as it was bequeathed to us by Hadrian, but, on the same site, the original 
edifi ce erected by Agrippa; indeed, the same piece of ground would be 
supporting the church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva and the ancient temple 
over which it was built. And the observer would perhaps only have to 
change the direction of his glance or his position in order to call up the one 
view or the other. (Freud. 1929. 7)
Cities are ever changing, adapting, accumulating and de-constructing. They change and 
alter over time and are never fi nished. For instance, the constant building and rebuilding 
of Rome could perhaps be seen as an enactment of dwelling. Seen from a large enough 
scale and on a long enough time scale, cities must appear as ever changing, incomplete, 
manifestations of dwelling. However, these changes occur outwith the hands of the 
inhabitants and at scales that are large enough to be barely perceptible.
Heidegger’s call is for all mortals to try “on their part, on their own, to bring dwelling 
to the fullness of its nature” (Heidegger. 1971a. 159). The way that contemporary 
cities change acts upon individuals, rather than being changed by individuals. A 
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society of dwellers, however, might enact change and build relationships with places 
on comprehensible scales. This would be a society of dwellers like Thoreau and 
Rybczynski, building for themselves out of and for their dwelling experiences.
This urban situation already exists, although it is marred with diffi culties. Rybczynski 
points out that building one’s own home is considered by many to be a luxury but 
“paradoxically, it is a luxury that almost all poor people in the so-called underdeveloped 
world enjoy.” (Rybczynski. 1989. 189). Perhaps an urban manifestation of dwelling can 
be seen in the shanty towns of the world. The idea of extolling the benefi ts of shanty 
towns will undoubtedly strike many as unsound. But what is of interest is the form and 
process of the shanty town, not the socio-economic failings that precede their creation. 
What is of interest is a view of building as dwellers, building by dwelling, the shanty 
town can be seen as experiential engagement turned into shape. 
•
Commonly considered to be places of negative qualities, for a variety of good reasons, 
the assumption that shanty towns are universally awful has been challenged in various 
places. Although in the forward to the UN-Habitat report, The Challenge of Slums, Kofi  
Annan, then UN Secretary General, writes that slums are the “urbanization of poverty” 
and that they “represent the worst of urban poverty and inequality” (UN-Habitat. 2003. 
v) it might be possible to fi nd in shanty towns that building by dwelling evidences real 
benefi ts. Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, Executive Director of UN-Habitat, writes in the 
introduction to the report, 
Slums are also places in which the vibrant mixing of different cultures 
frequently results in new forms of artistic expression. Out of unhealthy, 
crowded and often dangerous environments can emerge cultural movements 
and levels of solidarity unknown in the suburbs of the rich. Against all odds, 
slum dwellers have developed economically rational and innovative shelter 
solutions for themselves. (UN-Habitat. 2003. vi) 
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In shanty towns building occurs as a result of individuals having control of their 
environment. In Slums of Hope? Peter Lloyd discusses the effect of this in the shanty 
town saying that there are frequently strong communities present where care is taken 
by many individuals to uphold the area, “such areas often report strong feelings of 
corporate identity and well-developed local organizations.” (Lloyd. 1979. 163). 
In Learning from Favelas it is lamented that shanty towns are never considered as 
worthy of academic study. However, the fact is that they “constitute, partly because 
of their immense size and variety, a type of settlement that needs to be seen as a new 
area of experience and learning for architecture.” (Nicolin. 2010. Inside front cover). 
It is outwith the scope of this thesis to develop the work in these references and form a 
study of shanty communities, dwellers and buildings. However, evidencing a possible 
Heideggerian direction, Nicolin points out the benefi ts of the shanty town are that,
Slum morphology results from numerous small, individual decisions, rather 
than from planning. As density increases, the slum dweller builds upward 
and outward to gain area without inhibiting access. Houses are knit together 
or built wall-to-wall, creating residential quarters that swallow street space 
and convert it into private access corridors. The prevailing culture privileges 
personal, qualitative space over anonymous, quantitative space. (Nicolin. 
2010. 57. My italics)
We can imagine that a society of dwellers, if provided with the means, could enact 
changes and build relationships with places on comprehensible scales much like that 
seen in the shanty towns of the world. This could embrace the ‘luxury’ of building one’s 
own home and the nearness and engagement to places that is involved. Individuals 
building buildings as dwellers would construct a city of continually changing spaces 
as they alter and adjust the requirements of life. This city would consist of a society 
of dwellers like those of the farmhouse in the Black Forest building for themselves, 
both for and as a result of, their dwelling. This could be a response to Heidegger’s 
concluding assertion in Building Dwelling Thinking that individuals must try on their 
own to concern themselves more fully with their own building and dwelling. 
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A self-governing, self-building, dwelling community might be unrealistic in terms of 
geopolitics but as an architectural and philosophical idea it is an interesting concept. It 
calls for a complete decentralisation of the right to build and can be seen as a physical 
manifestation of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling. A continually building-up, altering, 
reappraising, heterogeneous city would be a city of builders, a city of people who 
remember that they are dwellers. We each perceive different variations of reality, 
coloured by a unique series of spatial associations. A city of dwellers would be a 
physical manifestation of this individualisation. 
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Figs 91 & 92: (Williams. 2013). Two images of a project exploring the manifestation of our building continually 
on an urban scale on Perth Road. This desire is not too dissimilar to the desire to keep allotments, of which Dundee 
has many. We tend our patch of land, commune with our neighbours, and become stewards of a place through our 
engagement. 
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Architectural control 
This reading of Heidegger’s texts gives power back to the agency of individuals in 
the environment. The environment becomes perceived as something that is, like our 
dwelling, fundamentally incomplete. Arguably, this architectural interpretation of 
Heidegger’s concept of dwelling is, however, denied by the architectural profession.
In The Illegal Architect, Jonathan Hill criticises the profession of architecture and the 
professional body of architecture in the UK, the RIBA, by arguing against the enshrined 
‘laws’ of architecture. Damningly he suggests that, 
The architectural profession claims a monopoly over a specifi c area of 
architectural production for the purpose of economic and social self-
protection. The principal aim of the profession is to provide the products 
and practices of its members with an iconic status and a cultural value, to 
suggest that only the work of architects deserves the title architecture. [...] 
They deride any threat as ignorant or mistaken and imply that there is a 
truthful and correct interpretation of a fi xed body of knowledge. (Hill. 1998. 
16)
The profession, in Hill’s view, achieves this level of control over individuals by denying 
that buildings need to be occupied in order to be considered architecture. We can see the 
manifestation of this denial and fear of the user, says Hill, in the inhabitantless images 
provided by architects of their buildings. Life is not being explored in this conception 
of architecture, only form and surface aesthetics. In this way, buildings can be seen as 
complete in and of themselves and not subject to the contingencies and complexities of 
life as judged by any occupants in the ongoing process of dwelling.
This discussion of contingency and complexity is one developed by Jeremy Till in 
Architecture Depends. Till argues that the architectural profession’s desire for a sense 
of completion is a result of an attempt to forcefully deny the importance of the variety 
of individual perceptions. The starting observation of his book is that there is a gap 
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between the working architect’s desire for autonomy and completeness, and the fact that 
buildings are inherently contingent upon uncertain factors. He states that this separation 
from the world that the architect desires is problematic since,
It allows architects to detach themselves as humans (social, political, and 
ethical beings) and then look through the wrong end of the telescope, and so 
to see the world as an abstraction. One might think that an abstracted world 
can be ordered, beautifi ed, and perfected, but in the end the real will come 
back to bite you. What becomes quickly apparent is that any permanent 
detachment is deluded. (Till. 2009. 25) 
He continues to say that from the beginning stages of design to the fi nal fi nishing 
touches of a building, architecture is dependent on external factors. However, Till 
argues, architects belie this contingent nature of architecture, holding up impossible 
claims of autonomy and completeness as achievable goals, “the will to order [is] a 
central feature of modernity.” (Till. 2009. 34).
What is troubling about this is that it imposes a system upon individuals  in which they 
are not considered to be important. We can see this by thinking of Nikolaus Pevsner 
again: he began An Outline of European Architecture by saying that “A bicycle shed is a 
building; Lincoln Cathedral is a piece of architecture.” He goes on, “Nearly everything 
that encloses space on a scale suffi cient for a human being to move in is a building; the 
term architecture applies only to buildings designed with a view to aesthetic appeal.” 
(Pevsner. 1943. 15. My italics).
Pevsner’s Lincoln Cathedral is, in this conception, always architecture, his bicycle shed 
never more than just a building. How one feels about these built artefacts is not seen 
as important. However if we think of my bus shelter or my tent it seems impossible 
to categorise one’s emotional reaction to a space into two groups, one of ‘quality’, the 
other without. And if such groupings could exist, who decides where the line between 
the one and the other lies? Does a bicycle shed that provides sanctuary from a storm 
still belong to the category of mere building? And does a Gothic Venetian palazzo, 
that is barely noticeable in the background, surrounded by all the other canal side 
palazzos, still count as the highest form of architecture? With Heidegger’s focus on the 
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importance of an individual’s perception the answer is surely, ‘no’. A bicycle shed can 
be the source of a transcendent experience, and a Venetian cathedral can be passed by 
unnoticed.
By raising ‘architecture’ to include only the profoundly beautiful, and Lincoln 
Cathedral is beautiful, is to miss the point. As Jonathan Meades notes, writing in the 
Guardian newspaper in 2012, Pevsner’s “bent towards aesthetic totalitarianism” and 
the architectural line of thinking that it represents, is a major cause of the architecture 
profession’s failure to realise good places (Meades. 2012). This perspective ignores 
the poetry that can be found in every spatial encounter. ‘Architecture’ in the defi nition 
given by Pevsner becomes little more than a myth propagated by architects to shield 
themselves from the terrifying richness of reality. Adhering to this concept, whereby a 
form is either ‘architecture’ or ‘not architecture’, that which is deemed unworthy can be 
discounted. Consequently the architects’ illusory control over the interpretation of the 
built environment can be upheld. 
Arguably one of the primary aims of the architectural profession is to protect their claim 
of authority over the domain ‘architecture’. As Jonathan Hill, in Actions of Architecture, 
notes, 
To acquire social status and fi nancial security architects need a defi ned area 
of knowledge, with precise contents and limits, in which they can prove 
expertise. One of the aims of the architectural profession is to further the 
idea that only architects make buildings and spaces that deserve the title 
architecture, suggesting that the user is predictable and has no part in the 
creation of architecture. (Hill. 2003. 3)
The image of the lone creative soul realising their vision is still prevalent and 
romanticised in the architectural profession, from Le Corbusier, to Hadid, to the 
Randian hero of Howard Roark unselfconsciously imposing their brilliance upon the 
inhabitants of the city. This is a self-absorbed idea that leads to buildings conceived as 
inwardly looking narcissistic objects, such as I perceived in Berlin’s Jewish Museum. 
Just as Narcissus was unaware of Echo’s interest in him as he gazed into his refl ection, 
the narcissistic building is unconcerned by external factors and is equally untouchable.
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This attitude of externality becomes the background of our lives. Buildings become 
conceived of as always existing separately from us, rather than as active participants 
in our existence. This enacts the mind/world separation that Heidegger rejected. We 
become fundamentally divorced from spaces in a technology park urbanism as seen in 
the mass housing that Heidegger derides.
It might at fi rst seem that an architecture of completeness, an idea that will be explored 
in more detail in the following chapter, is to be striven for, but what occurs, as Till 
points out, is only the “marginalization of difference” (Till. 2009. 39) since the idea 
of completeness invariably develops in a single homogenous style due to the small 
pool of architectural practitioners. All that occurs is bland uniformity, the distanceless 
nightmare that began Heidegger’s The Thing. The process oriented view of the built 
environment, in contrast, leaves the environment as incomplete, allowing everyone to 
participate in its continual recreation.
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Providing frameworks
Perhaps, short of complete decentralisation of building rights and means, to join 
Heidegger’s thoughts with architectural practice, one way of putting into practice 
Heidegger’s concept of dwelling could be to provide frameworks allowing inhabitants 
to build their own buildings. This could continue the benefi ts of self-determinism 
outlined by Thoreau but reduce the anarchy of a society of dwellers.
It may be that what is required is the construction of structures that encourage dwellers 
to build. The idea was explored by Steven Holl in one of his earliest works. A project 
that was never built, his proposal was for a Philippine housing project. Consisting of 
a series of indicative building plots given structure by a central concrete spine Holl’s 
project suggests that the inhabitants would be permitted to build their own structures. 
The spine would form a major ‘street’ and several public squares. By forming this 
minimal ordering system of house plots and public spaces, Holl allows the organic 
development of shanty homes whilst retaining space for community action.
Fig 93: (Holl. 1989. 15). Architectural control with a light touch. Holl’s project allows individual control whilst 
retaining an overall order.
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Equally, we can look to Le Corbusier’s 1920’s Pessac housing development near 
Bordeaux. Although not intended for the same purpose as Holl’s conceptual project, the 
result has been comparable. The design of these 51 houses near Bordeaux for French 
industrialist Henry Fruges has, over the years, been adapted by the inhabitants of the 
area.
In Lived-in Architecture, Phillipe Boudon notes that Le Corbusier’s design has changed 
drastically since it fi rst became inhabited. This might at fi rst seem a critique of the 
original design, and in some ways it is, Boudon notes that, 
The impression is suffi ciently pronounced for the visitor to feel that, in 
addition to the normal processes of ageing, there has also been a real 
confl ict between what the architect wanted and what the occupants wanted. 
(Boudon. 1969. 1-2) 
However, Boudon also notes that the Pessac development at the time of building was 
considered an experiment by both the client and the architect. It was a “laboratory, in 
which Le Corbusier would be able to ‘put his theories into practice and carry them to 
their most extreme conclusions’.” (Boudon. 1969. 2-3). And so it remains a laboratory, 
many years since its fi rst unveiling. 
Although in many ways a Corbusian apologist, Boudon argues that the project at Pessac 
provided a framework in which the dwellers could build for themselves, as responses to 
their dwelling, similar to Holl’s Philippine proposal. Although it is frequently used as a 
shorthand example for the failures of the modern movement’s misunderstanding of how 
people live, Boudon concludes that the project was not an architectural failure at all. 
Instead,
[...] the modifi cations carried out by the occupants constitute a positive and 
not a negative consequence of Le Corbusier’s original conception. Pessac 
could only be regarded as a failure if it had failed to satisfy the needs of 
the occupants. In point of fact, however, it not only allowed the occupants 
suffi cient latitude to satisfy their needs, by doing so it also helped them 
realize what those needs were. (Boudon. 1969. 161)
Providing frameworks
163
In a similar argument for providing frameworks for growth, in How Buildings Learn 
Steward Brand discusses the worth of considering the practice of architecture as 
something that is not only deeply concerned with how buildings alter spaces but also 
how buildings adapt over time. He states that we too often consider our buildings as 
static, designed, in fact, not to adapt. In the period of a building’s life, “Between the 
dazzle of a new building and its eventual corpse” is a period of potential, “when a 
building can engage us at our own level of complexity.” This involves the evolution 
of the building, its adaptation to our requirements (Brand. 1994. 11). This, for Brand, 
results in a change in the architectural profession from being artists whose medium is 
building, to being the convenors of the lives of buildings. Architects in this view would 
not, therefore, only oversee the construction of a building and then step back admiring 
its completion. Instead, they would have a continual interest in leaving open the process 
of re-imagining and re-forming each building as time passes.
The idea of providing frameworks will reappear in Chapter Three with a more 
experiential rather than physical focus. However, before progressing this idea further, a 
fundamental fl aw in Heidegger’s idea for building continually, as observed in the Black 
Forest farmhouse, should be discussed.
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Building continually provides no guarantee of dwelling
As we have seen, by building for oneself a sense of nearness is engendered through the 
long labour of engagement. This is what Heidegger was aiming for with his farmhouse 
example. However, when someone else visits the building, is there any guarantee of 
their dwelling there? It seems not. The Black Forest farmhouse is a manifestation of 
dwelling having happened but building as a dweller implies, like dwelling itself, never 
fi nishing. In this sense any building built by dwellers immediately becomes a ruin once 
it is fi nished and development ceases. It becomes only a symptom of dwelling having 
happened at some point in the past. The Black Forest farmhouse was built by dwellers 
but Heidegger makes no mention whatsoever as to whether it is conducive to the 
dwelling of anyone else now that it is empty. Thoreau’s hut is nothing to his neighbours. 
There is nothing in its form that suggests encouraging the bringing near by another 
person. Heidegger’s question “Do the houses, in themselves, hold any guarantee that 
dwelling occurs in them?” (Heidegger. 1971a. 144) used in reference to modern mass 
housing, in fact, still seems relevant to his hypothetical farmhouse. Can we guarantee 
that dwelling occurs in a city built by dwellers? Or even a single building? Once 
construction ceases, it seems not. Perhaps there is no more guarantee of one bringing 
these places near than the mass housing with which Heidegger began his discussion 
of homelessness. If one can use the old bridge at Heidelberg indifferently – the bridge 
that every member of the Building Dwelling Thinking audience was asked to invoke 
in their minds – then it must be possible to feel homeless in any situation. Perhaps 
the farmhouse in the Black Forest, or Thoreau’s hut, or a city built by dwellers, each 
hold no more guarantee of one’s bringing them near than any of the mass housing that 
Heidegger derides. The building strategy that Heidegger advocates, like dwelling, only 
exists in the journey rather than the goal. 
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This sense of continual accumulation is condemned by Kenneth Frampton in The Status 
of Man and the Status of His Objects. Taking a lead from Hannah Arendt’s distinction 
between ‘work’ as an unnatural state of stasis and ‘labour’ as an impermanent process 
analogous to life itself, Frampton argues that continual labour, as was seen most clearly 
in the labour mills of the 18th century, is continued today in our continual consumption 
that requires our continual labour. This, in Frampton’s view, “has condemned man to 
perpetual movement.” (Frampton. 2002a. 29). In his view, an architecture of continual 
building as evoked by Heidegger would be a state of continual forced consumption 
and waste. He worries that in such an environment of continual changes, the idea 
of returning home would be rendered pointless since that place would already have 
changed and would have become unrecognisable. However, Heidegger is not the least 
bit concerned with this, focussing only on what it means for an individual to dwell in 
the moment. The question of whether it alters the dwelling process of others apart from 
the builder are, for Heidegger, unimportant.
At this point in the thesis we have reached an interesting problem. A re-evaluation of 
Heidegger’s concept of dwelling suggests that poetic engagement and recreation has 
been under-appreciated by architects when discussing dwelling. This poetic is key to 
understanding that as dwellers we are in control of the measuring, individuals are the 
rulers of space. We build spatial associations accumulatively as memories, and equally 
we continually forget these. Heidegger says that the way we build buildings should 
refl ect this and we should build and adapt our buildings continually as the requirements 
of life dictate. 
However, there is no guarantee that the environment created in this way aids the process 
of dwelling of anyone but the dweller themselves. Obviously the dweller engages, and 
has engaged, but the question, of whether anyone else who comes afterwards would 
dwell, is left unasked. Consequently we have still not found a satisfying architectural 
interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling.
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Heidegger’s lack of interest in architecture
Part of the reason for the poverty of this interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of 
dwelling, is that Heidegger lacked any real interest in fi nding architectural solutions 
because he believed that architecture was incapable of aiding our dwelling in any way.
Arguably Heidegger wasn’t interested in, and perhaps even misunderstood the role of, 
architecture in the environment. Whilst Heidegger did use architectural terms we can 
see that he was not particularly interested in engaging with architectural discourse. 
Whilst his language is at times familiar to architects - ‘place’, ‘site’, ‘building’, 
‘dwelling’ - he is tackling a far deeper and more sensitive topic than surface aesthetics. 
Rather, he is asking questions of what it is to be (“into that domain to which everything 
that is belongs.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 143)). 
He shows this in the use of the term baugedanken, which can be translated as ‘ideas 
as how to build’. Heidegger begins Building Dwelling Thinking by saying that he 
doesn’t “presume to discover architectural ideas, let alone to give rules for building.” 
(“Baugedanken zu fi nden, oder gor dem Bauen Regeln zu geben” Heidegger. 1971a. 
143). However, as Lefas notes in Dwelling and Architecture, Heidegger’s use of 
baugedanken (ideas as how to build) evidences a reluctance to even use the word 
“architecture” at all. This is a subtlety that is missed by Hofstadter’s translation of 
baugedanken as “architectural ideas” (Lefas. 2009. 47). Instead, Heidegger was 
saying that he doesn’t “presume to discover [ideas as how to build], let alone to 
give rules for building.” Lefas continues to suggest that this reluctance was perhaps 
because Heidegger was aware of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s unwilling association with 
a particular architectural style and sought to distance himself from similar issues. In 
doing so, Heidegger would remain relevant to discussions of the underlying form of 
the environment, rather than only stylistic values (Lefas. 2009. 47). From the outset 
Heidegger rejects a discussion of architecture and distances himself from the possibility 
of any ‘Heideggerian architectural style’. In any case, this would ultimately just be 
another product-oriented (rather than process-oriented) view of the world. Instead, what 
he is discussing is only ever the process of building by dwelling. 
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For our purposes Heidegger’s lack of interest in architecture opens possibilities to 
develop his work. This is particularly evident with the additional observation that when 
Heidegger did discuss architectural ideas his understanding seems to have been lacking 
nuance. For instance, as previously discussed, Heidegger makes no attempt to discuss 
the discrepancy between the rural farmhouse solution to the urban problem of mass 
housing. Equally we can see the poverty of Heidegger’s understanding of architecture 
during the passage referencing the farmhouse in the Black Forest, when he leaves 
unexplored the building’s future appropriateness for aiding the dwelling process in 
others. Heidegger is not interested in the form of the building, he is interested in how 
the relationship of an individual to a place changes through action. We must assume 
that in Heidegger’s view every inhabitant of the building will continue to develop it 
according to their needs, some aspects unchanging like the pitch of the roof, others like 
the room layouts changing frequently. 
There is a further architectural discrepancy in that although Heidegger uses the example 
of a farmhouse built by dwellers as a ‘true’ building, elsewhere he extols the virtues of 
the Greek temple. In The Origin of the Work of Art he compares a temple to a work of 
great art in which “the artist remains inconsequential as compared with the work, almost 
like a passageway that destroys itself in the creative process for the work to emerge.” 
(Heidegger. 1971d. 39). For Heidegger, the Greek temple is silent, it “portrays nothing. 
It simply stands there in the middle of the rock-cleft valley.” (Heidegger. 1971d. 
40). However, this use of this temple confl icts with the message of the farmhouse. 
Architecturally it can be argued that whilst the latter is built by dwellers and is therefore 
incomplete the former is fundamentally a symbol of completeness. The classical Greek 
temple has been used throughout architectural theory as something almost preordained, 
perfect and complete. Sigfried Gideon describes the temple in Architecture and the 
phenomena of transition as being the archetypal example of a spatial conception that 
celebrates objects distinctly placed as complete and separate from one’s experience 
(Gideon. 1971). This is an enactment of the mind/world split Heidegger sought to deny. 
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These objects radiate infl uence over the surrounding area. They are of externality like 
the pyramids before them and in architectural terms consequently not at all comparable 
in nature to the Black Forest farmhouse. 
There is a problem with this continual lack of interest in architecture from Heidegger. 
He seems to think that architects, and the entire building profession, serve to distance 
individuals from genuine being by creating buildings that are not built by the dweller 
and consequently never truly dwelled in. This, however, seems to be a property unique 
to architecture among the arts. Heidegger is quite happy to discuss the engaging effects 
of poetry or painting, created by great poets and great artists, but seems to think that 
it is impossible for buildings to engage us in the same way. This is clearly, at the very 
least, an impoverished view of architecture and opens the possibility for us to develop 
Heidegger’s thoughts.
•
The vast majority of the world’s greatest buildings involved an architect. Architects 
will remain the most skillful designers of buildings since it takes years and years of 
experience in the trade to be able to design a building that works in every way that it 
should whilst having the desired emotional effect. “I have been to a very small number 
of buildings that are almost perfect.” says Adam Caruso of Sigurd Lewerentz’s Saint 
Peter’s church in Klippan, Sweden, in his book The Feeling of Things, 
They are characterised by a mastery of the act of building that has nothing 
to do with displays of virtuosity and everything to do with an all pervasive, 
existential character that fi lls their every pore. This character is usually 
indistinguishable from that of their architect, not in the conventional manner 
of the artist-genius and the work of art, but as a result of a completely 
internalised, synthetic way of working where issues of construction and 
thematic intent become one. The perfect buildings that I have seen are the 
work of old men. (Caruso. 2008. 76)
Caruso’s ‘perfect building’ shows that architects are capable of creating profoundly 
moving buildings. This church, built when Lewerentz was 81, is a building that must be 
engaged with, as an architectural poem. Caruso says that, 
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Lewerentz removes the possibility of our forming easy or conventionalised 
associations within the church. Instead we are confronted with brooding 
walls and spaces whose darkness make us strain to even understand their 
extent. When the rich variety of spatial conditions begin to emerge from this 
darkness they appeal directly to our emotions bypassing an understanding 
of the building within our personal inventory of experience. [...] each of 
us must confront the spaces of St. Peter’s anew, and on our own. (Caruso. 
2008. 78-79) 
This is a building that, like poetry, must be engaged with, even if one is not involved in 
its construction in any literal sense. It doesn’t exist as a present-at-hand, diagrammatic, 
conception worked out on paper fi rst and then imposed on ready-to-hand, experienced, 
reality where it never achieves its full intent. Instead, as Caruso notes, it “represents an 
unprecedented integration of making and thought.” (Caruso. 2008. 77).
It is important therefore, in the light of Heidegger’s lack of specifi c architectural interest 
(and perhaps understanding), to read his building examples as discussing, not style or 
form, but ideas. 
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Concluding remarks - Building for Dwelling
Heidegger’s rejection of the importance of architecture is a problem that must be 
addressed if Heidegger is to remain of interest to the architectural profession. The 
advocation of an individual and continual process of building makes the practice 
of architecture redundant. However, as we have seen Heidegger’s vision is fl awed. 
Instead, we need an architectural solution that goes beyond his call for us all to build 
buildings for ourselves, as seen in the Black Forest farmhouse. Although this may have 
been the way it was once possible to dwell, it is no longer appropriate. By considering 
the architectural implications of this we can see that it doesn’t guarantee dwelling in 
any case. Frampton may be correct in his observation that Heidegger condemns us to 
perpetual change.
We need to go beyond the architectural interpretations of Heidegger’s texts. The 
idea of building akin to the ‘spirit of place’ outlined by Norberg-Schulz is arguably a 
misunderstanding of Heidegger’s fourfold concept as physical rather than mental. The 
interpretation of the vernacular qualities of the Black Forest farmhouse were not what 
Heidegger sought to emulate. Zumthor’s rich and sensorially stimulating environments, 
although they encourage one’s poetic engagement, remain as controlling devices 
intended to evoke a specifi c response. It might be that it is Zumthor’s very success that 
stands in the way of his being considered by this thesis as truly Heideggerian. He cannot 
stand in the background and allow dwelling to occur because his buildings and his 
intentions are documented so thoroughly.
Instead, I will argue in the following chapter that we could embrace a particular type 
of emptiness in our environment that allows us to dwell. We need an environment 
that in some way allows for our continual poetic experiencing rather than prescribing 
a particular emotional response. The farmhouse in the Black Forest is continually 
modifi ed but should be seen only as a metaphor for what we do as dwellers continually.
 We want something that allows, not for the continual modifi cation of the environment 
but the continual modifi cation of ourselves. The building that we need to attend to, and 
that should be aided by our environment, is the continual building of ourselves.
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In order to embrace our rich complexity, we must embrace an environment that supports 
the way in which we each defi ne different interpretations of spaces. In the following 
chapter this will be discussed as a particular type of emptiness. This emptiness is not a 
simple absence but the emptiness that provides potential for an individual to fi ll. It is a 
poetic emptiness that, like the emptiness of a poem, is not complete untill experienced.
This opens a wider view of architecture. It suggests that all spatial experiences are of 
architectural merit. Heidegger revolutionised the way that we can think of ourselves in 
the environment, as active agents. This removes total control of architectural perception 
from the architectural profession and is replaced by a far richer whole environmental 
perspective in which we all exist as equals and in which we can dwell poetically.
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Chapter Three: Buildings for Dwelling
An exploration of emptiness in buildings allowing the poetic process of dwelling
Fig 94: Serlio’s Comic scene. (Serlio. 1611. 2nd book, 3rd chapter, fol 26).
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Chapter introduction
As we have seen in previous chapters, in his essays on dwelling Heidegger sets out 
homelessness as an issue of paramount concern that is not addressed in the creation 
of many new buildings. As we saw in Chapter Two he shows that one’s homelessness 
ceases by bringing places ‘near’ to us. This nearness occurs through our dwelling 
process which can be manifest by making changes to our environment. These changes 
are building buildings as a manifestation of our building of memories and associations 
by dwelling. By using the farmhouse in the Black Forest as an example of dwelling 
having happened Heidegger is calling, not for stylistic copying of the house, but for us 
all to build out of our dwelling. 
The understanding of dwelling as repeated poetic experiences, fundamentally 
incomplete, is almost incompatible with the common conception of architecture as a 
practice and profession. Poetry is, we should recall, an engaged act. One cannot skim 
read a poem but through its recitation we recreate what is poetic. We ‘live’ the poem and 
are able to interpret its various meanings as a result. This relationship is symbiotic, were 
we not able to interpret the poem we would not be able to give ourselves to it. In the 
light of an understanding of dwelling, much architecture is revealed as being closed and 
inherently stifl ing of our individual processes of dwelling. 
Ultimately, Heidegger is saying that our relation to place is too important to be left to 
other people. For the philosopher our relation to places is the most important aspect of 
our being. His aim is that Building Dwelling Thinking “traces building back into that 
domain to which everything that is belongs.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 143). The conversation 
about dwelling and building is, for Heidegger, a fundamental discussion about the 
nature of experiencing the world. This previous chapter of this thesis suggested that 
since Heidegger believed that the building profession distances individuals from places 
we should instead act like the dwellers of the Black Forest and build ever changing 
collections of individually controlled houses and communities.
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Heidegger ends Building Dwelling Thinking by saying that the only way one can 
eliminate the misery of homelessness is by “trying on their part, on their own, to bring 
dwelling to the fullness of its nature[.] This they accomplish when they build out of 
dwelling, and think for the sake of dwelling.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 159). We have read 
this in Chapter Two as nothing short of a call for the decentralisation of all architectural 
powers to individuals. This continual modifi cation of buildings would thereby strip 
away the existing barriers between building buildings and the process of dwelling. The 
way we dwell would be made manifest by our playing a substantial role in constructing 
our environment. 
In this chapter we will ask what is the environment that allows - not the continual 
modifi cation of our buildings - but the continual modifi cation of ourselves through our 
ongoing poetic experiences of dwelling.
This is required because an implementation of Heidegger’s ideas about architecture 
- advocating continual modifi cation of our buildings - leads to buildings that whilst 
benefi cial to those who live in them, give no guarantee of aiding the dwelling of others. 
It might be true that in the past we built like those in the Black Forest but it is not 
practicable in contemporary society. 
We can consider the environment that more fully enables us to be poetically engaged 
and bringing our own interpretations, as with a poem, as being an environment that 
more fully supports our dwelling process. Taking inspiration from Heidegger’s 
discussion of the jug, this environment can be considered as having an emptiness. We 
must ask, not, ‘what would dwellers build?’, but, ‘what environment has the particular 
type of emptiness that allows an individual to dwell there?’ This is the type of emptiness 
found in the jug and in the poem. It is not an absence of something but speaks of 
potential. Consequently, as we proceed in this thesis we see that if Heidegger is to 
remain of interest to the architectural profession then not only must architects embrace 
a more nuanced approach to Heidegger’s philosophy but a reading of Heidegger’s 
concept of dwelling can be extended with a more nuanced understanding of architecture. 
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This observation, that neither Heidegger nor architects fully understand each other, 
opens an interesting gap in the research, what can buildings do to aid our process of 
dwelling? We begin to depart from Heidegger’s theory here, using it as a springboard 
to develop architectural ideas and make connections to the architectural writers and 
practitioners who might not previously have considered themselves Heideggerian.
First we will ask, since we are dwelling all the time - as we are being all the time - 
whether environments can affect our dwelling at all. Looking through a Heideggerian 
lens at architects like Superstudio and Rem Koolhaas in the section entitled 
Environments suppressing our dwelling we see that they have critiqued environments 
that are stifl ing of our poetic dwelling process. Additionally people like Kevin Lynch 
have sought to fi nd the underlying form of environments that aid the degree to which 
we can become near to a place. In contrast to the type of emptiness and incompleteness 
that we are looking for, this chapter will argue that buildings like Libeskind’s Jewish 
museum in Berlin that has been discussed throughout this thesis, have a type of fullness 
or completeness that suppresses dwelling.
In the section Architectural obsession with completeness, and following the previous 
chapter’s discussion of architectural control, we will discuss the ways in which the 
architectural profession is obsessed with fullness and completion. This desire for 
completion is seen in much contemporary architecture, as well as being historically and 
methodologically reinforced. 
We move away from this desire for completion towards a concept of emptiness in 
architecture, in the section Emptiness, authorlessness, and incompleteness. Here we 
gain inspiration from Roland Barthes’s The Death of the Author. This work of Barthes’s 
speaks of incompleteness and potential that is key to this thesis’s concept of emptiness. 
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In the section A language of multiple fragments, we will speculate that a particular 
type of emptiness can be formed through a language of multiple fragments. This draws 
inspiration from the creative practice carried out throughout this thesis, as well as from 
other texts and art, as with previous chapters. The section Architectural multiplicity will 
study similar ideas of emptiness.
Finally, in A return to the farmhouse, we will look at Heidegger’s Black Forest 
farmhouse armed with these new observations of emptiness and multiplicity and suggest 
that in its form, built by dwellers, is perhaps an environment in which we can dwell 
after all. 
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Environments suppressing our dwelling
We might imagine that since dwelling comes from within ourselves, then the poetic 
process must be achievable anywhere. One might assume that a feeling of nearness is 
possible anywhere depending on the degree of one’s engagement with that place. One 
person could feel near to a place that another person passes by ambivalently. Someone 
lives there, someone else walks by each day, someone else has a single but profound 
memory of an event in that place. Everyone has their own series of ‘insides’. To what 
extent can the form of the built environment alter this?
Alain de Botton notes in For an Architecture of Happiness that architects can be 
frustrated with the fact that our surroundings are frequently not the main factor in 
determining our state of mind, 
Architecture is perplexing, too, in how inconsistent is its capacity to 
generate the happiness on which its claim to our attention is founded. While 
an attractive building may on occasion fl atter an ascending mood, there will 
be times when the most congenial of locations will be unable to dislodge our 
sadness or misanthropy. (de Botton. 2006. 17)
However, whilst dwelling can theoretically occur anywhere it seems that Heidegger 
believes that one’s surroundings do alter a capacity for dwelling with.
Heidegger had two main residences, one near university and another, a hut in the 
mountains nearby. Adam Sharr notes in Heidegger’s Hut that Heidegger claimed “an 
emotional and intellectual intimacy with the latter building, its surroundings, and its 
seasons.” (Sharr. 2006. 3). It was here that, for over fi ve decades, Heidegger wrote 
most of his texts. He frequently referred to his town house as ‘below’ or ‘under’ and his 
hut as ‘above’ or ‘up there’ refl ecting both the topographical reality and the moral and 
philosophical purity that he perceived there (Sharr. 2006. 64). In contrast, despite the 
fact that his hut forms an important part of his writing and personal letters, his house is 
rarely mentioned.
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Architecturally too it is clear that some environments are more engaging than others 
and whilst much of this might be circumstantial, as de Botton suggests, some of it 
might be environmental also. We can imagine for instance a place in which we cannot 
engage such as a hypothetical environment of an extended plane in which, featureless 
and immense, the ground stretches in every direction. The haze in the distance blurs 
the boundary of ground and sky. Dwelling in this domain, could only be considered as 
dwelling within an abstract placeless expanse since there would be no way to demarcate 
individual places. This expanse is essentially distanceless having no things or possibility 
of nearness. The only place it holds is the place of one’s own body and, without 
anything onto which one can preserve one’s memories, locations would be experienced 
as indistinguishable from one another. We could never engage since there would be 
nothing to engage with. For an environment to have any possibility of engaging it must 
provide options. Were we handed a spade then this distanceless environment might be 
altered, marking places by piles of earth.
In the 1960s Italian architects Superstudio critiqued the state of urban development 
in their Twelve Cautionary Tales for Christmas. Here they provide twelve visions 
of hypothetical cities in which, we might suggest, dwelling has been suppressed by 
blind subservience to technology. Each city provides no options for its residents and is 
unilateral in its vision for living. 
The ‘2000-ton city’ extends across the landscape as a grid of cells stacked on top of one 
another. Each resident lives in one cell that through a variety of means satisfi es all their 
requirements, we are told that “All citizens are in a state of perfect equality.” (Lang & 
Menking. 2003. 150). Should a resident ever have unworthy thoughts about their utopic 
imprisonment the ceiling collapses with the force of the city’s namesake. 
In ‘Continuous Production Conveyor Belt City’ the dream of every resident is to move 
to the newest houses which are continually under construction on the city’s extremities, 
a feat only the wealthiest can afford. Those houses that are older are looked on with 
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disgust and “Only society’s rejects, mad or insane individuals, still dare to wander 
amongst the ruins, the detritus and rubble that the city leaves behind it.” (Lang & 
Menking. 2003. 158). 
In the end they state that each of these twelve represent existing urban situations. If we 
approve of them we are named “an empty shell, a dark, humid cavity [...] not a human 
being.” (Lang & Menking. 2003. 161). If we reject them we can only despair in the 
face of their inevitable realisation in the future; Superstudio believe that the wheels of 
technologic subservience are already in motion.
Looking to another example of contemporary urban critique Rem Koolhaas examined 
the idea of substance overwhelming spatial choice in Junk-space. Junkspace for 
Koolhaas was the archetypal spatial type of the late 20th century, the shopping centre 
proliferation of symbols. He says that, 
Junkspace is a Bermuda triangle of concepts, a petri dish abandoned: it 
cancels distinctions, undermines resolve, confuses intention with realization. 
It replaces hierarchy with accumulation, composition with addition. More 
and more, more is more. Junkspace is overripe and undernourishing at the 
same time, a colossal security blanket that covers the earth in a stranglehold 
of care [...] (Koolhaas. 2004. 163)
Fig 95: (Lang & Menking. 2003. 150). Superstudio’s ‘2000-ton city’. A vast utopia in which all one’s needs are met, 
however should one think about leaving they are immediately crushed in their cell.
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Junk-space is written in a style that acts as metaphor for how Koolhaas perceives this 
type of space. Sentences run on from one another in a stream of consciousness. No 
paragraphs break up the continual fl ow. In this environment - that Koolhaas sees as a 
symptom of commercial architecture’s legacy - a sense of Heideggerian nearness is 
impossible. 
It is fl amboyant yet unmemorable, like a screensaver [...] There is no form, 
only proliferation [...] it makes you uncertain where you are, obscures where 
you want to go, undoes where you were. Who do you think you are? [...] 
Junkspace pretends to unite, but it actually splinters. (Koolhaas. 2004. 162-
171)
In this environment there is no emptiness and no being near. As with the experience 
of reading Koolhaas’s essay, being in junkspace is disorienting, anything can mean 
anything; there is no way to fi nd anything amongst the excess. The individual is 
suppressed by the space’s fullness. 
Arguably the proliferation of stuff outlined by Koolhaas is as equally suppressing of our 
dwelling as the total control of Superstudio’s twelve cities. Discussing contemporary 
suburbia in America, Jason Griffi ths in A Guide to the Essential Indifference of 
American Suburban Housing suggests that there is a sense of abandonment to be found 
in suburbia due to a similar proliferation of stuff. 
Conventional images of emptiness imply a physical absence or decay; here 
in suburbia we found the opposite. This profound emptiness was bizarrely 
enhanced by the very richness of suburbia – it was the most embellished 
houses which often felt the most abandoned. (Griffi ths. 2011. 4).
This isn’t an abandonment like one would normally consider a waste space, like an old 
warehouse for example, but a ghostliness caused by overabundance. This idea of space 
is reminiscent of the argument from Neil Postman in Amusing Ourselves to Death that 
“This is a book about the possibility that Huxley, not Orwell, was right.” (Postman. 
1986. viii). He argues that whereas George Orwell’s vision in 1984 was the suppression 
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of the population through tyranny and concealment, Aldous Huxley’s in Brave New 
World was that we would become suppressed not through oppression but through 
trivialisation and overabundance.
Koolhaas’s Junk-space and Superstudio’s Twelve Cautionary Tales for Christmas are 
both metaphors for the problem of contemporary architecture that caused Heidegger to 
decry the state of dwelling in the fi rst place. They are critiques of the obsession with 
surface aesthetics, the present-at-hand conception imposed upon ready-to-hand world, 
the diagram confused for reality. Contemporary architecture’s authoring of the complete 
object, as will be discussed in a few pages, only serves to suppress one’s own dwelling 
process that requires a particular emptiness to thrive.
As we saw in Chapter One, the idea that some environments are more conducive to 
relating to than others is explored by Kevin Lynch in The Image of the City. He states 
that a person with a “good environmental image” can feel emotionally secure (Lynch. 
1960. 4). Lynch’s studies relate to the legibility of city form understood through 
interviews with city residents. From these interviews Lynch discerns different types of 
element that one perceives in the environment such as paths, edges, districts, nodes and 
Fig 96: (Lynch 1960. 147) Lynch’s image of Boston derived from interviews with locals. The map shows paths, 
edges, districts, nodes and landmarks illustrating how people relate to the places within the whole. A stronger mental 
image, argues Lynch, gives a stronger feeling of belonging. 
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landmarks. Without these, he argues, one is left without any sense of place. For instance, 
remarking on experiences of “formless” Los Angeles one interviewee remarks that “it’s 
as if you were going somewhere for a long time, and when you got there you discovered 
there was nothing there, after all.” (Lynch. 1960. 41). This bleak appraisal of LA is of a 
place without places, in which we are without the ability to fi x our memories of places 
and bring places near to us.
In order to bring places near to us we have to be able to construct our own sense of the 
meanings, narrative, and experiences in the environment. A building that does this for us 
makes our own decisions impossible. Visiting the Jewish Museum in Berlin I was struck 
by its intense fullness. I felt cowed into experiencing only what I was told by Libeskind 
to experience. As in a theme park, architectural ‘events’ are encountered - ‘The Garden 
of Exile and Emigration’, ‘The Holocaust Tower’ - and then exited by the same door. 
Like a ride one is expected to experience these, react appropriately, then leave suitably 
impressed in a state of appropriate contemplation. Comparable to a shopping centre 
one is pressed from all sides by the correct interpretation, except these are not sales 
techniques but symbols intended to put one in a somber mindset. The building plan 
is taken directly from a shattered Star of David, a form of symbolism also used by 
Libeskind in the Imperial War Museum, Salford, where a shattered globe reassembled 
stands for much the same meaning. In the Jewish Museum this leads to confusion, 
“the route through the upstairs is a muddle” notes William JR Curtis writing for The 
Architectural Review, “and the matter is not improved by the confused presentation, 
which is not worthy of the subject matter. [...] Never in the history of humanity has so 
much meaningless geometry been produced by so few architects.” (Curtis. 2011. 116-
117). Throughout the Berlin Museum adjacent to the inaccessible ‘Holocaust Voids’ are 
expositional plaques insisting that the architect Daniel Libeskind envisioned these voids 
as representative of absence and loss. 
In the book Counterpoint Daniel Libeskind, Paul Goldberger provides an elaboration on 
these unilateral symbols, 
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Three underground ‘roads’ symbolize three paths in the history of German 
Jews. The fi rst leads to the dead end of the holocaust tower, the second to 
the garden of exile, and the third to the stair of continuity and exhibitions 
[which] represent the continuation of Berlin’s history. (Goldberger. 2008. 
32-34)
I saw this building as so full of its own unilateral symbolic intent that my own poetic 
connections were impossible to make. Poetic experiencing requires an openness to 
interpretability; this invites us to be part of the experience, not subject to it. In the 
Berlin Jewish Museum poetic experiencing was impossible. Consequently it was a 
building that I felt impossible to be ‘inside’. It was always separate from me, an object 
I could never touch. This is a building that, like a shopping centre blasting music and 
advertisements, continually demands that one receives and accepts rather than interpret 
and create. In contrast we can look at Libeskind’s early drawings known as micromegas 
and chamberworks, which almost seem to demand one’s participation. For Martin 
Woessner writing Heidegger in America, Libeskind’s early drawings were magical. In 
fact he connects this work to Heidegger’s writings in terms of their desire to engage 
(Woessner. 2011. 259). It is clear that at some point a great change in approach occurred 
in Libeskind’s oeuvre from engagement to exclusion.
A culture that produces iconographic objects full of their own signifi cance in the vein 
of much commercial architecture can only occur as a product of a culture that conceives 
of their built environment as objects distinct from experience. These forms are seen as 
ideals of contemplation rather than environments of experience. Even though we do 
inevitably end up seeing these objects as experiential, their primary and original aim is 
that of removed object and statement. In environments such as these, dwelling becomes 
an incidental outcome rather than explicit aim. We need instead something that allows 
an emptiness so that we, as dwellers, can engage more fully.
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Environments suppressing our dwelling
Top - Fig 97: Chamberworks horizontal drawing VII (Libeskind. 2001. 50)
Bottom - Fig 98: (Goldberger. 2008. 23) Outside of the Berlin Museum.
186
Architectural obsession with completeness
Whilst the essence of our being is of incompleteness and engagement, our celebrated 
architecture strives to be seen as complete, full, and unilateral. In the previous chapter 
this was discussed as the profession’s desire to deny the importance of individual 
agency. Now we shall explore the formal, historical, and methodological means by 
which this is realised.
Arguably architecture is often seen as a means of denying our essential incompleteness. 
It is perhaps the greatest tragedy of architecture that it is continually incapable of 
reconciling its need to be fi nished with its inhabitants’ need to remain incomplete. For 
if we were complete we would not be capable of accumulating new memories and 
experiences. Where then does our desire for completion in our buildings come from? It 
might be that, confronted by the terrifying richness of reality, the idea of being complete 
is seductive. Perhaps we aim for the idea of completion in our buildings in the vain 
hope that we will obtain completion in ourselves. In For an Architecture of Happiness, 
Alain de Botton alludes to the fact that our tendency for collecting things of beauty is a 
consequence of our desire to attain for ourselves the qualities we see in the objects. He 
argues that we often desire to purchase an object to absolve ourselves of some fl aw that 
we feel is present in our own character. However, this desire is always doomed to fail. 
“Owning such an object may help us realise our ambition of absorbing the virtues to 
which it alludes,” he says, 
but we ought not to presume that those virtues will automatically or 
effortlessly begin to rub off on us through tenure. Endeavouring to purchase 
something we think beautiful may in fact be the most unimaginative way of 
dealing with the longing it excites in us[...]. (de Botton. 2006. 152)
In terms of buildings it seems that in desiring a complete object we might be attempting 
to ‘cure’ our own existential incompleteness. The complete building fosters the fantasy 
that we are complete and whole when in many ways we are fragments. This can only 
lead to one’s sense of disillusionment and self loathing in the long term as we realise 
that, as dwellers, we are fundamentally incomplete and can never live up to some 
idealised life where we are as unambiguous as a complete building. 
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The appeal of a minimalist home, for instance Pawson House designed by the famous 
minimalist John Pawson, is its claim that its clean lines will provide a lifestyle 
that is controlled, ordered, and rational. ‘You could be a complete person!’ Despite 
appearances, however, this style is not of the tabula rasa. It has not the potential of 
a clean sheet of paper but the sheen of a surface that exposes one’s dirty fi ngerprints. 
Disorder can only increase through its occupation. The concept of completeness in our 
buildings is unhelpful, it succeeds only in pointing out how unsuitable we are for stasis, 
it distances us from our environment. The solution to our existential homelessness is not 
to be found in owning completed objects but, as Heidegger says, by remembering that 
we are dwellers, critically incomplete, continually accumulating. 
Figs 99 & 100: (Pawson. 2002) The desire for a life without existential complications evidenced by the purity and 
sense of completion in the forms of bathroom and kitchen.
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Architecture is not generally thought of as incomplete. In much the same way that 
Aesop’s fables are illustrative of the way the world is experienced, we can look at the 
origin myths that the architecture profession tells itself as a way to explore current 
views. Throughout the history of architectural theory, origin myths have been utilised 
to add credence to an idea. Joseph Rykwert states that the desire behind defi ning the 
primitive hut comes from an appeal to historicism. 
Whether in ritual, myth or architectural speculation, the primitive hut has 
appeared as a paradigm of building: as a standard by which other buildings 
must in some way be judged, since it is from such fl imsy beginnings that 
they spring. These huts were always situated in an idealized past. (Rykwert. 
1972. 190)
Many propagators of these historical appeals are documented in Rykwert’s book On 
Adam’s House in Paradise. Their central tenet is the belief that in order to create the 
best buildings we must look to the fi rst principles of architecture to understand how we 
acted before the corrupting infl uence of modernity. They evidence, in Rykwert’s words, 
a desire that, “[...] a return to the “preconscious” state of building, or alternatively 
to the dawn of consciousness, would reveal those primary ideas from which a true 
understanding of architectural forms would spring [...].” (Rykwert. 1972. 28). And since 
etymology is an exploratory technique engaged by Heidegger in his study of language it 
is perhaps relevant here.1
18th century architectural theorist Marc-Antoine Laugier imagined a series of attempts 
by which an early human endeavoured to fi nd comfort within the harsh world. 
Beside a tranquil stream he sees a meadow; the fresh turf pleases his eye, 
the tender down invites him. [...] but presently the sun’s heat begins to 
scorch him, and he is forced to look for shelter. A neighbouring wood 
offers the cool of its shadows, [...] thick clouds obscure the air, and 
fearful rains stream in torrents down on the delicious wood. The man, 
1 Both assume the inherent ‘truth’ of humankind’s actions in times long past. Vitruvius in fact took his 
origin of architecture back to groups of humans clustering around fi res and developing language and buildings 
synchronously.
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inadequately sheltered by leaves, does not know how to defend himself 
[...] A cave comes into view: he slips into it; fi nding himself sheltered 
from the rain he is delighted with his discovery. But new defects make 
this dwelling disagreeable as well: he lives in the dark, the air he has to 
breathe is unhealthy. He leaves the cave determined to compensate by his 
industry for the omissions and neglect of nature. Man wants a dwelling 
which will house, not bury him. Some branches broken off in the forest are 
material to his purpose. He chooses four of the strongest, and raises them 
perpendicularly to the ground, to form a square. On these four he supports 
four others laid across them; above these he lays some which incline to both 
sides, and come to a point in the middle. This kind of roof is covered with 
leaves thick enough to keep out both sun and rain: and now man is lodged. 
True, the cold and the heat will make him feel their excesses in this house, 
which is open on all sides; but then he will fi ll the in-between spaces with 
columns and so fi nd himself secure. (Rykwert. 1972. 43-44 Quoting from 
Laugier’s fi rst edition of Essai sur l’architecture. 1753.)
Laugier’s aim, in using origins as authority, is to state that the temple form, complete 
with columns, entablature, and pediment, is essential to architecture. (Rykwert. 1972. 
44). His version of man was at one with nature and therefore the temple/shelter form 
must come from nature. The image that accompanied his text, shown on the following 
page, develops the message of the purity of the temple form. In this image mankind, 
depicted as innocent cherub, is presented the building by the personifi cation of 
architecture. This is not an architecture earned in increments, but given completely. 
Although Laugier’s protagonist tries several natural features fi rst, when he comes to 
build he builds, immediately and without error, a classical Greek temple.
Corbusier too used a very similar example in Towards a New Architecture. “Primitive 
man has brought his chariot to stop, he decides that here shall be his native soil.” (Le 
Corbusier. 1923. 69). What transpires is the construction, immediately and without 
trial or error, of a temple form replete with fl attened ground, cleared trees, rectangular 
boundary, symmetry, elegant proportions, and entrance axis. Le Corbusier’s primitive 
builder builds a sophisticated and complete form by which “he has brought in order”, in 
contrast to the disorder of the surroundings (Le Corbusier. 1923. 71).
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Fig 101: The personifi cation of architecture and the primitive hut, after Laugier (Rykwert. 1972. 45). Architecture 
arrives fully formed, given to human kind in their innocence.
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It should be no surprise that architects are obsessed with the complete object and pure 
idea rather than the incomplete process of being. The method of the working architect 
has, since Renaissance times when the ‘master builder’ became a separate profession 
to on-site worker, been one of a separation from the experience of the building. This 
conception of the architectural profession can be seen as an appropriate enactment of the 
metaphysical tradition of mind/world split that Heidegger sought to undermine. From a 
detached position a building is conceived in the mind, and then built in the world. The 
fi nal product stands as testament to the vision. However, the building must always be 
an imperfect rendition of the essential idea conceived fi rst on paper. Many architects 
have, of course, succeeded in creating beautiful, meaningful buildings but the profession 
is nonetheless almost as perfect enaction of the mind/world split, an intellect imposing 
completed products on the world, as one could hope to fi nd.
This conception of what architects do, as being a top-down realisation of preconceived 
design onto the world rather than ground-up building as dwellers, can also be seen 
throughout contemporary world views. In the bestselling The Greatest Show on Earth, 
Richard Dawkins uses architecture as the exemplar form of top-down design. “An 
architect designs a great cathedral. Then, through a hierarchical chain of command, the 
building operation is broken down into separate departments, [...] until the cathedral 
is built, looking pretty much like the architect’s original drawing.” (Dawkins. 2009. 
217). According to this view of the profession, architecture is seen fundamentally as 
an act of imposing objects that were completed in the mind prior to commencement 
of construction. The work which occurs in the architecture offi ce encourages this 
association with the idea of completeness. The way that some architects conceive their 
work unsullied by life, particularly evidenced by the architects’ model, pristine and 
virginal white, attest to the fact that a profession has become convinced that human 
nature can be overcome by the complete object. 
This is particularly enhanced by the profession’s methods of working, especially the 
reliance on the tools of production, namely the plan and section. Jeremy Till states 
in Architecture Depends that “What is clear is that the drawing, in all its rigid two-
dimensionality and spatiality, cannot begin to presume to be the same as the building in 
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all its sociality and temporality.” (Till. 2009. 111). The mind/world separation can result 
in the creation of objects in the Heideggerian sense, of being conceived only as their 
dimensional, quantitative aspects. Till continues, 
Architectural space may not be physical in the scientifi c sense of the word, 
but as long as it is conceived in the shadow of form, the objectlike qualities 
will stick around space. Such an understanding of space aligns precisely 
with the Cartesian view of the world. [...] At one level the measurement of 
space is a benign, and useful, activity; it is necessary to know the area of a 
room so that, say, one can understand roughly how many people can occupy 
it. But the measurement of space has a nasty way of becoming the dominant 
criterion of space. (Till. 2009. 120)
Additionally Jonathan Hill in Actions of Architecture notes that, 
Architects build drawings, models and texts. They do not build buildings. 
However, to claim authority over building, architects often discuss 
architectural drawings as if they are a truthful representation of a building. 
But all forms of representation omit as much as they include. Texts, 
drawings, models and photographs are partial, providing contradictory and 
elusive information. (Hill. 2003. 130)
For Hill the gap between the architect’s drawing and the building “is an uncomfortable 
truth to be forcefully denied because it threatens their authority over architecture (Hill. 
1998. 20). This is an almost perfect enactment of the problem Heidegger saw occurring: 
the present-at-hand diagrammatic conception of the world becomes confused for 
reality, whereas the ready-to-hand, the experienced, is what is real. We always know the 
hammer, to use Heidegger’s example, through use, through swinging it and it becoming 
an extension of our body. Although the hammer does have quantifi able dimensions and 
weight, these are secondary.
This observation, that the methods of architectural production in the offi ce contribute 
to separation and subsequent object creation, is one that is explored by Bruno Zevi 
in Architecture as Space. He states that the rendering of spaces into two-dimensional 
drawings results in a conception of architecture that belies its three-dimensional 
complexity. The greatest fault with architectural critique is thus that, 
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buildings are judged as if they were sculpture and painting, that is to say, 
externally and superfi cially, as purely plastic phenomena. It is not merely 
an error of critical method; it is a misconception arising from the lack of a 
philosophical position. (Zevi. 1957. 19) 
This, states Zevi, reduces everything to pictorial values. In doing so, what is unique 
and special about architecture is lost. Architecture is fundamentally inhabitable, it is 
fundamentally made to be lived amongst and engaged with. Like Till, Zevi notices 
that, by disregarding this, the tools of the architect serve to undermine the beauty 
of architecture. Obviously, and as already mentioned, many architects do in fact 
overcome this obstacle, evidenced by any building that one fi nds to be meaningful or 
near. However, it remains the case that the separation of an architect from the building 
process has permitted the fallacy of buildings as ‘complete’ objects to endure. It has 
resulted in the idea that the form of the plan, or the elevation, is itself capable of 
signifying an idea rather than encouraging one to read one’s own ideas into the space. 
This reduces the critical practice of architecture to the creation of objects that have a 
specifi c absolute and unilateral meaning and therefore remain forever separate from 
us, unpoetic through the denial of our own engagement. The elevation of the building 
becomes intended to be read from afar, its three-dimensional actuality never quite living 
up to its two-dimensional conception. Zevi notes that “most histories of architecture are 
full of observations that have nothing to do with architecture in this specifi c meaning 
[of architecture as space]. They devote page after page to the façades of buildings 
which in effect are sculpture on a large scale.” (Zevi. 1957. 28). This aids a creation 
of a complete product that directly enacts the mind/world divide instead of embracing 
the fact that buildings are always experienced by a variety of individuals with different 
spatial sensibilities.
Zevi claims that the drawings of architects can never attain the richness of space 
that exists in reality. He provides an analysis of St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome by 
Michelangelo to illustrate this point. He shows 9 fi gures, each an interpretation of the 
plan of St. Peter’s. 
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Top - Fig 102: a traditional plan view of the building.
Middle from L-R Figs 103 - 106: A ‘design plan’ simplifi cation; an inverse design plan; the interior space at ground 
fl oor level, treating it as a homogeneous whole; the same ground level but considering only the outside space not 
bounded, as it should be, by the surrounding buildings in another ‘inside’ created by the piazza. 
Bottom from L-R Figs 107 - 110: Indicating the “fundamental structures” involved in the building; emphasising the 
cross shape of the plan.; emphasising the central zone and surrounding aisles; emphasising the importance of the 
vaults and cupolas. 
Each of these is, Zevi states, unsatisfactory, although together they are each complimented by the others. None of 
these however, states Zevi, comes close the the actual experience of being in Rome, in St. Peter’s Basilica. (Zevi 
1957. 47-53)
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The trouble it seems, architecturally, is that all too often buildings are conceived of as 
present-at-hand and then imposed upon ready-to-hand reality, as though the diagrams of 
my photomontages could have come fi rst and then given rise to the artefacts. However, 
the real artefact is always experienced as ready-to-hand and the diagram, the present-at-
hand, follows as a lesser representation. Although the present-at-hand can be complete, 
the ready-to-hand never can. As much as architects might wish their buildings to be 
manifestations of their diagrammatic conception they will always become experienced 
and interpreted by individuals who bring the element of lived experience.
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Emptiness, authorlessness, and incompleteness
Instead of a building being conceived of as complete and full of its own unilateral 
meaning, we could consider an architecture of emptiness. This is the particular kind 
of emptiness that was discussed by Heidegger in regards to the jug, and that we found 
in the poem. It is not the literal emptiness of the jug that he was interested in but the 
fi gurative emptiness, which allowed the jug’s appropriation by an individual. The 
creation of this kind of emptiness in space would be an architecture that allowed, even 
encouraged, the process of dwelling to continue. We have seen that our dwelling is 
in some way essentially incomplete since we must “ever learn to dwell” (Heidegger. 
1971a. 159). Were it possible to ‘complete’ dwelling then it would become a state 
of stasis and cease to be true dwelling. An environment of emptiness could be an 
environment that, like our dwelling, is essentially incomplete in some way since we 
each construct our own interpretation of it. Consequently, and as with the essential 
incompleteness of poetry discussed in Chapter One, this continual re-interpretation 
places us fi rmly as beings-in-the-world.
We can understand Heidegger’s concept of emptiness - the emptiness that is a 
precondition for dwelling - by reference to the concept of ‘authorlessness’ developed 
by Barthes in the essay The Death of the Author. Barthes suggests that separating a text 
from any analysis based on the author’s intentions or personal history frees the reader 
to interpret the text, making its potential meaning greater. Here, narrative is conceived 
as an act of speech that demands one’s concession whereas language is something that 
separates the intention from the work, allowing the work to become read by others. 
Narrative has a demanding voice, a soap box proclamation whereas language has a 
passive voice allowing for an interpretation. This concept of language results in the 
death of the author, who becomes seen as a separate entity to the work. Consequently 
the individual’s interpretation is seen with raised importance. “As soon as a fact is 
narrated no longer” Barthes says, “the voice loses its origin, the author enters into 
his own death, writing begins.” (Barthes. 1968. 142). On one hand we have authorial 
narrative that is full of specifi c intention and forces an opinion, on the other, the 
language itself that provides an emptiness and potential for interpretation. Through this, 
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Barthes casts off the weight of authorial intention. Once a text is released to the world 
any intention by the author becomes moot since we, as co-creators in reading, recreate it 
every time.
Jonathan Hill, whose thoughts on the architectural profession have been discussed 
several times, describes the author in Barthes’s text as someone proposing “the belief 
that an image, word or object is the carrier for a fi xed message determined by the 
author.” (Hill. 1998. 26). It is this sense of authorial weight and fi xed message, of which 
Hill fi nds a parallel in the architectural profession, that Barthes rejects.
As with Heidegger’s assertion that “It is language that tells us the nature of a thing, 
provided we respect language’s own nature.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 144). Barthes believes 
that language is more than just a medium for speech, “...it is language which speaks, not 
the author; to write is, through a prerequisite impersonality [...] to reach that point where 
only language acts, ‘performs’ and not ‘me’.” (Barthes. 1968. 143). Language is seen by 
both men as opening possibilities for interpretation.
The consequence of this is that, as with the earlier comments on poetry in Chapter One, 
we can perceive written work as created by the reader, in that instant, rather than by an 
author. Barthes says of reading that “there is no other time than that of the enunciation 
and every text is eternally written here and now.” (Barthes. 1968. 145). This removes 
the author’s stamp from the work, emptying it of the interpretation that would otherwise 
be forced upon the reader. Additionally, this authorless text can be seen as richer and 
without limit. He says, “Once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text 
 Authorlessness
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becomes quite futile. To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish 
it with a fi nal signifi ed, to close the writing.” (Barthes. 1968. 147). Without authorial 
intention the work becomes open, empty of a fi xed interpretation. 
For a visual example we can turn to the work of Magritte whose painting ‘The 
Mysteries of the Horizon’ is on the front cover of Poetry, Language, Thought. We 
see that Magritte’s work draws one in to question it, or as Nikos Stangos suggests in 
Concepts of Modern Art “Magritte’s paintings are argumentative; they question one’s 
assumptions about the world, about the relationship between a painted and a real object 
[...]” (Stangos. 1994. 133). By exploring the unreal, Magritte draws the observer into 
questioning reality. In doing so the experience of questioning the artefact is the real 
experience of the art, not any singular meaning by the artist. The artefact is without 
author and consequently can mean many more things to many people. This rejection of 
any unilateral interpretation is reminiscent of Francis Bacon’s comments on narrative in 
art that “The moment the story is elaborated, the boredom sets in; the story talks louder 
than the paint.” (Reed. 2001. 213).
Fig 111: Magritte’s ‘The Mysteries of the Horizon’ (Heidegger. 1971). We are asked to question our own reality and, 
like poetry, the art exists in our own living of the experience.
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We are on the way to fi nding a parallel with the spatial experience of dwelling. We can 
see this authorlessness as the particular type of emptiness that we are searching for. It 
allows the poetic recreation and engagement necessary for our dwelling. As with poetry, 
an experience in space has to be engaged with by the individual. When seeing a space 
where one is free to interpret, in emptiness, the whole history of one’s memories and 
associations come to bear upon the place. The interpreter creates the world.
Barthes goes on to discuss the relative richness of interpretable experiences compared to 
prescribed ones. The reader has an ability to gather complex memories and associations 
into one moment that an author cannot. Barthes describes the reading of a Greek tragedy 
where the individual characters do not fully understand the events on stage. The only 
place that the work truly exists, he argues, is in the mind of the viewer. The play is, he 
says,
woven from words with double meanings that each character understands 
unilaterally [...] there is, however, someone who understands each word in 
its duplicity and who, in addition, hears the very deafness of the characters 
speaking in front of him – this someone being precisely the reader [...] 
Thus is revealed the total existence of writing: a text is made of multiple 
writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of 
dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity 
is focussed and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author. 
The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing 
are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its 
origin but in its destination. (Barthes. 1968. 148) 
In this statement Barthes is suggesting that a reader-centred view of creative work is 
inherently richer and more complex than an author-centred view. Consequently we can 
argue that the relative fullness of intention that is found in work that speaks and has an 
obvious authorial intent, is less stimulating than the emptiness found in work that allows 
itself to be read. The audience of this play are allowed to dwell within the play.
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In the built environment many buildings can be conceived in a similar fashion. Whilst 
the buildings may be objects conceived of as complete objects ‘speaking their intent’, 
what is real about these buildings is the space between, understood only by the viewer 
existing between them in the same role as the reader of Barthes’s play. We walk through 
the environment, existing precisely where the buildings do not. Each building is like 
the characters in the play, preoccupied with themselves; this can also be seen in the 
narcissism of Libeskind’s museum. However, we, situated between these objects, 
can see the whole environment, and we can hear “the very deafness of the characters 
speaking in front of [us.]”
A consideration of the environment as ‘without author’ can be seen as something 
beautiful and empty; it is incomplete till the moment we engage with it. As Barthes 
notes it is more expansive and contains more potential than a closed, ‘authored’ space. 
In this open space we can be poetic.
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Continuing the spatial analysis of authorlessness we can turn to Calvino’s Invisible 
Cities. The distinction between authorial voice and personal interpretation is seen in 
the city of Tamara which, full of narrative, is contrasted against the emptiness of the 
surrounding nature (Calvino. 1972. 11-12). This is a city of signs, a city of signifi cance. 
It is “thick with signboards jutting from the walls.” We hear that it is entirely comprised 
of things that talk about other things. This signifi cation takes many forms, whether signs 
indicating shops or architectural styles indicating palaces and temples. Consequently, 
the observer is overwhelmed and cannot see the reality of the place, 
Your gaze scans the streets as if they were written pages: the city says 
everything you must think, makes you repeat her discourse, and while you 
believe you are visiting Tamara you are only recording the names with 
which she defi nes herself and all her parts.
This is a city of an overwhelming predominance of icons where there is only one story 
permitted. The traveller is not permitted to have their own image of Tamara since what 
Tamara is, is shouted at every scale from every corner. Calvino contrasts this against 
the surrounding countryside that remains silent. Once the traveller leaves Tamara they 
see that “the land stretches, empty, to the horizon; the sky opens with speeding clouds.” 
In the context of this city this emptiness is a fi gurative emptiness, a silence of authorial 
intent that allows the traveller to make their own patterns in the clouds, “you are already 
intent on recognizing fi gures: a sailing ship, a hand, an elephant.” The authorlessness 
found in the nature around Tamara allows you to make your own patterns. Once you are 
outside, “trees and stones are only what they are.”
The idea that we fi nd a sense of authorlessness in nature is discussed by Lucy Lippard 
in Overlay. Lippard suggests that we fi nd it hard to separate “visually and intellectually” 
nature and ancient art due to their perceived emptiness of intention (Lippard. 1983. 12). 
Contemporary authored objects require comment, whereas nature simply is. However 
because we are separated from the intention of ancient art we read it as empty of this 
intention and it becomes, like the area outside Tamara, interpretable and personal. 
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Lippard suggests that “Ancient art, wiped clean of its class and religious content by 
the ages, seems almost natural in its distance - a distance that allows it to become, 
paradoxically, more intimate than the art of our own times.” (Lippard. 1983. 11).
Calvino’s Tamara introduces themes that require further study for the idea of 
authorlessness. It is a city that, like Libeskind’s museum, is full of something and 
consequently does not permit the poetic process of dwelling. This poetic process, as 
discussed so frequently in this thesis, requires interpretability of symbols in order to 
be fully in-the-world. In Tamara this is stifl ed. Unlike Heidegger’s jug, that whilst it 
consists of material, shape and colour is in fact essentially empty, what Tamara consists 
of overwhelms an individual with its fullness. Tamara is made of “things that talk about 
other things”, and this chattering stifl es one’s perception, we are told that “the city says 
everything you must think”. In order to bring things near we have to be able to construct 
our own sense of what it means to us. A thing that does this for us makes our own 
decisions impossible.
This is, incidentally, precisely what Robert Venturi says about Las Vegas in Learning 
From Las Vegas. Structured for the requirements of car users, Venturi remarks that “This 
architecture of styles and signs is antispatial; it is an architecture of communication over 
space [...]” (Venturi, Scott-Brown & Izenour. 1972. 8). 
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A language of multiple fragments 
What is the architectural counterpart to Barthes’s authorless text? The environment 
that most fully permits the dweller to construct new and personal experiences is an 
environment that is silent of authorial voice. It allows poetic interpretation. Attempts 
to solicit the creative user have been carried out by various architects in the past: Le 
Corbusier’s free plan allows free movement within a building; Kahn’s unmeasurable 
‘silence’ permits refl ection. However, one way to progress the idea of how to allow 
poetic interpretation is to study the nature of an authorless text.
Calvino’s Invisible Cities provides a story of the great Kublai Kahn seeking to gain 
knowledge of his empire from Marco Polo who tells him of 55 different cities, each 
with different characters. Each of these cities, in the words of Kevin Lynch in A Theory 
of Good City Form, “exaggerates the essence of some human question, and for each 
there is a form, brilliantly and surprisingly conceived, that fulfi lls and informs that 
question.” (Lynch. 1981. 72). However, in one reading of this book, it becomes evident 
that each of these 55 is in fact an aspect of one place, Polo’s native Venice. Although 
Tamara is a place of authorial abundance, Calvino’s view of Venice as a whole is very 
different. 
Aware that a single representation cannot convey the whole, Calvino provides us with 
multiple visions of Venice. As Calvino tells this story from a variety of viewpoints, 
one’s engagement becomes richer as the experience is told and retold over and over 
again and we begin to get lost in the richness of the multiple images that provide 
something greater than the sum of their parts. It is precisely the variety of viewpoints 
that Calvino provides that makes his interpretation of Venice so alluring. Venice is 
described as a place of rich stories and history as in the case of Zaira that consists of, 
relationships between the measurements of its space and the events of its 
past [...] The city, however, does not tell its past, but contains it like the lines 
of a hand, written in the corners of the streets (Calvino. 1972. 9)
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It is described also as a place that is only knowable through experiencing it as in the 
case of Zemrude where, 
If you go by whistling, your nose a-tilt behind the whistle, you will know 
it from below: window sills, fl apping curtains, fountains. If you walk along 
hanging your head, your nails dug into the palms of your hands, your gaze 
will be held on the ground, in the gutters, the manhole covers, the fi sh 
scales, wastepaper. (Calvino. 1972. 58)
It is described as a place continually under construction as in the case of Thekla where 
the construction is continual so that the destruction cannot begin (Calvino. 1972. 115). 
His Venice is never fi nished, it is retold incessantly, the reader understands that every 
traveller and every inhabitant has their own versions of Polo’s tales. Consequently 
Calvino questions the nature of knowledge, any view must inherently be multiplicitous, 
lest it stifl e this richness. We are asked to question our own interpretation. Each city is 
just one version of Venice (of life?) that is ultimately authorless since it consists of an 
infi nite retelling of personal stories. It has a language based on multiplicity rather than 
unilateralism. We perceive its emptiness as a consequence and can dwell within it.
•
Taking inspiration from this we can begin to explore the idea of a language of multiple 
fragments as a method towards the particular type of emptiness required for our poetic 
dwelling. 
This language should not be read as simply an advocation of abundance, as with 
Koolhaas’s Junk-space or of ‘fragmented’ geometries. The term ‘fragments’ here refers 
to an incompleteness rather than a formal fragmentation. It can draw from writing 
techniques in that its meanings, rather than its form, embrace different perspectives 
and individual agency. Whilst it is perhaps optimistic to make direct connections from 
literature to art and architecture perhaps an analogue could be made. We learn from 
Barthes, read through a Heideggerian lens, that we can dwell within the text. There 
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is a skillful indeterminacy in a poem, a positive aspect of incompleteness. This acts 
as an invitation to engage and in the moment of re-creation by the reader, one fi nds a 
wholeness to the text.
Due to the inherently collaborative nature between text and reader, the image of what 
is being described becomes, in a way, ‘triangulated’ between a variety of fragmented 
associative points. What actually is physically, cannot be described in words, so the 
reader is drawn in by suggestive language and their own memories and associations. 
The text is then considered authorless because it leaves room for interpretation. It is 
fragmented in the sense that it has gaps in its meaning that are available to the reader.  
For instance, looking again at Morgan’s poem For Bonfi res we are told some details 
but specifi cs are sparse. The economy of language here allows our own memories of 
bonfi res, dogs, heavy air, and red suns to fi ll out the experience. My bonfi re created by 
this poem is in a specifi c place, I know the character of the gardener and the dog. Had 
the image been of something fi xed and whole then we would not be permitted to enter. 
This is also precisely what Heidegger achieved in his texts regarding dwelling, both in 
the message and methods. His view of dwelling is that we must try on our own to bring 
dwelling to our minds (Heidegger. 1971a. 159). We must therefore place ourselves in 
the world. His text is intended as an inspirational springboard to encourage us to think 
our dwelling. The method of this message is his rhetoric that loops and cycles, never 
precisely stating how to dwell since this would be, in Barthes’s terms, to close the text. 
The fourfold for example, so frequently shied away from and discussed in Chapter One, 
provides not a direct explanation of perception, but a hint and suggestion that asks to be 
followed through by the reader.2
2 Additionally, sometimes more than one translation of Heidegger’s texts are available. In Günter Figal’s 
The Heidegger Reader (2009), the translator provides a different translation of Heidegger’s The Thing from the one 
provided in Poetry, Language, Thought. Re-reading a well known text which frequently has different subtleties of 
interpretation is an uncanny experience, especially with a text as nebulous and indeterminate as Heidegger’s. Some 
terms in the different translation seem more appropriate, others less so. The impression one is left with is that both are 
accurate in different ways. The Thing becomes a greater entity.
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•
I attempted to achieve this in my own work on Perth Road in Dundee. The potential for 
engaging with a language of multiple fragments can be seen in my sketches, montages, 
and models. They are missing parts, richly heterogeneous, a collection of fragments that 
ask for the viewer’s completion. The work is not given to any one person as complete. 
Thus it was intended that the viewing of the work demands one’s poetic engagement.
The sketches were kept deliberately rough so as to convey only an impression 
of the place. At the moment of their creation they were more concerned with the 
process of forming the relationship with the place than the fi nished product (as with 
Heidegger’s Black Forest farmhouse) but now they ask a question of the viewer about 
their relationship to that place. The montages collected the fragments of individual 
photos and reassembled them along lines of perspective leaving gaps, overlaps, and 
inconsistencies. Additionally, on closer inspection, it is evident that time passes between 
each individual photograph. Overlaid on these are collected fi gures, Barnett Newman, 
Richard Serra, a group from a Superstudio image, Caspar David Friedrich’s Wanderer, 
each hinting at an area of intellectual focus beneath the surface aesthetics. The viewer is 
asked to engage, to question. 
Fig 112: (Williams. 2013) The montages are an attempt to draw one into the perception of the place. 
A language of multiple fragments
207
Figs 113 & 114: (Williams. 2013) Fragments 
of material, meaning and time collected 
together ask the viewer to question their 
perception and reality in an attempt to 
encourage their own dwelling in the places 
which I explored.
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Figs 115 & 116: (Williams. 2013) Exhibitions allowed the various interpretations of Perth Road to be seen by many 
people who know the area in their own way. My mistakes were pointed out to me, in one case a mislabelled street, 
evidencing the engagement of local residents with my work. 
By seeing each of the artefacts together in one place my image of the area became larger than the sum of its parts, just 
as in our experience we ‘see through’ to all of our past experiences and memories. 
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The models too embraced this language, either, as in the case of the scale model, 
through the fragmentation of form and embracing of different materials, or in the model 
where form was simplifi ed through a collection of fragments of scales and meanings. 
Each step is individually represented, giving overtones of repetition, re-engagement, 
and ongoing processes. This second model was particularly successful also because it 
simply didn’t look like Perth Road, although it retained some major features. It therefore 
demanded a degree of unpacking by the viewer.
Seeing all these together in an exhibition added a further layer of fragmentation. The 
places could be seen in a variety of interpretations, as photographs, architectural plan 
and section, as sketches, as montages, as screen prints, and as models. The qualities of 
the places, and of the overall area, could additionally be questioned by viewers who 
brought their own version of Perth Road to the event. As with Heidegger’s texts the 
exhibition was intended to act as a springboard prompting others to consider their own 
dwelling.
The idea of looking at the same place again and again to explore subtly different 
perspectives is explored by Cézanne in his series of Mont Sainte Victoire and was 
introduced in Chapter One. Visble from his studio the mountain became the focus of 
a series that developed between 1890 and 1905 and saw Cézanne experimenting with 
various new techniques (Düchting. 1989). When looking at these, one fi nds oneself 
drawn into the work. By providing various versions of the subject one is asked to 
project one’s own views onto the work and to compare differences. We are asked which 
of the versions is ‘more’ real, the faint sky coloured mountain of fi gure 119, the ominous 
and domineering mountain of fi gure 121, or the bulbous almost fatty mountain of fi gure 
124. It is, of course, all of these and none of these. Cézanne sees it differently each 
time, revisiting and reappraising it with each iteration. For our purposes, in Cézanne’s 
series, like Calvino’s cities, each individual artefact is less important than the nature of 
knowing that is explored by the entire series.
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Figs 117 - 124: clockwise from top left. (Düchting. 1989. 214-223). In a multiplicity of interpretations Cézanne asks 
us about the nature of knowing the mountain. We are asked to participate, adding our own reality as supplement to the 
one he provides.
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Architectural multiplicity
The observation that an environment with a particular type of emptiness allows 
our poetic dwelling, and that this might be found in environments that are richly 
heterogenous and consist of various fragments, serves to link various fi gures in the 
architectural profession with Heidegger’s texts where no connections had previously 
been evident.
Architecture is already suited to being considered as having a language of multiple 
fragments. If we think of the way that Barthes’s play only exists in the mind of the 
audience, architecture too really exists as the space between things, experienced by 
users. It is a collection of fragments through which we exist. This is similar to Jonathan 
Hill describing the idea of montage as an architectural strategy. Taking inspiration from 
Barthes and The Death of the Author, Hill says that, 
the reader can remake any book, but montage makes this possibility explicit. 
Just as the reader can make a new book through reading, the viewer can 
make a new architectural project through viewing, and the user can make a 
new building through using. (Hill. 2003. 5) 
We can be ‘inside’ these buildings in a way that others never allow. Relph discusses a 
psychological state of ‘existential outsideness’ that occurs in some spaces. “Existential 
outsideness involves a selfconscious and refl ective uninvolvement, an alienation from 
people and places, homelessness, a sense of the unreality of the world, and of not 
belonging.” (Relph. 1976. 51). In contrast with this Zevi notes that, “in architecture we 
are dealing with a concrete phenomenon which is entirely different [from any other art 
form]: here, man moving about within the building, studying it from successive points of 
views, himself creates, so to speak, the fourth dimension, giving the space an integrated 
reality.” (Zevi. 1957. 27). Combined with the layering of memories upon memories 
discussed throughout this thesis, step by step repeated poetic engagements, arguably the 
perception of the environment is fundamentally a collection of fragments and something 
that should be embraced.
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However, frequently in architectural discourse the fragmentary, and the implications 
of incompleteness that it conveys, is denied. Instead of embracing a multiplicity of 
ideas the concept of fewer over-arching ideas is seen as stronger. We have seen that 
both Superstudio and Koolhaas critique a situation in which individual appreciation is 
suppressed in the face of a single overwhelming idea. Each case is to some extent about 
not providing options through unilateral spatial conceptions. 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Jeremy Till argues that architects are terrifi ed of the 
disorder of the world. Developing this idea further we see that for Till this is because 
“[Entropy] denotes a condition of ongoing uncertainty and with it the potential decline 
into disorder, something beyond the jurisdiction of any professional body.” (Till. 2009. 
104). Consequently the architectural profession seeks to impose ideas of wholeness 
and unilateralism in order to defy the continual chaos of experience. He says that 
“One aspect of the modern project, in its quest for purity and unfettered ideals, can 
be seen as an ongoing battle to halt the processes of entropy.” (Till. 2009. 104). He 
asks for architects to consider working with disorder rather than deny its existence. 
Thus the design would be fi lled with potential since it is, to some extent, incomplete, 
fragmentary, 
[...] building the unfi nished compels the architect to project multiple 
actions onto the building. Where the functionalist or behaviourist architect 
attempts to determine use in a fi xed and singular manner, the architect of the 
unfi nished mentally inhabits the spaces of their future building in myriad 
ways in order to test them for their openness to appropriation, and then 
makes adjustments when the whole feels too constricted. (Till. 2009. 108). 
Till is arguing for an architecture with an abundance of possibilities, each ‘open to 
appropriation’. A way that we might embrace this is through an architecture of multiple 
fragments. 
A handy visual analogue for this is provided by Sebastiano Serlio’s theatre scenes 
developed in The Book of Architecture (Serlio. 1611) and shown on page 44. The scenes 
are named the ‘Satyric’, ‘Noble’, and ‘Comic’. Each of these scenes is comprised 
of a perspectival ‘street’ of some sort. The Satyric presents a rural peasants’ hamlet; 
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the Noble a classical city; and the Comic scene presents a merchant city. They are 
sometimes discussed as analogues for vernacular European urbanism (Shane. 2005. 
20-21); in addition we can here interpret Serlio’s scenes as forming an argument that the 
architectural fragment is more conducive to benefi ting human nature. 
The peasants’ hamlet portrayed in the Satyric scene consists of perspectival lines 
roughly formed by a line of trees among which thatched roofed huts are nestled. The 
use of the term Satyr here invokes Greek mythology of half goat, half human creatures, 
suggesting that these inhabitants are seen to be less than human. Consequently if 
considering each scene as infl uencing human nature, here we have a depiction of 
humans as being reduced to beasts.
In contrast with this bestial scene we can look to the order and grace of the Noble 
scene. This depicts Serlio’s impression of classical Rome. The street is clearly defi ned, 
geometrical and built of stone. Religious monuments and palaces line the perspective 
and in contrast to the Satyric’s external setting the Noble is a scene of interior space. We 
are permitted a view ‘out’ of the city through the arched city wall. Whereas the sky in 
the Satyric scene is full of clouds and birds, the sky of the Noble scene is clear. Here the 
environment has been tamed by humans. Everything is controlled and internal, to the 
point that even the sky is forgotten. We can infer that this scene consists of a depiction 
of humans as approaching godliness. However, a single dilapidated tenement hints that 
we can never achieve this lofty height.
Between these two extremes is the Comic scene. Here is a heterogeneous mix of 
fragments, from brothel to church. This is a merchant city (Venice perhaps and therefore 
another iteration of Calvino’s Invisible Cities?) and it displays signs of impermanence 
and change. A corner of a shop is opened up to the street, timber is used as a 
construction material, a fl ag blows in the wind. Although it is largely internal, we are 
not shown an outside for instance, the sky is populated with birds and clouds. This is a 
rich and complex scene made for the poetry of various individuals. It is both inside and 
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outside, geometric and disordered. Like Heidegger’s poetic dwelling it is a celebration 
of the complexities of life. Between gods and beasts, the earth and the sky, we can 
perhaps read the Comic scene as a depiction of humankind’s dwelling nature.
The impression we get from the Comic scene is one of continual change and adaptation 
forming a rich mix of building types. What Serlio provides is an image of space that has 
multiple fragments and allows the particular type of emptiness that is required for poetic 
experiences. Serlio provides us with a visual image that embraces an environment 
in which Heidegger’s dwelling can take place, not as a continual modifi cation of the 
environment, as in a literal reading of the farmhouse in the Black Forest, but as the 
continual modifi cation of ourselves as dwellers.
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Figs 125 - 127: Serlio’s Satyric, Noble, 
and Comic scenes. (Serlio. 1611. 2nd 
book, 3rd chapter, fol 25-26).
Perhaps a view of humans as beasts and 
gods, between these, in rich complexity 
are humans as fragments.
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•
The appeal of multiple fragments is also discussed in more contemporary times. For 
instance Yoshiharu Tsukamoto of Toyko based architects Atelier Bow-Wow explores 
the richness of heterogeneous Tokyo environments in Pet Architecture. Documenting 
buildings that occupy tiny almost left over spaces within Tokyo’s density. Tsukamoto 
says, “We aimed to establish one new category in urban structure by giving them 
a certain name not by negatively considering them as openings [...]” (Tsukamoto. 
2002. 9). In these pet buildings, so named because they exist at the feet of their 
larger neighbours, Tsukamoto fi nds something that people engage with, everyone he 
interviewed having their own suggestions for their own, much loved, pets. Arguably 
we can see that dwelling is allowed to occur in these small fragmented moments. It is 
not their formal fragmentation that is so appealing but the juxtaposition of characters in 
the environment. Their idiosyncratic nature allows the city dweller to reappraise their 
environment and tend to the continual building of their memories and experiences.
Fig 128: Diagram and location plan of a ‘pet’ building (Tsukamoto. 2002. 105). We are told that in one instance a pet 
building, in this case a diner, makes one feel as though “you had become the hero (heroine) in the famous scene of the 
movie ‘Titanic’, pretending the entire city block as a luxury liner, the Titanic.” (Tsukamoto. 2002. 104)
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Fig 129: (Tsukamoto. 2002. 104). The bow of the ‘Titanic’.
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•
Some architects have embraced a design approach involving multiple fragments not 
just in the analysis of spaces but also in the designs of their buildings. The following 
examples are representative of many more and have been chosen partly due to their 
intellectual approach and partly due to my own preferences. 
Hans Scharoun attended the same conference at which Heidegger presented Building 
Dwelling Thinking. This lecture appears to have had a great impact upon Scharoun who 
occasionally cited Heidegger afterwards and also post-rationalised some of his earlier 
work as being broadly Heideggerian (Blundell Jones. 1995. 136). Peter Blundell Jones 
notes in Hans Scharoun that, 
Scharoun did not consider his buildings as isolated objects but as places. 
Rather than imposing a particular plan shape for aesthetic or constructive 
reasons and then dividing it up according to functional needs, as many 
architects do, he tried instead to allow each function to determine its 
particular form, and to grow his overall plan our of the relationship between 
functions and site. (Blundell Jones. 1995. 12)
The forms of his buildings might develop not as a whole idea into which lesser ideas 
would be fi t but as accumulations of “advantageous combinations of elements”. 
(Blundell Jones. 1995. 117). This is a process of accumulation in keeping with the 
creation of my sketches, montages, and models, and as with the building of the Black 
Forest farmhouse, echoing the step-by-step process of dwelling in a place. However 
there is more to the way in which we can dwell in Scharoun’s work.
At this conference in 1951 Scharoun presented a proposal for a school at Darmstadt. 
This building was never built but in it can be seen various ideas that infl uenced his later 
work. The richness and particular kind of emptiness that we are searching for in this 
building come from the myriad of small places that exist as potential meeting places, 
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Top - Figs 130 - 131: (Blundell Jones. 1995. 139) Model 
views of the proposed school by Scharoun. Multiple options 
are provided allowing for the potential of emptiness. 
Bottom - Fig 132: (Blundell Jones. 1995. 138) Plan view of 
the proposed school.
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or places for imagination. The spaces externally are every bit as carefully crafted as 
those internally; this is a building one would remain ‘inside’. Blundell Jones notes the 
remarkable nature of the open zones that act as circulation spaces; they are, 
more than mere passages [...] but rather of a whole series of carefully 
modulated spaces, sometimes more open sometimes more closed. He can 
take a passage and by widening it, punctuating the space with a level change 
and opening it visually with a view, turn in into a meeting place. (Blundell 
Jones. 1995. 142)
This variety of options allows the building to be appropriated by those who inhabit it. 
It embraces multiplicity and indeterminacy. We can see it, like Barthes’s text, as having 
greater potential than if it were closed off to this level of user control.
This attitude of creating potential to engage is one shared by Herman Hertzberger. In a 
similar fashion to Holl’s framework for a shanty town in the Philippines, Hertzberger 
designs to structure the potential for individual interpretation in his buildings through 
embracing multiplicity. This, like Barthes’s text, permits the spaces to be appropriated 
by those who use them. For instance, he discusses the organisation of an offi ce area 
that offers “the opportunities, including basic fi ttings and attachments etc., for the users 
to fi ll in the spaces according to their personal needs and desires.” (Hertzberger. 1991. 
24). This results, claims Hertzberger, in each employee feeling a sense of stewardship 
over their area. We can suggest in a Heideggerian sense the employee is near to this area 
through their poetic engagement encouraged by the nature of the design. Hertzberger 
says, “The architect can contribute to creating an environment which offers far more 
opportunities for people to make their personal markings and identifi cations, in such 
a way that it can be appropriated and annexed by all as a place that truly ‘belongs’ to 
them.” (Hertzberger. 1991. 47). To fail to do this, he suggests later in the book, is to 
suppress creativity (poetry?). He decries the fact that in our buildings and our cities we 
prescribe functions and interpretations upon spaces and cause uniformity, 
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What makes the old canal-houses so livable is that you can work, relax or 
sleep in every room, that each room kindles the inhabitant’s imagination 
as to how he would most like to use it. [...] the potential for individual 
interpretation is inherent due to their greater polyvalence. (Hertzberger. 
1991. 147) 
For Hertzberger this occurs through embracing the potential multiplicities in spaces. 
Level changes should be embraced rather than smoothed. Changing conditions such 
as found on buildings’ thresholds deserve an elaboration, a neither here nor there type 
of space in which one might choose to linger. Both of these moments for instance can 
be utilised as impromptu seating areas. Offering places to sit, he notes, is perhaps the 
“most elementary provision” of encouraging individual interpretation (Hertzberger. 
1991. 177). Hertzberger seeks to densify his environments with varieties of possibilities. 
Unlike Pawson House shown earlier that is unilateral, Hertzberger’s ideas take joy in 
multiplicity and fragments analogous to life itself.
Alvar Aalto too recognised the requirement for a rich complexity to be acknowledged 
in the design of buildings. “Imperfection is in some sort essential to all that we know of 
life”, he said, 
Nothing that lives is, or can be rigidly perfect: part of it is decaying, part 
nascent. . . . And in all things that live there are certain inequalities and 
defi ciencies, which are not only signs of life but sources of beauty. (Coates. 
1997. in Pallasmaa. 2011. 14)
Juhani Pallasmaa notes in Alvar Aalto Houses that for Aalto “genuine and true homes 
are expressions of the dweller’s personality rather than that of the architect’s. The 
objects of home should be associated with the inhabitant’s past, appreciations, and 
memories instead of being an aesthetic choice by the designer” (Pallasmaa. 2011. 14). 
He goes on, 
Many homes of the modern era can be experienced as too controlling and 
aesthetically predetermined to permit the inhabitant’s personal adaptation 
and lifestyle. After all, there is a distinct contradiction, confl ict, and tension 
between the concepts of “architecture” and “home.” Whereas architecture 
is a product of deliberate design and aesthetic aspirations, home is a 
projection of personal life. Aalto’s houses, on the other hand, contain a 
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benevolent margin for unconstrained and liberated life. Even the detailing 
and furnishing, light fi ttings, and everyday objects he designed project this 
relaxed and unrestrained ambience [...] (Pallasmaa. 2011. 14)
This interpretation of Aalto’s houses by Pallasmaa shows that Pallasmaa believes the 
houses to have the sort of emptiness that we have seen as Heideggerian. The emptiness 
is achieved by the “benevolent margin” of Aalto’s fragments that allows for our “past, 
appreciations, and memories.”
Sarah Menin and Flora Samuel, in Nature and Space: Aalto and Le Corbusier, state 
that Aalto is “interested in the roots of the notion of harmony in a more precarious 
dialogue of the disparate, which allowed ‘other’ forms of order, such as the organic 
model, to effect the whole” (Menin & Samuel. 2003. 51). Aalto’s buildings, whilst not 
necessarily infl uenced by a fragmented geometry as is frequently the case in Scharoun’s 
work, evidence the essence of multiple fragments that act as a means towards the type 
of emptiness in which we can poetically dwell. For instance in Villa Mairea, a house 
for a private art collector client, Aalto allows a complexity and openness, both between 
internal spaces and the boundaries between inside and outside. He expressed that it was 
an “experimental laboratory” for his ideas of art collecting (he spoke of the diffi culty 
of presenting art in a way that wasn’t merely in an annex for “scotch and soda” and 
was instead integrated with normal life) and integrating many ideas into a complex 
organic whole (Schildt. 1997. 225). Ultimately it is a place that embraces rather than 
denies the inherent complexity of our living process, our dwelling. These buildings, 
and the language of multiple fragments they represent, allow for a variety of potential 
experiences. The potential for poetry is increased and we are consequently permitted to 
be more in their environments. We can be in the containing emptiness of the building.
A poem is not generally thought of as fragmentary, and even when it is, it is usually 
highly structured. However, it is the variety of possible interpretations that cause it to 
be considered here as consisting of fragments. It is not a one-liner but contains a rich 
depth. Architecturally, a building like Libeskind’s museum is generally considered to be 
‘fragmentary’ but we see it here as being only formally so. It is a one-liner and shouts 
its meaning too loudly, closing off other possible interpretations. A building that allows 
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this need not have a fragmentary formal language, a simple beautiful room can engage 
a person for a lifetime. My bus shelter, only a bus shelter, has become an object of 
enormous signifi cance for me.
•
On Perth Road what allowed my dwelling, apart from the deliberate focus placed 
on it by this study, was the richness of its various fragments. Personally, materially, 
historically, socially, the list of fragments could continue. Perth Road is a place of vast 
variety in which one can fi nd one’s own poetry.
For an exploration of fragments on an urban scale we can turn to Colin Rowe and 
Fred Koetter who discuss the idea that planners and architects should embrace what 
we might call multiple fragments in Collage City (1978). They call for a rejection of 
the totalitarian whole for a democracy of fragments. If we reappraise this book with 
a Heideggerian lens we see that constructing by the accumulation of ideal fragments 
moves away from architectural totalitarianism of authorship toward various small 
fragments in which one is free to dwell.
The authors state that the ideals of architecture that emerged in the early part of the 20th 
century, ostensibly of completion as discussed earlier, can never become manifest on an 
urban scale. They argue that instead of holding onto the dream of a complete utopian 
solution to our urban situation we need “imperfect action now” (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 
105). Like Aalto writing above, they reject the concept of any perfectly conceived 
solution and instead argue for the benefi ts of a collage of multiple fragments. In the 
chapter ‘Collision City and the Politics of ‘Bricolage’’ they criticise the concept of ‘total 
architecture’ or ‘total design’ remarking that it would neither be plausible nor desirable 
to create such a system. They link the idea of ‘total architecture’ or ‘total design’ to 
‘total politics’ and remark that, far from being a positive ideal any utopia demands 
compliance and is ultimately stifl ing. (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 87). They point out that 
we have, to a large extent, rejected the concept of ‘total politics’ as unsound, but fail 
to grasp that its “physical counterpart”, ‘total design’, is a similarly fl awed concept. 
Total politics is never subtle or rich enough for our freedom, we require politicians 
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who embrace nuance and complexity, and so it is with our buildings. The lack of this 
understanding is a problem, they say, since architecture is always seen as “aiding and 
abetting an in some way benign or decorous social order.” and a desire for a complete 
utopian totalitarianism can be seen as oppressing this. 
As an example they contrast Louis XIV’s Versailles and Hadrian’s Villa Adriana saying 
that, 
if the one [Versailles] is certainly an exhibition of total architecture and 
total design, the other [Villa Adriana] attempts to dissimulate all reference 
to any controlling idea; and, if here there is absolute power under two 
impersonations [Louis XIV and Hadrian], then one might even feel 
constrained to digress and to ask which is the more useful model - for us. 
(Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 90)
For Rowe and Koetter, Versailles, and thus Louis XIV, celebrates total design, an 
overwhelming adherence to what Heidegger would see as a present-at-hand entity 
imposed upon ready-to-hand reality: a model confused for truth. They say that Versailles 
is representative of “the triumph of generality, the prevalence of the overwhelming idea 
and the refusal of the exception.” (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 90). 
In contrast to this they suggest that Hadrian, despite being comparably powerful to 
Louis XIV is revealed by Villa Adriana as someone, 
apparently, so disorganized and casual, who proposes the reverse of any 
‘totality’, who seems to need only an accumulation of disparate ideal 
fragments (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 90) 
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Top - Figs 133 - 134: (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 88-91). Versailles. Echoes of Serlio’s Noble scene and total control
Bottom - Figs 135 - 136: (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 88-91). Villa Adriana. Echoes of Serlio’s Comic scene and poetic 
potential
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Thus whilst Versailles is “the complete unitary model [...] the ultimate paradigm of 
autocracy [...] a complete political power, undeviating in its objectives” (Rowe & 
Koetter. 1978. 90-91). Villa Adriana, the collection of ideal fragments, is “the apparently 
uncoordinated amalgam of discrete enthusiasms” (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 91). 
Rowe and Koetter extend these two opposing personality traits through the philosophies 
of Isaiah Berlin and Claude Lévi-Strauss, both of whom wrote about similar opposing 
psychological orientations. On the one hand, there is the desire for a complete solution 
and on the other an accumulation of ideal parts. For Claude Lévi-Strauss (1966) these 
are termed the scientist and the bricoleur respectively.
The scientist embarks on a deductive, product-led mentality to solve a task. The 
bricoleur mentality is an inductive, process led, making do with what is to hand to suit 
the task. The Sun King would be considered a scientist and Hadrian a bricoleur, 
Simply, the scientist and the ‘bricoleur’ are to be distinguished ‘by the 
inverse functions which they assign to event and structures as means 
and ends, the scientist creating events ... by means of structures and the 
‘bricoleur’ creating structures by means of events.’ (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 
103)
Bricoleur
Many ideas
Collection of Fragments
Hadrian
Scharoun 
Aalto
Barthes
Heidegger
Scientist
One Big Idea
Total design
Louis XIV
Libeskind
Zumthor
Pevsner
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Rowe and Koetter state that the model of the architectural profession has recently 
tended toward the scientist world view as seen in the cases of Gropius and Mies van der 
Rohe, and we might now add Daniel Libeskind as well as various other contemporary 
architects. 
However, the bricoleur in fact has a far more appropriate mentality for building our 
environments. This is “far more of a ‘real life’ specifi cation of what the architect-
urbanist is and does then any fantasy deriving from ‘methodology’ and ‘systemics’.” 
(Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 104). The bricoleur, “creating structures by means of events” 
is exactly the process carried out by the dweller of Heidegger’s farmhouse in the Black 
Forest and it is exactly what happens in the day to day repeating of poetic engagements 
we enact as dwellers. It is also inherently fragmentary. It recalls once again Ingold’s 
idea, fi rst introduced in the introduction to this thesis, that “the forms of buildings arise 
as a kind of crystallisation of human activity within an environment” (Ingold. 2000. 
186). Rowe and Koetter, however, continue this discussion architecturally.
They go on to discuss that the planning of cities should resemble the bricoleur’s 
mentality since there is never enough knowledge about such a complex system to 
accurately conceive a complete ‘scientist’ solution. For Rowe and Koetter this is 
evident in the same way that the idea of total politics, a complete ideology, has become 
understood as never suffi ciently nuanced. They point out that although we have become 
aware that the idea of ‘total’ politics is unsound, it is evident that we still think that the 
“physical counterpart” of total politics, total urbanism, is a desirable possibility.
For, if the notion of a ‘fi nal’ solution through a defi nitive accumulation of 
all data is, evidently, an epistemological chimera [...] if the inventory of 
‘facts’ can never be complete simply because of the rates of change and 
obsolescence, then, here and now, it surely might be possible to assert that 
the prospects of scientifi c city planning should, in reality, be regarded as 
equivalent to the prospects of scientifi c politics. (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 
105) 
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Planning, they say, cannot be scientifi c any more than politics can. We are constantly 
making do, accumulating new information as we progress. Whereas mass housing can 
be seen as symptom, cause, and manifestation of our homelessness, an environment of 
multiple fragments could be symptom, cause, and manifestation of our dwelling. 
As an example of a city built by bricolage they provide us with an image of Rome. 
They look to “the contradiction of seventeenth century Rome, to that collision of 
palaces, piazza and villas, to that inextricable fusion of imposition and accommodation, 
that highly successful and resilient traffi c jam of intentions, an anthology of closed 
compositions and ad hoc stuff in between” (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 106). They offer 
this Rome, the Rome of the Nolli plan, of the ad hoc in between, “as some sort of 
model which might be envisaged as alternative to the disastrous urbanism of social 
engineering and total design.” (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 107). This Rome, as mentioned 
by Freud is a rich changing complex place. The history of change is evident in its 
street patterns and spatial language. Rowe and Koetter are saying that an iterative 
constructing of fragments as opposed to a wholesale implementation of total design is 
a more fi tting way to structure change of our environment. In this way we can connect 
them to Heidegger and postulate that their theories provide an understanding of built 
environments which is conducive to dwelling in.
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A return to the farmhouse
One dwells, in a manner akin to Barthes’s co-creative reading, in a process of poetic 
recreating. An understanding of dwelling puts mankind in the world rather than apart 
from the world. This diversion from a mind/world understanding of the world as 
separate from us, to a Heideggerian in-the-world thinking changes architecture from full 
to empty and consequently from stifl ing to aiding our dwelling process. 
The understanding and design of built environments as found in the works of Serlio, 
Scharoun, Aalto, and Rowe and Koetter allow us to engage due to their particular 
type of emptiness discussed throughout this thesis. This is the emptiness that we need 
in order to poetically dwell. The way that we experience these places is built up in a 
process of bricolage, step by step, in a repeated process of poetic engagement. 
It might, in the end, be that the inhabitants of Heidegger’s Black Forest farmhouse built 
a house that is conducive to our dwelling. In Rowe and Koetter’s terms they built the 
farmhouse as a collection of ideal fragments. Consequently we can see that Heidegger’s 
farmhouse in the Black Forest may, in fact, be more suited to the dwelling of others 
than mass housing. However, this is not due to the relationship that its owners had with 
it but due to its fragmentary nature. It might have that particular emptiness that hints of 
incompleteness and potential. If we were to build by dwelling, the buildings we build 
could be seen as having this emptiness since they do not speak of a single intention 
but a myriad of moments. Buildings built in this fashion tend towards an impression 
of emptiness because they are built from the ground up as iterative responses, like my 
sketches. They would be without an over-arching complete concept planned from a 
position of mind/world separation as the traditional role of architecture understands 
building design. They would be ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand entities. They 
would be readable as a rich palimpsest of the history that had existed there.
Through the process of building accumulatively, perhaps over several years or decades 
the history of change would be evident. In In Praise of Shadows, a philosophical treatise 
on architecture and aesthetics, Jun’ichirō Tanizaki fi nds joy in the dark corners found 
in many traditional Japanese homes. These places by their nature require exploration, 
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experience and poetic inhabitation. They are incomplete in a way that only inhabitation 
can fi ll, and even then only temporarily (Tanizaki. 1977. 7). There is a mystery to them, 
like Magritte’s questions posed in his paintings. Tanizaki suggests that time stands still 
when experiencing these since one is so thoroughly engaged, “And even we as children 
would feel an inexpressible chill as we peered into the depths of an alcove to which the 
sunlight had never penetrated.” (Tanizaki. 1977. 33).
Additionally there is a depth that is created by long use and change. Tanizaki discusses 
what is so alluring about an artefact that has this depth 
As a general matter we fi nd it hard to be really at home with things that 
shine and glitter. The Westerner uses silver and steel and nickel tableware, 
and polishes it to a fi ne brilliance, but we [in the East] object to the practice. 
While we do sometimes indeed use silver for teakettles, decanters, or saké 
cups, we prefer not to polish it. On the contrary, we begin to enjoy it only 
when the lustre has worn off, when it has begun to take on a dark smoky 
patina. (Tanizaki. 1977. 18) 
We might fi nd an architectural implication of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling by 
embracing this richness. This, as with the Black Forest farmhouse’s fragments and 
Tanizaki’s patinas, allows us to engage poetically. Part of what is captivating about a 
sketch is that one can ‘see through’ to the thought at work. We can see the embodied 
process and we are able to access the thought. We are able to dwell within it. In this 
way we would have more with which to engage in spaces. This would be in a similar 
way that we fi nd ourselves engaging with artefacts made by hand or other engaged 
processes. We should not aim to make architecture complete. The life that is found in 
the fragmentary, the idiosyncratic, should be what we strive for. As with the farmhouse, 
buildings that embrace multiple fragmentary views are more suited to aiding our 
dwelling process.   
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Concluding remarks to the chapter
Heidegger’s comments on the farmhouse in the Black Forest, if taken literally and as 
explored in Chapter Two, suggest that we should build continually.
However it takes a long time for a society to build by dwelling and demands our 
continual building. The architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling, 
as explored through Heidegger’s texts, my creative practice, and architectural theory, 
suggest ways in which architects could build environments that are more amenable 
to dwelling. We shouldn’t aim to regress to a pre-division-of-labour period of an 
idealised agrarian past, ardently building as dwellers in the mountains, as Heidegger 
would have wished, nor should we continue to build with little consideration of how 
we bring places near. Instead of going backwards to a pre-industrial age, rose tinted 
and illusory, we could look forward to an architecture that does what dwellers do. The 
architectural profession, through an understanding of Heidegger, should be able to make 
evident more quickly what dwellers do slowly. This understanding would construct a 
particular kind of emptiness found in fragments that embraces potential and multiplicity. 
If this were the case, we would thereby allow ourselves to be set free to perceive the 
environment on our own terms.
This needn’t be a design manifesto, as though we could say, “If we do ‘A’ then ‘B’, an 
environment that aids dwelling will result.” Instead, the architectural implications of 
Heidegger’s concept of dwelling could be read as suggesting that a language of multiple 
fragments could be used as a manner of architectural critique. We could say, “This 
building is better than that building because it exhibits the qualities of fragments and is 
consequently more conducive to dwelling.”
The creation of environments in which we can dwell by building an emptiness and 
incompleteness is this thesis’s understanding of the architectural implications of 
Heidegger’s concept of dwelling. This can be realised by the accumulation of the ideal 
fragment. In a similar way to the emptiness and authorlessness found in texts, material 
patina, or language of multiple fragments in art, architectural richness must also be of 
fragments.
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A sense of emptiness, potential, perhaps found in the fragmentary, must be created in 
order for an environment to be engaged with. This emptiness is that which is conducive 
to individuals bringing places near. Some buildings help an individual remain near to 
an experience. However it is not just fi xing our memories that is required, a building 
must leave the inhabitant free. Heidegger says that these buildings are not objects that 
we read symbolism into, objects that are separate from us. Nor are they expressions of 
authorial meaning fi rst conceived then built, as the example of Dawkins’s top-down 
illustration conceives architecture. Fullness suppresses the individual. A building for 
dwelling in must have the essential emptiness that promotes the freedom of individual 
dwelling. 
This cannot guarantee dwelling, nothing ever can, but it does not suppress dwelling 
through overly prescriptive authorial voice. 
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Chapter outline
The aim of this dissertation has been to reappraise the later period philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger in an architectural light. This has been focussed on Heidegger’s concept of 
dwelling, particularly on his less frequently quoted essay ...Poetically Man Dwells... and 
the concept of poetry that was illuminated through creative practice. This has served 
to unravel previous architectural interpretations of Heidegger’s dwelling and suggests 
new links through the resultant concept of emptiness found through authorlessness and 
fragments. This shift towards viewing our dwelling as poetic also brings architectural 
writers and practitioners who may not have considered themselves Heideggerian fi rmly 
into the discussion of the architectural implications of his concept of dwelling. We can 
now connect the writings of Barthes, Hertzberger, and Rowe and Koetter to Heidegger’s 
texts in an architectural fashion. In this concluding chapter we will see these discussions 
summarised and the potential impact this research might have. 
Heidegger’s latter period of work shares with architecture a focus on the concept of 
place. However, forging links between the philosophy of place and the production 
of places has an inherent intellectual tension. How can philosophical theory wisely 
be applied to creative practice? Although Heidegger’s work has been explored 
architecturally before, most notably by Christian Norberg-Schulz (1980. 1985), due 
to underlying differences in philosophical positioning between the architectural 
profession’s and Heidegger’s conception of the environment, Heidegger’s philosophy 
was always interpreted by architects with the aim of fi nding methods to create products 
rather than processes. Whereas Heidegger says we make places meaningful to ourselves 
through what we might call the processional experience of being, Norberg-Schulz says 
that places can be made by uncovering meanings already present in the site. He says, 
“The existential purpose of building (architecture) is therefore to make a site become 
a place, that is, to uncover the meanings potentially present in the given environment.” 
(Norberg-Schulz. 1980. 18). This undermines the central idea of Heidegger’s that 
individuals poetically construct their own world image. 
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Heidegger’s thoughts on the nature of ‘place’ were amongst the most important in 
history (Casey. 1997). The fact that the architectural profession, those tasked with the 
creation and conservation of places, so misunderstands his philosophy is a problem 
that requires addressing. Even though some of what Heidegger says appears to be to 
the detriment of the architectural profession, as we have seen, an understanding of the 
architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling could ultimately serve to 
deepen our appreciation of how we relate to places. 
By using creative practice (physical thinking) to explore dwelling in the physical world 
this research explored relationships to places in a ‘hands-on’ fashion. This correlates 
directly with Heidegger’s philosophical ideas of embodied, ready-to-hand, reality. 
As we have seen, this idea that one must be ‘in’ the world to study the world’s effects 
has been described by a biographer as “studying the laws of free fall whilst falling” 
(Safranski. 1998. 107). Through this process I developed an understanding of the 
architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling that embraces this being-
in-the-world. The focus on this poetic aspect of dwelling, and the subsequent connection 
I made between Heidegger and ideas of authorlessness and fragments, provide new 
insight to the architectural understanding of dwelling.
This thesis has been structured so that an understanding of Heidegger’s texts were 
explored fi rst, both through textual analysis and self refl ective creative practice. This 
exploration was documented in Chapter One and illuminated the focus on poetry in his 
texts that has hitherto been largely ignored or misunderstood by architects. From this 
we can conclude that the discussions of dwelling that are based only on products are 
incapable of assisting our dwelling as explored in Heidegger’s philosophy. Following 
this, the implications that a poetic view of dwelling has on architecture were explored 
in Chapters Two and Three. In Chapter Two what Heidegger says about building for 
ourselves and why this confl icts with the architectural profession’s views of total control 
was explored. In Chapter Three the way that we might reconcile these two ideologies 
 - neither of which fully appreciates the other despite their common interest in ‘place’ - 
was explored, with a focus on emptiness, authorlessness, and multiple fragments as a 
means of allowing the poetic dwelling process to occur.
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In this concluding chapter the content of these discussions will be briefl y summarised. 
I will provide a summary of Heidegger’s dwelling interpreted through my own 
research practice, in which I carried out creative and textual refl ections infl uenced by 
Heideggerian philosophy. This interpretation led to my focus on the poetic engagement 
with places. Following this I will describe the architectural deductions that we can 
make from these conclusions involving both an analysis and critique of Heidegger’s 
architectural interpretation, and a solution that comes from a position of greater 
architectural insight. 
Progressing further than the thesis summary this concluding chapter will then consider 
the impact that this work may have on the architectural profession. I believe that 
this thesis alters the way that Heidegger may be used by architects. Following this 
I will discuss the potential implications that a reinvigorated interest in Heidegger’s 
philosophy, now understood as a poetic process, could have on the architectural 
profession, particularly in the potential for future speculative research into dwelling and 
sustainable development.
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Summary of Heidegger’s dwelling
As a means toward understanding Heidegger’s philosophy I began by trying to 
document my dwelling in the area in which I lived and worked. Through what was 
essentially an existential site survey I began to realise that the process of engaging was 
itself dwelling. It was this poetic process that was dwelling’s essence and by attempting 
to document dwelling I was, in fact, dwelling. The focussed engagement with places 
through creative practice illuminated the idea the dwelling is carried out through 
concern. We are always dwelling but engage with places to different degrees.
This shifted the view of what dwelling is away from considerations of the aesthetic 
conversations of Norberg-Schulz or Zumthor, that are so typical of the architectural 
profession’s obsession with surface aesthetics, and into a view of human interaction and 
engagement. 
Heidegger began his discussion in Building Dwelling Thinking with a worry that the 
problem of homelessness was not being suffi ciently addressed. First presented as a 
lecture in 1951 he stated that there was a gulf between the way that we dwell and the 
way that we build buildings. Consequently our ability to engage with places is reduced 
and we are left in a state of existential homelessness. This had occurred because we 
more frequently consider our environment as its objective, present-at-hand, abstractions 
rather than its qualities that are appreciated through lived experience.
With this worry, Heidegger refl ects a lament that occasionally runs through architectural 
discourse. Lewis Mumford, also writing in 1951, discussed the separation between 
emotions and facts in his book Art and Technics.  He stated that, “man’s spiritual life 
is limited to that part of it which directly or indirectly serves science and technics: all 
other interests and activities of the person are suppressed as “non-objective”, emotional, 
and therefore unreal.” (Mumford. 1951. 13). He then questioned a world without an 
appreciation of subjective qualities, “[…] if everything except technics is a nebulous 
whimsy, what is left of man except a living corpse […]?” (Mumford. 1951. 36). Other 
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books such as Rasmussen’s Experiencing Architecture (1959), and more recently 
Junhani Pallasmaa’s The Eyes of the Skin (2005) also develop the idea that the sensorial 
and ineffable aspects of space are as important as the aesthetic and the utilitarian. 
However, Heidegger’s ideas about dwelling progress further than these in exploring 
how it is that we dwell as a poetic process. This poetic nature of dwelling is a sense that 
our experience in the world is one of active involvement rather than passive reception of 
stimulating environments. Reality is a dance in which we are all involved. Or, to put it 
another way, there are no spectators in dwelling.
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The opposite of poetry in this sense is not prose. Poetry, understood by this thesis, 
stands for an act of engagement. Painting can be poetic, as can an experience of the 
environment. The opposite of poetic would be something like ambivalence, or non-
experiential. As with a poem that should not be read silently but out loud, poetic 
dwelling is fundamentally to be experienced. It is in the recreation by the reader that a 
poem’s rhythms and meanings come into being, outside of the moment of recitation a 
poem is just symbols on paper. In this way the reader is incorporated into the poem, a 
part of its existence. We have discussed Frost’s Atmosphere and Edwin Morgan’s For 
Bonfi res earlier in this thesis, now we can look to Morgan’s sound poem The Loch Ness 
Monster’s Song (Morgan. 1973b. 66) as a poem that is enhanced when audibly recited.1
Sssnnnwhuffffl l?
Hnwhuffl  hhnnwfl  hnfl  hfl ?
Gdroblboblhobngbl gbl gl g g g g glbgl.
Drublhafl ablhafl ubhafgabhafl hafl  fl  fl  –
gm grawwwww grf grawf awfgm graw gm.
Hovoplodok – doplodovok – plovodokot-doplodokosh?
Splgraw fok fok splgrafhatchgabrlgabrl fok splfok!
Zgra kra gka fok!
Grof grawff gahf?
Gombl mbl bl –
blm plm,
blm plm,
blm plm,
blp.
On the page the poem looks impenetrable, except for the pleasing arrangement of 
unusual letter combinations. Audibly however, the wet surfacing, lonely roaring, and 
subsequent re-submerging of the monster, leaving only a blp on the water’s surface, 
becomes evident. The poem has a greater impact when experienced than when glanced 
at ambivalently.
1 Readings by Morgan are recommended and widely available online, for instance at: http://www.
poetryarchive.org/poetryarchive/singlePoem.do?poemId=1683 [accessed 04/07/13]
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The idea of poetry is also of something richly multi-layered. There is depth that goes 
beyond the surface values. Shira Wolosky writes in Art of Poetry: How to read a poem 
that “poetry is a language in which every component element - word and word order, 
sound and pause, image and echo - is signifi cant, signifi cant in that every element points 
toward or stands for further relationships among and beyond themselves. Poetry is a 
language that always means more.” (Wolosky. 2001. 3). 
This engaged and multi-layered poetry is something that Heidegger found in the 
experience of the environment. Reading Heidegger we understand that we dwell 
more fully when we engage with places in a poetic fashion continually revising and 
reappraising our experiences with focussed concern rather than ambivalence.
It was my experiences with creative practice that made this interpretation of Heidegger 
evident. The act of sketching became understood as analogous to the process of 
dwelling in that they are both types of engagement that deepen one’s relationship with 
places. Just as the way a sketch slowly builds up, we can understand Heidegger as 
noting that we are continually making piecemeal memories of places in our minds. 
However, we are also continually losing connection with places as we forget our 
relationship with them, either through our absence or our ambivalence. Dwelling is 
therefore fundamentally impossible to complete in any way, underlined by Heidegger’s 
fi nishing statement of Building Dwelling Thinking, that the real plight of dwelling is that 
we must continually concern ourselves with dwelling lest we become homeless. This 
is at once cause for dismay and celebration. On the one hand Heidegger says that the 
human condition is one of incompleteness and we will never feel whole no matter what 
our lives consist of. On the other hand there is joy to be found in the continual poetics of 
experience, and new possibilities are always opening. 
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This key focus on poetic engagement being the foundation of our dwelling - elaborated 
upon by this thesis - suggested possible alternative interpretations of the architectural 
implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling. It unravels many previous 
interpretations by those in the architectural profession showing them to be concerned 
more with surface aesthetics and sensorially stimulating environments than with the 
more nuanced understanding of the process of dwelling and how we might encourage 
this.
A view of ourselves as poetic raises the importance of elements in the environment that 
were not previously considered architectural, a puddle in the pavement, an overhanging 
bush. A study of one’s poetic experiences in space must conclude that trees and cliffs 
share architectural merit with columns and walls. Therefore, an interpretation of 
Heidegger might have a focus on all space as interior space. We are always inside a 
space, the distinction between interior and exterior, even of man made or natural, is in 
this view secondary.
In order to enhance a poetic view of the environment we must release the perception 
of the environment from the grip of an authorial intention that demands we adhere to 
its concepts. This would be a kind of emptiness that hints at potential to dwell within. 
The concept of architectural emptiness, developed by this thesis is directly related to 
the ability for a dweller to poetically engage with a place. It is not the literal emptiness 
of a space that is of concern but the fi gurative emptiness that provides potential for 
interpretation. A poem asks questions of an individual who engages with it and a view 
of ourselves as poetic demands that the environment does not provide all our answers 
with a fi gurative fullness. The opposite of this emptiness is not solidity but unilateralism 
because in the unilateral only one voice can be accepted and we are all dwellers 
with our individually nuanced perceptions. The idea of buildings having symbolic 
pronouncements can be seen in a Heideggerian light as impediments of dwelling. 
This view raises the importance given to individual agency in the perception of the 
environment. Heidegger’s philosophy becomes an empowering idea of the importance 
of our own interpretation and recreation.
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Deductions of the architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling
One of the limitations of this thesis has been the lack of opportunity to build my own 
building, my own house by Walden pond or Black Forest farmhouse. This is something 
that I plan to develop in my own building practice that currently involves renovating 
my own house. However, it has been possible to extrapolate from the artefacts that I 
engaged with, such as sketches and photomontages, to larger artefacts like buildings 
since the constant factors were the central importance of experience and interpretation.
•
- Interpreting Heidegger’s farmhouse.
Discussed in Chapter Two, Heidegger used the example of a farmhouse in the Black 
Forest of Germany as an archetypal example of how dwelling was once carried out. 
This, like his etymological explorations of the terms building and dwelling, shows 
how the world had been in the past, before what he saw as the corrupting infl uence of 
modernity. This farmhouse was built by dwelling. Like our dwelling process it was 
built through the ongoing process of changes based on individual requirements. Like 
the sketch or photomontage the farmhouse develops moment by moment, building up 
the whole from various small decisions. What results is a building that is a palimpsest 
of the inhabitants’ lives. The changes over time are written in the building’s form and a 
sense of belonging has been engendered through ongoing labour and concern. Equally, 
the house should be considered as continually developing as the lives of its inhabitants 
change. We build, dwell, and think in a tripartite condition of “long experience and 
incessant practice” says Heidegger (1971a. 158). 
For Heidegger it seems that this emphasised the weakness of the architectural profession 
since it seeks to impose buildings atemporally. These are built in an instant and then 
considered complete. This separates the inhabitants from having a real concern of their 
environment, their poetic engagement is suppressed allowing them to tend towards 
Deductions of the architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling
244
homelessness. Additionally in the desire to retain control of a professional fi eld, and 
as discussed in chapter two by Hill (1998. 2003) and Till (2009) the architectural 
profession frequently denies the importance of individual agency in buildings.
However, there are major problems with Heidegger’s example that must be addressed. 
Whilst the farmhouse is an example of how dwelling occurred in the past, Heidegger 
does not elaborate on how these lessons might be appropriated for a contemporary 
solution. If we were all to build our own houses, continually and never completing, we 
would surely end up with an anarchic system of sprawling shanty towns. Although we 
may have built like this in the past, as Frampton notes, Heidegger’s view of building 
condemns us to perpetual movement (Frampton. 2002a. 29). 
Additionally, whilst one would fi nd one’s own home emotionally close, there is no 
guarantee that anyone else would feel concern for it. Heidegger’s farmhouse, indeed 
the entire farm, is an island. Heidegger is calling for individuals to be in control of 
their environment, but this only works if we revert to an idealised agrarian past. If his 
philosophy is to remain of use to the architectural profession - and there is no reason to 
suggest that this is what Heidegger wanted - a middle ground must be found where the 
poetic engagement of individuals is encouraged in a contemporary understanding. This 
is not a solution that demands the continual construction of buildings but one in which 
we are allowed the continual construction of ourselves, our memories and perceptions.
•
- An architectural interpretation.
Discussed in Chapter Three is a kind of emptiness that fi rst became clear in Heidegger’s 
example of the jug. This is a kind of emptiness that allows for potential using, and 
is aligned more to the emptiness of a piece of paper, not the absence in an empty 
cupboard. Allowing the poetry of experience in a kind of emptiness can be seen in 
the work of Roland Barthes who writes in The Death of the Author (1968) that the 
consideration of a text as being without authorial voice - we can suggest this is an 
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emptiness - provides far richer possibilities than considering only a single strict 
defi nition defi ned by the author, that we can see as a kind of fullness. Like poetry the 
authorless text lives in the individual as much as it exists on the page.
Our experiences in the environment could similarly be seen as fundamentally 
authorless. In the Greek tragedy described by Barthes only the watching audience sees 
between the actions of the characters. Only the audience understands the signifi cance of 
the misunderstandings and soliloquies, those characters in the play do not. Similarly, in 
spatial terms, whilst buildings comprise parts in the environment it is precisely the space 
between the buildings where we understand the environment and our place in it. It is 
where the buildings are not that we are poetic. A view of emptiness in the environment 
could be used as a basis for spatial critique. Buildings like Libeskind’s Jewish Museum 
in Berlin can be seen as full of symbolic intent, becoming impediments of our own 
poetic processes. 
Those spaces that have this emptiness more fully allow for an individual’s interpretation 
and can be seen as those that more fully allow our poetic process of dwelling. A way 
to encourage this emptiness could be to encourage a focus on a language of multiple 
fragments. Like Barthes’s play, Calvino’s Invisible Cities, Cézanne’s series of paintings 
of Mont Sainte Victoire, or my own exhibition of images relating to Perth Road, a 
variety of fragments of meaning and form provide gaps that allow one to enter with 
one’s own interpretation. We are invited in as poetic participants not just ambivalent 
viewers.
The observation brings architects like Atelier Bow-Wow into the discussion of 
Heideggerian dwelling. They write about and document many multi-layered ad hoc 
solutions to the extraordinarily dense population conditions in Tokyo in their book 
Pet Architecture (Yoshiharu. 2002) and can perhaps become seen as contemporary 
Heideggerians, without their prior knowledge. Architects such as Hans Scharoun 
evidence buildings that embrace multiplicity, complexity, and choice. Hertzberger’s 
philosophy of allowing individuals to use spaces in varieties of ways can be seen as 
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unwitting manifestation of a Heideggerian thought. Equally Alvar Aalto and other 
architects who embrace the richness of life, rather than deny it and attempt to conceive a 
building to suppress indeterminacy, can perhaps now begin to be seen as Heideggerians. 
On an urban scale of these architectural implications, writers such as Rowe and Koetter, 
who discuss the value of a series of fragmentary utopias rather than a single totalitarian 
whole in Collage City, are brought into the discussion of Heidegger’s concept of 
dwelling. They argue that any ‘solution’ to urban development is impossible since the 
system is fundamentally too complex. In place of this they advocate ad hoc piecemeal 
development that is familiar from my interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy.
Previously architects appealed to Heidegger through exhibiting a sensuous material 
choice. Zumthor’s statement regarding his thermal baths project in Vals, Switzerland, 
about which he said, “the mahogany in the changing rooms looks a little bit sexy, like 
on an ocean liner or a little bit like a brothel for a second, perhaps.” (Spier. 2001. 22) 
is a good example. However, this building remains over-full of the symbolic intent to 
create these emotions, leaving little room for reactions other than he prescribes.
The creation of spaces that allow the individual to poetically engage is more fully 
realised by those architects who develop conditions where interpretability is allowed. 
Although tactile materials are undoubtedly pleasant they remain unilateral in their 
purpose. Consequently, the language of multiple fragments, as seen in the examples 
above, to name just a few, is perhaps a more Heideggerian approach that embraces a 
variety of potential uses and supports our continual poetic dwelling process.
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Impact of thesis upon the architectural profession
Seen in the light of this thesis, architectural studies that include Heidegger’s philosophy 
should not be concerned only with a discussion of the product but also how this affects 
the ongoing and incomplete process of dwelling. It has been shown in these pages that 
this is not at all about vernacular architecture or the spirit of place, as suggested by 
Norberg-Schulz. Nor is it about a tactile material language. 
Instead this research opens up possibilities for further discussions and research. 
Primarily, Heidegger could be used in other discussions about the agency of individuals 
in the environment. This might occur in terms of individuals physically constructing 
their own environments, although as we have seen this can lead to problems and is not 
viable on a global basis. In the past, we engaged with places through building them. 
However this continual building can not engender a lasting system in which dwelling 
is encouraged since it is only interested in itself. Additionally in contemporary times 
self-building is less practicable, so what is required is the kind of buildings which do not 
suppress our poetic process of dwelling through their symbolic fullness. I believe that an 
alternative reading of the architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling 
is in the construction of environments by architects that attain towards emptiness, 
thereby allowing individuals to poetically construct their own relationships to places.
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Implications for future research
After the conclusions drawn by this thesis, that a language of multiple fragments is one 
way to open a building to dwelling and is a manifestation of a desirable authorless and 
empty environment in which we are free to dwell, I believe that we can speculate that 
Heidegger may have relevant implications on contemporary discussions of sustainable 
environments. This section is speculative but could provide grounding for future 
research.
This speculation, based on the research of this thesis, is not in keeping with the way that 
Heidegger is sometimes discussed as an environmentalist so a distinction should briefl y 
be made. This view often comes from a misunderstanding of his words ‘spare’ and 
‘preserve’ that suggest once again that one is sparing and preserving something physical 
rather than one’s memories and associations. David Seamon provides a good example 
of this misunderstanding. Dwelling, he says, “is sparing and preserving - the kindly 
concern for land, things and people as they are and as they can become.” (Seamon. 
1979. 92). This is not in keeping with Heidegger’s philosophy. As we saw in Chapter 
One, we spare and preserve our memories. 
Equally, the incorrect association drawn by some between Heidegger and vernacular 
architectural styles sometimes places him alongside those who state that self-building is 
inherently low-tech and sustainable. This is found in the premise of books like Olsen’s 
Handmade Houses – A century of earth-friendly home design, that express an idea 
linking simplicity, recycled materials, handmade products, and ecological awareness 
in a mix that is assumed to be self evident. Olsen says that “these daring, boldly 
creative designers and builders [...] sought to create a simplifi ed, down-to-earth kind 
of house amid a world of political and environmental upheaval and rapid technological 
transformation.” (Olsen. 2012. Inside front cover). There is frequently a tendency 
from such view points to equate simplicity with integrity and ecology, in opposition to 
complexity and rampant capitalist consumption.
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This linking of low-tech and ecology is an easy one to make but as pointed out by 
Stuart Walker in Sustainable by Design is fundamentally fl awed. He notes that one of 
the aims of many sustainable strategies is to regain some kind of kinship with nature. 
These strategies often argue that “through the right effort and right judgement, we can 
regain this lost idyll.” (Walker. 2006. 18). However, Walker suggests that this feeling of 
loss, a manifestation of Heidegger’s ideas of homelessness perhaps, are in fact part of 
the human condition and have been expressed throughout time. What else is the story of 
Adam and Eve’s ejection from Eden except a suggestion that we had what we desire and 
somehow lost it? Walker says that, 
These ideas are anything but new, in fact they are a constant theme 
throughout human history. Our yearnings are always for a paradise that has 
been lost through our own making – through foolishness, corruption and 
greed; such stories appear time and time again in the world’s mythologies 
and religious texts. (Walker. 2006. 18)
There are many points on the benefi ts of handmade houses that Olsen and this thesis are 
in agreement on. The relationship that the builder develops with the house for instance. 
However, it should be noted that this needn’t have anything to do with ecological 
sensitivity, we might as well equate hand made buildings to low density urban sprawl 
rather than low impact material choice. Olsen argues that handmade houses have a 
feeling of primitiveness and are always “low-tech, if not anti-tech.” (Olsen. 2012. 11). 
Whilst it is true that joy might be found in “taking control of your life” (Olsen. 2012. 
12) primitiveness needn’t be a prerequisite of building one’s own home. 
The way in which Heidegger might contribute to the contemporary discussion of 
sustainable design is through the idea of stewardship. To think back to the sense of 
belonging I felt in my tent and on my bike whilst cycling in France, and the care that 
I extended towards these two things, suggests a Heideggerian approach to looking 
after that which one perceives as ‘near’. The process of dwelling engenders a sense of 
ownership of places in an individual and this could possibly be explored as a means 
for embracing sustainable desires. We often consider only ‘nature’ as that which 
should be preserved whilst ignoring our major habitat, the city. Arguably this results 
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in the fetishisation of nature as some kind of ‘other’ thereby pushing it out of our day 
to day consciousness. Kemal and Gaskell note in Nature, fi ne arts, and aesthetics 
that in large city parks and public nature reserves, “This democritization of nature, 
though, has increasingly taken the form of individuals consuming the product ‘natural 
landscape.’” (Kemal & Gaskell. 1993. 16). How might we instead reintegrate a desire 
for stewardship of our environment in an urban context?
In Nature by Design David Orr argues that we need a rethinking of our material 
culture and the way we interact with the world before any real progress can be made in 
sustainable design. “The greatest impediment to an ecological design revolution is not, 
however, technological or scientifi c, but rather human.” He says, 
A real design revolution will have to transform human intentions and 
the larger political, economic, and institutional structure that permitted 
ecological degradation in the fi rst place. [...]The success of ecological 
design will depend on our ability to cultivate a deeper sense of connection 
and obligation without which few people will be willing to make much 
difference. (Orr. 2004. 23)
This deeper sense of connection is precisely what is engendered by Heidegger’s concept 
of dwelling. For Heidegger dwelling is an ideal relationship that we can have with 
places. This is also one goal of the ecological movement. 
Additionally, Heidegger’s philosophy is of the oneness of all things, the earth, sky, 
divinities, and mortals each exist symbiotically with one another. This places individuals 
fi rmly as part of the world, not separate from it. “Separation is unwelcome because it 
allows people to feel an artifi cial superiority over the world and over other humans, 
perhaps encouraging them towards inappropriate attempts at control,” notes Adam Sharr 
(2007. 86). This awareness of being a part of an overall system could be required in 
order to become a truly self suffi cient society.
The connection between individual control, belonging and stewardship, and the desire 
for sustainable solutions could perhaps be explored further in my work after the 
completion of this PhD. 
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Heidegger stresses the importance of one’s poetic relationship with places. It is possible 
that the contemporary global focus on sustainability could provide an opportunity for 
a renewed interest in the importance of Heidegger’s philosophy. This might be a view 
of sustainability that is based, like the research carried out in this thesis, on ideals of 
experiential qualities, continual incremental change, and poetic engagement.
Implications for future research
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